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Abstract 
This dissertation is the first major study of a slave trade that captured up to one million 
slaves along the Russian and Iranian frontiers over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries alone. Slaves served as farm-workers, herdsmen, craftsmen, soldiers, concubines, and 
even, in rare cases, as high-ranking officials in the region between the Caspian Sea and westernmost 
China. Most of these slaves were Shīʿites who were captured by Sunni Turkmens and sold in 
Central Asian cities and towns. Despite the Central Asian slave trade’s impressive dimensions, and 
the prominent role of slaves in the region’s history, the topic remains largely unstudied by historians 
of the region and of the broader Islamic world.  Drawing on unpublished autobiographical sources 
and eyewitness accounts, I argue that slaves’ resistance and resourcefulness helped to define the 
contours of the slave labor system and played a key, unacknowledged role in their emancipation. 
While previous studies of slavery in the Muslim world have emphasized the role of colonial 
governments in fostering abolition, I argue that slaves in Central Asia, by fomenting the largest 
slave uprising in the region’s history, triggered the abolition of slavery in the region as a whole.  
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Introduction: Slavery and Imperialism in Central Asia  
  
“The indolent, enervated Orientals may still regard with bitter resentment 
and rancor the efforts of Europe in the cause of humanity; but the sale and 
purchase of human beings is everywhere practiced with a certain reserve 
arising from a sense of shame, or, to speak more correctly, of fear of 
European eyes. This trade is now to be found unfettered and 
unembarrassed only in Central Asia.” 
           Arminius Vambery, Sketches of Central Asia, 1868
1
 
 
 
By the time of the Russian conquest of Central Asia in the 1860s and 70s, the region’s social 
landscape had been impacted by a millennium of slavery. Slaves served as farm-workers, 
herdsmen, craftsmen, soldiers, concubines, and even, in rare cases, as high-ranking officials in 
the region between the Caspian Sea and westernmost China. The institution of slavery in the 
region had never been seriously challenged by any internal or external forces down to the 
nineteenth century. It thrived especially in the khanates of Khwarazm and Bukhara. As the 
nineteenth century wore on, however, negotiations over the release of slaves began to factor 
heavily in these khanates’ relationship to Iran, Russia, and Great Britain. By the end of the 
century, tens of thousands of slaves would be free.  
                                                 
1
 Arminius Vambery, Sketches of Central Asia (London: W.H. Allen, 1868), 205. 
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 This dissertation examines the period from 1750-1873, which saw both the flourishing of 
the Central Asia’s slave trade and its collapse, and it focuses in particular on the region 
extending from Khurasan in the south to the Kazakh-Russian frontier in the north, and 
encompassing Khwarazm, Bukhara and their environs.
2
 It is not a political history of Central 
Asia, nor another diplomatic history of the so-called “Great Game.” Rather, the purpose of this 
dissertation is to advance three arguments about slavery and abolition in the region. First, I 
explore the ways in which slaves influenced the nature of their captivity through their own 
initiatives and ingenuity, and I argue that slaves’ resistance, rather than Russian military 
intervention, was the driving force of abolition in the region. Second, using evidence from 
slaves’ testimonials, I argue that slavery in the region was a largely rural and agricultural 
phenomenon, and that the trade in slaves was generally conducted across caravan routes. Slavery 
in Muslim Central Asia thus offers an important contrast to other parts of the Islamic world, 
where the urban and military dimensions of slavery were more prominent. Finally, I challenge 
the historiographical consensus that Russian military force ended the slave trade, demonstrating 
that the trade’s decentralized nature made it impossible to police. I also present a number of case 
studies that show how Russian efforts toward fostering abolition often had ulterior motives as 
well as wildly mixed results. I conclude by showing how slaves in the khanate of Khwarazm 
launched an uprising, little-known even among historians of Central Asia, which served as the 
catalyst for abolition in the region as a whole. 
                                                 
2
 Slavery was also prominent in other regions of Central Asia, such as Afghanistan and East Turkistan, but I have 
chosen not to cover those regions in the present work in part because, as we shall see, the region extending from 
Khurasan north across the Caspian coast and along the Russian-Kazakh frontier can be considered a distinct and 
bounded (albeit roughly) ecosystem in which slaves circulated. The slave trade in East Turkistan, for example, 
which revolved around Tarim Basin trade networks and also involved Chinese slaves and Chinese traders, is 
deserving of separate study, and Laura Newby (see above) has broken ground in that effort. A recent dissertation by 
Benjamin Levey has offered groundbreaking insights into the fate of slaves along China’s Kazakh frontier: “Jungar 
Refugees and the Making of Empire on Qing China’s Kazakh Frontier, 1759-1773” (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard 
University, 2013).  
3 
 
 While evidence of slavery and the slave trade in Central Asia is plentiful, scholarship on 
it is nearly non-existent.
3
 This is not surprising, as the scarcity of research on slavery in Islamic 
Central Asia mirrors the broader scarcity of research on slavery anywhere the Muslim world. (In 
Joseph C. Miller’s comprehensive bibliography of scholarly works on slavery, published in 
1999, we find a table showing the distribution of works on the subject according to their 
geographical focus: among the thousands of works on slavery published between 1900 and 1991, 
a mere 3.3% focused on the Muslim world. Between 1992 and 1996, the proportion dipped 
slightly, to an even 3%.
4
) Fortunately, the last two decades have seen an increased interest in 
Muslim slave systems, particularly in Ottoman contexts. The burgeoning study of slavery in the 
Muslim world has tended to follow trends visible in the broader historiography of global slavery. 
In recent years, for example, there has been a pronounced shift in emphasis from the institutional 
and material study of slavery (legal conceptions, trade volume, and so on) to what might be 
termed a historical ethnography of the slaves themselves.
5
 Whereas in earlier works the 
infrastructure of slavery emerged at the expense of a clear sense for individual experiences, more 
recent works have often privileged the individual at the expense of the larger framework in 
which the slave was enmeshed.  
 The rise of the “ethnographic approach” to slavery is predicated on a luxury of pre-
existing groundwork which scholarship on Central Asia is lacking. Scholars who explore the 
                                                 
3
 The only monograph on the topic remains a slim but important Soviet-era volume in Uzbek, by Tursun Faiziev: 
Buxoro feodal jamiyatida qullardan foidalanishga doir hujjatlar (XIX asr) (Tashkent: Fan Nashriyoti, 1990). Some 
related articles of note include Laura Newby, “Bondage on Qing China’s North-Western Frontier,” Modern Asian 
Studies 46:7 (2012), 1-27; Scott Levi, “Hindus Beyond the Hindu Kush: Indians in the Central Asian Slave Trade," 
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 12/3 [2002]: 277-288); and Benjamin Hopkins, “Race, Sex, and Slavery: 
‘Forced Labor’ in Central Asia and Afghanistan in the Early 19th Century,” Modern Asian Studies 42:2 (2008), 629-
71.  
4
 Joseph C. Miller, Slavery and slaving in world history: a bibliography, 2 vols. (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 
1999), xi-xii. 
5
 Recent examples of this approach include Ehud R. Toledano, As If Silent and Absent: Bonds of Enslavement in the 
Islamic Middle East (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); and Eve Troutt Powell, Tell This in My Memory: 
Stories of Enslavement from Egypt, Sudan and the Ottoman Empire (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012). 
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experiences of an individual slave in Istanbul or Baltimore can do so with the ease of knowing 
that the basic features of Ottoman and American slavery have been clarified elsewhere; they can 
even take for granted that a sizable audience for their work will already be familiar with this 
background. A historian who attempts a history of Central Asian slavery has no such luxury. 
Fortunately, the task of building foundations is made less discouraging by the sheer abundance 
of primary sources on the subject, which span every type from census records to firsthand 
narratives by former-slaves (a genre which has generally been absent from researches into the 
Ottoman world).
6
 Thanks to this wealth of material, I will provide a general overview of the 
institution of slavery and its economy in the region, while also offering case-studies of individual 
slaves based both on their own testimony and on eyewitness accounts. 
 Another feature widely shared among works on slavery in Muslim societies is a tendency 
to divide slave labor systems into discrete spheres, each corresponding to particular jobs and 
spaces: military slavery, domestic slavery, harem slavery, and so on. (Specialists have emerged 
in the study of particular spheres: we have, for example, David Ayalon’s remarkable body of 
work on the Mamlūk military slave system.7) Here, I will likewise examine the specific jobs 
undertaken by slaves and the places they inhabited, but, whenever possible, I will take a more 
holistic view, considering how slaves’ occupations fit into the broader narrative of their lives and 
experiences. This approach is particularly appropriate for the Central Asian context, in which an 
individual slave could occupy many different spaces and perform many different kinds of labor 
over the course of his or her life.   
                                                 
6
 On the relative lack of firsthand slave narratives in the Ottoman context see, for example, Y. Hakan Erdem, 
“Slavery and social life in nineteenth-century Turco-Egyptian Khartoum,” in Terence Walz and Kenneth M. Cuno, 
eds., Race and Slavery in the Middle East: Histories of Trans-Saharan Africans in 19th-Century Egypt, Sudan, and 
the Ottoman Mediterranean (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2010), 125.  
7
 See David Ayalon, The Mamluk Military Society: Collected Studies (London: Varorium, 1979) 
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 While I will focus here on slavery in the Muslim societies of Central Asia, it is important 
to observe that slavery was not introduced to the region by Muslims, and neither were captive-
taking and slave-owning exclusive to Muslims. Furthermore, as I will show, Muslim Central 
Asia was home to a great diversity of slave systems, some of which invite comparisons beyond 
the Muslim world.
8
 In Khwarazm, for example, where we find slaves laboring on large 
agricultural estates, the prevailing system of slavery shares more common features with 
plantation slavery in the American South than it does with urban slavery in Istanbul. Slavery 
among the nomadic Kazakhs, meanwhile, shares more in common with slavery among nomadic 
non-Muslim groups such as the Mongols than with either Khwarazm’s plantation slavery or 
Istanbul’s urban slavery. Aside from its diversity of forms, the extensiveness of slave-owning 
also varied by region: even as the trade thrived in Khwarazm and Bukhara, it remained strikingly 
small in scale in the neighboring Muslim khanate of Kokand.
9
  
 Given the above, it is best to think of Central Asian slavery as a regional phenomenon 
rather than as a religious one.
10
 While Hanafi law, in theory, governed the slave system, and 
religious differences usually distinguished slaves from their owners, slavery among Muslims was 
merely the continuation—amended with certain religiously-informed cultural adaptations—of a 
                                                 
8
 The terminology of slavery in Central Asia is vast—ghulām, qul, chūrī, and mamlūk are just a few of the many 
terms for slaves that we shall encounter over the course of this dissertation—and the word “slave” is hardly adequate 
in reflecting that diversity. What unites the roles defined by all of these terms is best captured in Seymour 
Drescher’s definition of slavery: “The most crucial and frequently utilized aspect of the condition [of slavery] is a 
communally recognized right by some individuals to possess, buy, sell, discipline, transport, liberate, or otherwise 
dispose of the bodies and behavior of other individuals” (Drescher, Abolition: A History of Slavery and Anti-Slavery 
[Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009], 4-5).    
9
 The main reason for this is likely Kokand’s relative distance from Khurasan, the region that supplied most of the 
slaves kept in Khwārazm and Bukhara.  
10
 This approach contrasts with that taken by a number of recent works on “Muslim” slavery, most notably William 
Gervase Clarence-Smith’s ambitious comparative synthesis, Islam and the Abolition of Slavery (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
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region-wide phenomenon that can be traced into the distant pre-Islamic past, as well as into 
neighboring, contemporary, non-Muslim societies.
11
 
 
A Shared Culture of Captive-Taking  
As we shall see, the slave trade played a major part in both Russian and Iranian diplomatic 
engagement with Central Asia throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The rulers of 
Khwarazm and Bukhara in particular were blamed for encouraging captive-taking, for providing 
markets for slaves, and for maintaining tens of thousands of slaves in bondage. When it came to 
the actual taking and selling of captives, however, the blame cast by foreign statesmen, 
diplomats, and adventurers fell squarely upon nomadic Turkmens and Kazakhs.   
 The near-exclusive focus of foreign observers—particularly Russian and British ones—
on slave-trading and captivity among the Turkmens and Kazakhs has obscured a larger truth 
about slavery and Eurasian warfare before the twentieth century: captive-taking was central to it, 
and significant armed conflicts almost invariably involved the phenomenon of mass captivity. 
The Qajars and Russians themselves engaged in both captive-taking and in the ransom economy, 
                                                 
11 
The last two decades have seen the steady development of research on Eurasian slavery beyond Central Asia, and 
I will mention just a few notable works here. On slavery in pre-modern Central Asia, see Peter B. Golden, “The 
Terminology of Slavery and Servitude in Medieval Turkic,” in Devin DeWeese, ed., Studies on Central Asia in 
Honor of Yuri Bregel (Boomington: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 2001),  27-56; on slavery in early 
modern China, see Pamela K. Crossley, “Slavery in Early-Modern China,” in David Eltis and Stanley Engerman, 
eds., The Cambridge World History of Slavery, Vol. 3 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 186-
216; on South Asian slavery, see Indrani Chatterjee and Richard M. Eaton, eds., Slavery & South Asian History 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006). On slavery in Iran (still a relatively little-studied topic), see Thomas 
Ricks, “Slaves and Slave-Trading in Shi’i Iran, AD 1500-1900,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 36/4 (2001), 
407-418; and Behnaz A. Mirzai, “Slavery, the abolition of the slave trade, and the emancipation of slaves in Iran 
(1828-1928),” (Ph.D. Dissertation, York University, 2004). Valuable studies of slavery and the slave trade in regions 
to the west and southwest of Central Asia can be found in Christoph Witzenrath, ed., Eurasian Slavery, Ransom and 
Abolition in World History, 1200–1860 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2015).  
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and even while deploring the barbarity of enslavement among the nomads, they made little effort 
to hide their own parallel efforts to deprive rivals, including non-combatants, of their freedom. 
Examples are legion, especially in “official” Persian and Chaghatay chronicles, which often brag 
of captive-taking as if it was a hallmark of victory in battle.  
The chroniclers had much to brag about on that front, and Turkmens—the most notorious 
captive-takers in the region’s history—were often themselves the captives in question. In the 
Ma’āṣir-i sulṭānīya of ʿAbd al-Razzāq Dunbulī, the court historian of ʿAbbās Mīrzā (1789-
1833), multiple assaults by the Shah’s armies—invariably characterized as reprisals for 
Turkmens’ plundering—on Yomuts, Göklengs and Tekes result in captivity for these Turkmens. 
In 1792, according to the chronicle, during a Qajar assault on the Yomuts and others in the 
vicinity of Astarabad, “great numbers of them were put to death or reduced to slavery and 
captivity, and on the highways were built minarets constructed with their heads.”12  In 1803-4, 
according to the same chronicle, Yomuts and Göklengs living along the banks of the Gurgen 
River, who had formerly been tax-paying subjects of the Qajars, were allegedly making trouble 
in the region and refused to pay taxes; the Shah’s retinue attacked the Turkmens, burning their 
tents and taking their wives, daughters, and sons into captivity. Those left alive agreed to pay 
their dues.
13
 Ten years later, in 1813, the Shah’s troops intercepted a host of Tekes, claimed by 
the chronicler to be in the employ of Khwarazm, that had been staging attacks on the towns of 
Sabzavar and Juvayni. The Tekes were stripped of their loot and their prisoners; forty of them 
were killed, and 100 were taken captive by the Qajar army and sent to Tehran. Considering the 
damage insufficient, the Shah delegated Muḥammad Qulī Mīrzā, who was at that time governor 
                                                 
12
 Harford Jones Brydges, The Dynasty of the Kajars (London: John Bohn, 1833), 22 
13
 Materiali po istorii turkmen i turkmenii, t. II. XVI-XIX vv. Iranskie,bukharskie, i khivinskie istochniki (Mosow: 
1938-39), 217   
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of Mazandaran and Astarabad, to launch a massive assault on the Tekes. In the attack which 
followed, the Ma’āṣir-i sulṭāniya claims that some 2,000 Teke men, women and children were 
taken captive, and that 50,000 camels, oxen, sheep, horses, and mares were stolen. Some Iranians 
who had been held among the Tekes—including pilgrims to Mashhad and merchants—were 
freed in the course of the attack.
14
  Similar incidents can be observed in nearly every major 
Persian chronicle concerning Khurasan in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
15
  
 At times the Turkmens would complain of Qajar captive-taking to Russian officials, who 
were simultaneously hearing similar complaints about the Turkmens from the Qajars. Thus, in 
1828, some Turkmen leaders from the Caspian coast informed the Russians that many of their 
people were still held in Iran even after a peace agreement had been concluded, inspiring 
resentment in their communities.
16
 Russian sympathies tended overwhelmingly to fall on the side 
of the Iranians, however, as have the sympathies of historians in the generations since. The idea 
of Turkmens as perennial persecutors and Iranians as their perennial victims is etched so deeply 
in the historiography of nineteenth-century Central Asia that it has become a kind of leitmotif. 
We see this, for example, in the kitschy title of Charles Marvin’s earnest and classic work on 
Merv in the nineteenth century: Merv, Queen of the World, and the Scourge of the Man-Stealing 
Turcomans,
17
 and in the terrifying Turkmen brigands of The Adventures of Hajji Baba of 
                                                 
14
 Materiali po istorii turkmen i turkmenii, t. II, 218 
15
 In 1841, for example, a Qajar force of 22,000 attacked more than 20 Turkmen auls, making off with 1,200 camels, 
30,000 sheep, 7,000 horses, and 150 captives (Russko-turkmenskie otnosheniia v XVIII-XIX vv., 339, doc. no. 245). 
In 1861, a Qajar unit assaulting Yomut settlements along the Atrek River stole 1,000 camels, 12,000 sheep, and 15 
elderly Turkmen women; the reason, evidently, was that these Yomuts refused to become Qajar citizens and to 
surrender the Iranian captives held among them (ibid, 505-506, doc. no. 374).  
16
 Russko-turkmenskie otnosheniia v XVIII-XIX vv., 259, doc. no. 174. It is revealing that, in this document, the 
Turkmens kept in Iran are referred to as being held “under arrest” (pod arestom)—a markedly different terminology 
than the language of captives (plenniki) and slaves (raby, nevol’niki) typically used to describe Iranians taken by the 
Turkmens.  
17
 Marvin, Merv, Queen of the World, and the Scourge of the Man-Stealing Turcomans (London: W.H. Allen, 1881). 
9 
 
Ispahan, James Justinian Morier’s once-beloved picaresque novel.18 Depictions of Iranians in 
nineteenth-century European literature are likewise generally negative, but they are relatively 
multifaceted, drawing on a wider array of stereotypes; the Turkmens, however, were either 
barbarous slave-raiders or slave-raiding barbarians, and nothing more, though on occasion one 
finds an appreciative word or two concerning their audacity.   
Rare European accounts exist, nevertheless, which detail the horrific cruelty suffered by 
some Turkmen captives in Iran. N.G. Petrusevich, a Russian officer and scientist who was killed 
at the siege of Dengil Teppe, reported that in 1861, not long after the disastrous Qajar attempt to 
take Merv from the Teke Turkmens, these Turkmens assembled a large force and began raiding 
the villages around Mashhad. Qajar troops intervened and many of the Tekes were killed; up to 
100 were taken captive. Petrusevich describes their terrible fate:
19
 
There followed an order by the Shah to deliver the captives to Tehran, and so, in groups 
of several individuals, they were shackled by the hands and feet to a single iron rod and 
driven on foot to Tehran, which was over 1,000 versts from Mashhad. The Shah, wishing 
to reassure the populace, which was displeased with the shameful showing of the 
substantial army [which had been defeated at Merv], ordered that all the captives be 
executed in front of the gates of the city. His ministers decided, for the public’s great 
entertainment [dlia bol’shego naslazhdeniia publiki], to tie the captives to the city walls 
and begin shooting them at a distance of 300 paces. It should be clear enough that the 
regular infantry [sarbazy], never having been trained in arming and firing flintlocks, 
could not manage to hit the living targets which were laid out so far from them, such that 
the pleasure of shooting could last until evening, subjecting the unfortunate Turkmen to 
the torments of hell. Learning of these barbaric orders, all of the ambassadors 
immediately appealed for the abolition of such executions. But it was too late: the 
execution took place, though only when the infantry were summoned closer. Regardless, 
the shooting still continued until evening. Some of the bullets hit not the captives, but the 
ropes by which they were tied. Thus untied, they would come forward and sit before the 
                                                 
18
 Morier, The Adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan (London: MacMillan, 1902).  
19
 Petrusevich, “Turkmeny mezhdu starym’ ruslom’ Amu-Daryi (Uzboem’) i severnymi okrainami Persii,” Zapiski 
kavkazskago otdela imperatorskago russkago geograficheskago obshchestva, Vol. 11 (Tbilisi, 1880), 53-54; see also 
A. Rzhevuskii, “Ot tiflisa do Dengil’-tepe,” Voennyi sbornik 8 (1884), 285.  
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infantrymen, in hopes that they would depart from this life more quickly if they were 
closer to the infantry, since they had no hope for mercy. 
 
 Another revolting “entertainment” was observed in 1875, and is worth retelling here both 
because it is one of the few accounts concerning the fate of Turkmen captives in Iran and 
because it speaks volumes about the extraordinary bitterness that could characterize the 
Turkmen-Qajar relationship:
20
 
In 1875, the brother of the current Shah was appointed governor of Khurasan. The 
administration of Khurasan decided to honor his arrival at Mashhad, Khurasan’s capital, 
by sacrificing Turkmen captives. They prepared twenty of them for this, and when the 
new governor arrived the captives were raised up on bayonets before him, one after 
another, so they could be seen by him and by the majority of the people who had gathered 
to welcome the Shah’s brother. What must have been the mortal agony of the captives 
can be ascertained from the fact that the last of them, when it was his turn to be raised on 
bayonets, tried to offer 2,000 tumans (8,000 rubles at the going rate) to ransom himself. 
But his offer was not accepted. His hopes were dashed, and he had to go forth to be 
impaled. He did not make it, however: death overtook him beforehand, and he fell dead 
in front of the governor and the whole gathering. 
 
  Turkmens as well as Kazakhs were also taken into captivity in Khwarazm and Bukhara, 
and according to the chronicles produced in both of these domains the Khwarazmians and 
Bukharans also very frequently seized one-another’s subjects in warfare.21 The Khivan chronicle 
Firdaws al-iqbāl contains no fewer than nineteen references to conflicts in which “innumerable,” 
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 Petrusevich, “Turkmeny mezhdu starym’ ruslom’ Amu-Daryi (Uzboem’) i severnymi okrainami Persii,” 54; 
Rzhevuskii, “Ot tiflisa do Dengil’-tepe,” 285. Petrusevich meditated on the implications of this repulsive scene: “It 
stands to reason that, having neighbors characterized by such a disposition—and despite the fact that Persia is still 
seen as a beacon of civilization, tending to mitigate human cruelty and inspire a more rational vision of human 
life—the Turkmen have had nowhere else from which to receive examples of kind-heartedness, and it is for that 
reason that they remain primitive in their savagery” (Petrusevich, op cit, 54).  
21
 Baron Meyendorff recounted meeting a group of Uzbeks in Bukhara who boasted, “if the Khan would only give 
us permission, we would revenge ourselves on the Khivans by conquering them, killing or taking them prisoners, as 
we did 10 years ago” (Georg von Baron Meyendorff, A Journey from Orenburg to Bukhara in the Year 1820 
[Calcutta, 1870], 41).  
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“countless,” or “numerous” prisoners were taken (not including one which resulted in “an 
unspeakable number” of captives), 22 as well as dozens of other mentions of captives being taken 
in known or estimable numbers. Naturally, the elaborate bravado of the genre must be kept in 
mind, and some of these numbered or numberless victims may have been simply rhetorical 
embroidery. A typical passage informs us that in one battle between the Khivan army and a 
Qongrat detachment, “the ever-victorious [Khivan] army captured rich booty and innumerable 
prisoners. Thanks to his royal majesty’s valor and courage this large army, as numerous as ants 
and locusts, was utterly destroyed and the late khan gained victory. No brave warrior except his 
majesty ever gained such a marvelous result.”23  
 Whatever the exaggerations involved, the nearly constant reference to captive-taking in 
the region’s chronicles is revealing. It reveals the normative quality of captivity as a result of 
warfare, as well as the prestige related to taking captives. Prisoners-of-war were listed among the 
other spoils of battle—such as camels, horses, and sheep—and were a hallmark of victory.24 
Combatants and non-combatants alike were captured, though the capture of young women seems 
to have held particular appeal in, for example, the world of the Firdaws al-iqbāl, and we learn 
that spoils—women among them—were divided between warriors and elites. Concerning the 
aftermath of one battle, Munis and Āgāhī write that “When the raiders gathered under the 
victorious banner, his majesty divided the booty amongst the troops, and everyone received a 
great amount of property… Among the prisoners were thirty seven virgin girls of perfect beauty 
and exceptional slenderness. His majesty entrusted the prisoners to reliable and virtuous people 
                                                 
22
 Shīr Muḥammad Mīrāb Munis and Muḥammad Rizā Mīrāb Āgāhī, Firdaws al-iqbāl: History of Khorezm, trans. 
Yuri Bregel (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 118, 194, 196, 205, 210, 211, 220, 221, 297, 305, 307, 309, 331, 389, 397, 398, 
448, 503, 645.  
23
 Firdaws al-iqbāl, 211. 
24
 E.g., “They continued to pursue the fleeing [Turkmens] till the time of night prayers, killed many of them, took 
some prisoners, captured many women and children, seized ten thousand sheep as booty and went back” (Firdaws 
al-iqbāl, 197).  
12 
 
and went home victorious and triumphant.”25 After a particularly successful struggle in which 
Khivan and Yomut forces teamed up against the Kazakhs, we learn that “the ever-victorious 
troops captured plenty of booty and innumerable prisoners, including more than 100,000 sheep 
and more than 40,000 camels; and from this one may have some idea about the rest of the booty. 
There were 500 virgin girls among the prisoners, and from this one may estimate the number of 
other prisoners. The daughters and harems of Jantu Töre and Ayten Töre, sons of [the Kazakh 
Lesser Horde leader] Bölekey Khan, we also captured. One wife of Burkut Bay Biy and his 
young sons were also taken prisoner.”26  
 While we may assume that young women taken as captives tended to end up in the 
harems of elites, there is little clear information on what became of the other captives taken by 
Khivan, Bukharan, or Iranian armies. Arminius Vambery, in one of the only extant descriptions 
concerning Turkmen captives in Central Asia, claims to have seen three hundred Chawdur 
“prisoners of war” awaiting their fate in Bukhara. “They were separated into two divisions,” he 
writes, “namely, such as had not yet reached their fortieth year, and were to be sold as slaves, or 
to be made use of as presents, and such as from their rank or age were regarded as Aksakals 
(grey beards) or leaders, and who were to suffer the punishment imposed by the Khan.” The 
former were led away in groups of ten or fifteen, chained together by their iron collars. The 
latter, he claims, suffered a shocking, horrific punishment:
27
   
Whilst several were led to the gallows or the block, I saw how, at a sign from the 
executioner, eight aged men placed themselves down on their backs upon the earth. They 
were then bound hand and foot, and the executioner gouged out their eyes in turn, 
kneeling to do so on the breast of each poor wretch; and after every operation he wiped 
his knife, dripping with blood, upon the white beard of the hoary unfortunate. Ah! cruel 
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spectacle! As each fearful act was completed, the victim liberated from his bonds, 
groping around with his hands, sought to gain his feet! Some fell against each other, head 
against head; others sank powerless to the earth again, uttering low groans, the memory 
of which will make me shudder as long as I live. 
 
    Russian officers and subjects likewise took captives, and could sometimes be found 
raiding nomadic communities in a manner not dissimilar from that by which nomads raided 
sedentary districts. In the summer of 1841, the Orenburg governor-general received a complaint 
from representatives of a Kazakh community that Siberian Cossack bands had been attacking 
their village and others nearby. In one alleged assault on some twenty-five villages, the Cossacks 
killed forty people, including fifteen women (all of whom are named in the document), and stole 
621 camels, 555 horses, 263 cattle, and 7,770 sheep. This was followed by a confrontation in 
which the Cossacks captured twenty-four people (including eleven women and girls and ten boys 
between three and ten years old), killing another eighteen.
28
 As we shall see in the chapters to 
come, the Russian military also took part in the “ransom economy,” trading in captives as well as 
holding hostages in exchange for political promises and concessions.  
 Mass resettlement was another option for disposing of captives, and sometimes the 
number of people forcibly resettled at one time could total in the thousands. Entire towns could 
be created out of thin air in this manner, the most famous of which was Khurasan’s 
“Khivaqābād,” a Khurasanian town under Qajar jurisdiction consisting entirely of people 
forcibly resettled by Nadir Shah after his conquest of Khiva in 1740.
29
 Turkmens were 
sometimes the victims of this sort of strategy as well: 1,500 families of Gökleng Turkmens were 
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resettled by the Qajar Najaf ʿAlī Khan after battling with the Khwarazmians in 1837.30 
Resettlement could also be a defensive strategy: this same Najaf ʿAlī Khan resettled 150 
households of Arabs from the vicinity of the Atrek to the walled village of Katlish in Khurasan 
in order to protect them from the inevitable attacks by the Turkmens.
31
  
 In short, captive-taking in Central Asia and its borderlands was not limited to the 
Turkmens and Kazakhs; it was a normative tactic of war. Nevertheless, foreign observers 
imposed a remarkable double-standard on this phenomenon, whereby violence done by non-
nomads was dignified with a formal military language that was denied to nomadic combatants. 
Russian, Qajar, or Bukharan violence was described with the orderly vocabulary of campaigns, 
expeditions, offensives, operations, detachments, soldiers, regiments, and prisoners-of-war. 
Turkmen or Kazakh violence, meanwhile, was described using the contemptuous language of 
raiding, pillaging, plundering, looting, and slave-taking.  At the heart of this division is the idea 
that the violence perpetrated by settled peoples—and especially by European empires—has a 
legitimacy that nomadic violence lacks.  
These Turkmens and Kazakhs are very often called, in our Russian and English sources, 
“pirates” (piraty), “brigands” (razboiniki), and “predators” (khishchniki). Their activities were 
compared to those of the Barbary pirates from the North African coasts and the caravan-robbers 
of the Sahara. Thus, Ferrier writes that “A horse is to the Turcoman what a ship is to the 
pirate.”32 For Vambery, “What the Portuguese slave traders and the Arabian ivory merchants are 
in Central Africa, that are the Turkomans in the north-eastern and north-western portions of Iran, 
indeed we may say in all Persia. Wherever nomad tribes live in the immediate neighbourhood of 
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a civilised country, there will robbery and slavery unavoidably exist to a greater or less extent.”33 
Vambery’s comment is typical in associating nomadism itself with brigandage. The perceived 
independence and statelessness of nomads was often seen as an inherent threat to “civilization,” 
as the nomads’ seemingly unbounded migrations were thought to undermine borders and 
citizenship, as well as taxation, agriculture, urbanism, and all the allegiances and systems of 
loyalty that were regarded as hallmarks of “settled” statehood.  
 The nomads were also alleged to be impervious to diplomacy, or even to reason. Joseph 
Wolff, the eccentric, globetrotting missionary, wrote that “The Turkomauns of the desert of 
Mowr and Sarakhs are a people of such a perfidious disposition, and of such great rapacity, that 
one could not depend for a moment on their promises, or on any treaties entered into with them; 
for the Turkomauns, as well as the Beduins in the deserts of Arabia, do not consider 
consequences, but are only restrained by instant infliction of punishment.”34 Alexander 
Gorchakov, the Tsar’s chancellor in the era of Central Asia’s conquests, would echo these 
sentiments in his famous circular from November of 1864, in which he reasoned that “the tribes 
on the frontier have to be reduced to a state of more or less perfect submission”—and reduced 
violently, since, he wrote, “It is a peculiarity of Asiatics to respect nothing but visible and 
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palpable force; the moral force of reason and of the interests of civilization has as yet no hold 
upon them.”35  
While the nomads were typically singled out for a special degree of contempt, these same 
traits were sometimes attributed to Khwarazm and Bukhara as well. But even then the nomads 
were implicated: one of the most common critiques of these two states—and particularly of 
Khwarazm—is that they benefitted from the thievery of nomads, forming alliances with them or 
employing them as agents and mercenaries. Thus M. Ivanin, deploring Khwarazm’s rulers for 
“inciting” the Turkmens and Kazakhs to abduct Russians and sell them into slavery, writes that 
“Khiva, by its actions in relation to its neighbors, could be dubbed the Algeria of Central Asia, as 
the foremost enterprise of its government has been to rob their neighbors and traffic in people.”36  
Khwarazmian elites did indeed benefit from this traffic directly, by owning the slaves themselves 
and putting them to work on their estates.    
Even so, Ivanin wildly exaggerates the centrality of the slave trade (not only for 
Khwarazm, but also for Algeria), and, in a typical fashion, simplifies the relationship between 
Turkmens, Kazakhs and Khwarazmian rulers. The nomads were not just “agents” of the khan, 
but an essential part of the fabric of Khwarazmian society; the Turkmen and Kazakh populations 
of Khwarazm, though not entirely nomadic, may at times have added to as much as 40% of the 
total population of the khanate. The khan benefitted not only from their military participation, 
which was considerable, but also from their tax revenues and their commerce more generally. 
Relations between these populations and the khan were often strained; the years 1855-1867, for 
example, witnessed continual uprisings among Yomuts and other Turkmen groups who had 
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formerly been considered Khwarazmian subjects.
37
 Baron Meyendorff succinctly summed up a 
general predicament faced by the khans with respect to the Turkmen and Kazakh populace: “The 
Nomads, who wander about all over the country,” he writes, “could easily leave it altogether, so 
that their Chiefs are compelled to treat them gently, and have even, sometimes, to flatter them. 
The present khan has not had enough regard for this precept, and has therefore lost many 
Turcomans, who, having subjected themselves to the khan of Khiva, show their fidelity by 
wasting and plundering the countries belonging to their former master.”38 
 
Revenue from Slaves and the Ransom Economy 
Tax revenues could be gained from the trade in slaves. According to Ismāʿīl Sarhang Mīrpanja, 
who was imprisoned for ten years in Khiva, a tax of one ṭilla was extracted for every single sale 
of a slave.
39
 N.N. Murav’ev, whose travelogue of a mission to Khiva provides some of the most 
detailed reportage on Khwarazmian slavery, writes that all subjects of the khan who engaged in 
raids into Iran would owe in taxes 1/5
th
 of any spoils they brought back to the khanate.
40
 
Vambery, traveling in a caravan full of emancipated slaves, observed that the transport tax for 
this cargo was extracted beyond Khwarazm as well, and sometimes the levies could be 
considerable.
41
 Slaves purchasing their own freedom from their owners were also taxed some 
portion of their value.
42
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The ransom economy also served as a significant financial incentive for perpetuating the 
slave trade. Of those captives taken in the relatively affluent district of Mazandaran and along the 
southern Caspian coast, Vambery estimated that one-third would be ransomed back into the care 
of relatives rather than being sold north to Khwarazm or Bukhara. Captives taken from poorer 
regions of Khurasan and Sistan rarely had relatives who could pay a suitable ransom price, 
however, and so most were sold into slavery: “I have heard,” Vambery writes, “out of the mouth 
of a slave dealer who had grown grey in his trade, that from these districts scarcely a tenth part 
are ransomed, the remaining nine-tenths being forwarded for sale in the markets of the 
khanats.”43 Ransom was no doubt the outcome of first resort from the perspective of the captive-
takers themselves, not only for its greater financial rewards but also because it eliminated the 
need to transport captives across long distances. The bounty gained from ransom was also free 
from the fluctuating prices of the northern markets and independent of the captive’s physical 
traits; if slave prices were down in Khiva, or if the captive in question was ill-suited to labor, 
relatives would still pay top dollar to liberate a loved one.   
Mῑrzā Maḥmūd Taqῑ Āshtiyānῑ, who was himself held for ransom among the Sarïq 
Turkmens, records the system by which these ransom exchanges would take place. Sometimes, 
the families of captives would send coins and promissory notes (called barāt) via caravans 
traveling from Iran, which merchants from the caravans would exchange for their loved ones. 
Otherwise, the merchants themselves might pay out-of-pocket for the captives, having received a 
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promise of reimbursement from their loved ones back in Iran.
44
 Families with the means to do so 
could also hire Turkmen agents to “kidnap” their enslaved relatives in their places of bondage 
and bring them back home.
45
 Once within Khwarazm or Bukhara, however, ransom would have 
been a much greater challenge, as rulers of these domains—as we shall see—were disinclined to 
allow the repatriation of slaves into non-Sunni environs. The process of ransoming or otherwise 
extracting slaves from the khanates was thus always done covertly.
46
 
 Our sources abound with tales of former slaves who, having purchased or otherwise 
gained their own freedom, attempt to buy the freedom of family members who had likewise been 
taken into slavery. In 1804-05, a woman named Akulina Krivodokova approached Orenburg 
border authorities after having lived for 31 years in slavery, having apparently been owned by at 
least one Khivan khan (v nevol’nichestve khivinskogo khana). Relatives had purchased her 
freedom the preceding summer, but her two sons and two daughters remained in captivity. The 
cost of buying their freedom was more than the family could afford, and she had come to the 
Russian government in order to petition them to provide the necessary funds.
47
 Vambery reports 
having met in a single caravan several people who had been in a similar position, seeking to 
purchase or having purchased their loved ones’ freedom:48 
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There were in the karaván, as I remarked at the first station, many others besides myself 
who were longing to reach the southernmost frontiers of Central Asia. These were the 
emancipated slaves, with whom Hadjis were intermixed, and I had an opportunity of 
witnessing the most heart-rending incidents. Near me was an old man—a father—bowed 
down by years. He had ransomed, at Bokhara, his son, a man in his thirtieth year, in order 
to restore a protector to his family left behind—that is to say, to his daughter- in-law a 
husband, to his children a father. The price was fifty ducats, and its payment had reduced 
the poor old man to beggary. ‘But,’ said he to me, ‘rather the beggar's staff than my son 
in chains.’ His home was Khaf in Persia. From the same city, not far from us, was 
another man, still of active strength, but his hair had turned grey with sorrow, for he had 
been despoiled by the Turkomans, some eight years ago, of wife, sister, and six children. 
The unfortunate man had to wander from place to place a whole year in Khiva and 
Bokhara, to discover the spot in which those near members of his family were 
languishing in captivity. After long search, he found that his wife, sister, and two 
youngest children had succumbed under the severity of their servitude, and that, of the 
four children that survived, he could only ransom half. The remaining two having besides 
grown up, the sum demanded for them was beyond his means. Farther on sat a young 
man from Herat, who had ransomed his mother. Only two years ago, this woman, now in 
her fiftieth year, was, with her husband and eldest son, surprised by an Alaman. After 
seeing those near relatives both fall, in self-defense, under the lances and swords of the 
Turkomans, she experienced herself unceasing sufferings until sold for sixteen ducats in 
Bokhara. The owner, discovering a son in him who sought to ransom her, exacted a 
double amount, thus turning filial piety to cruelly usurious account. Nor must I omit to 
mention another unhappy case—that of an inhabitant of Tebbes. He was captured eight 
years ago, and after the lapse of two years he was ransomed by his father. They were both 
returning home, and were three leagues from their native city, when they were suddenly 
attacked by the Turkomans, taken prisoners, led back to Bokhara, and again sold as 
slaves. Now, they were a second time freed, and were being conveyed to their homes.  
 
Still more important than the tax and ransom revenues, however, were the captives 
themselves: by all accounts, a substantial proportion of the agricultural labor both in Khwarazm 
                                                                                                                                                             
means to enable his relatives to ransom him, or whether, being without relatives or property, he ought to be sent on 
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any sum they please. The Persian, who is cunning even in his misfortune, always contrives to conceal his real 
position; he is therefore subjected to much ill-treatment until by the lamentations which he forwards to his home his 
captors have squeezed from his friends the highest possible ransom, and it is only when that arrives that his torment 
ceases” (ibid, 75-76). The ordeal described by Vambery, in which ransoms are gradually extracted by tormenting a 
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and in Bukhara was performed by slaves, and slaves constituted a significant demographic in 
these states’ militaries as well. For their part, those Turkmens and Kazakhs bringing slaves to the 
market would benefit from payment not only in cash, but also in goods and—most importantly—
in the crucial stocks of grain that nomads of the arid zones were unable to produce themselves. 
This “grain-for-slaves” commerce was the crux of the symbiotic relationship between slave-
traders and the settled states.  
 
Socioeconomic and Demographic Features of the Slave Trade 
It would be wrong to see captive-taking in purely economic terms, however, especially in light of 
the overarching culture of captivity discussed above, in which it was a standard part of the 
strategic vernacular of warfare. Though foreign observers did not dignify Turkmen and Kazakh 
raids as part of an ongoing political struggle, this is precisely what they were. For both groups, 
the long-term goal was often independence—either a degree of it within the confines of fealty to 
Khwarazm or Russia, or complete independence in regions that were increasingly encroached 
upon by expansionist imperial neighbors. Attacks on the villages of Khurasan provided revenue, 
but they also served to create a buffer zone of weakened, destabilized territory between Tehran 
and the Turkmen deserts. Kazakh attacks on caravans and settlements likewise came with 
financial benefits, but they also asserted dominance over the steppe in an era when Russian 
power was increasingly visible at its peripheries. Raiding was a form of resistance.  
  As I will show in the chapters to come, the slave trade also fulfilled many other functions 
for the captive-takers and slave-owners. For the slaves themselves, captivity could be as brief as 
a matter of days before being ransomed or as long as several decades in bonded labor. Many 
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would die during the brutal ordeal of being transported across the deserts by their captors. Those 
who survived the journey would join tens of thousands of other slaves in Khwarazm, Bukhara, 
and the Kazakh steppe, performing all manner of work. Agricultural labor predominated, 
especially for Iranian slaves, but we also find slaves working as soldiers, teachers, carpenters, 
blacksmiths, musicians, drovers, prostitutes, miners, herders, and dancers. Most were converted 
to Sunni Islam. Many were married, sometimes forcibly, and most often to other slaves. 
Fortunate slaves were permitted to perform independent labor in their limited free time, the 
proceeds of which were their own to keep (if their masters did not expropriate them); by this 
means, a great many slaves purchased their own freedom. A very fortunate few, either during or 
after their period of bondage, managed to achieve prominent positions in the royal dīvān or in the 
military.  
 The estimated total number of slaves in Khwarazm and Bukhara varied throughout the 
nineteenth century from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands. There was consensus on one 
key point: the overwhelming majority of slaves were Iranians. The earliest estimates concerning 
the number of Iranian slaves in Khwarazm alone were generally in the range of 30-40,000, 
though on the higher end we find estimates of up to 140,000. Similarly, for Bukhara, estimates 
on the number of enslaved Iranians tend to range from 30-40,000; one estimate—by Joseph 
Wolff—put the figure as high as 200,000, a sum which seems impossible but which we should 
hesitate to dismiss entirely, given Wolff’s claim that the estimate was offered by the Bukharan 
Amῑr himself (albeit in passing).49 By the mid-late nineteenth century, the claim that Iranian 
slaves in Khwarazm numbered as many as 50-60,000 became more common.
50
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 By contrast, the estimated number of Russian slaves plummeted as the century wore on. 
Unsurprisingly, the number of Russian slaves, despite being by all estimates a tiny fraction of the 
total slave population, inspired much more commentary among both Russian and British 
travelers, officials, and observers. Estimates from the early decades of the century posited as 
many as 15,000 Russian slaves in Khwarazm and Bukhara combined. The best-known and most 
widely-reported estimate was relayed by Murav’ev, who, during his mission to Khiva, 
discovered a haunting secret letter from a representative of the Russian slave population:
51
 
As I was preparing to clean this gun, I discovered a slip of paper in one of the barrels, on 
which the following was written in Russian: “We venture to inform your Honor that there 
are over 3,000 Russian slaves in this place, who have to suffer unheard-of misery from 
labour, cold, hunger, &c. Have pity on our unhappy situation and reveal it to the 
Emperor. In gratitude we shall pray to God for your Honor's welfare.” The perusal of 
these lines deeply affected me, and I thanked God that I should, perhaps, have the fortune 
to serve as an instrument of help.  
 
 These numbers align more or less with the estimate offered by Lieutenant Gladyshev, 
who proposed that there were 3,000 Russians, Kalmyks and “foreigners” in the khanate, a 
number of whom he saw cleaning the canals when he visited Khiva in 1740-41. They also align 
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with the estimate of an Orthodox priest named Khrisanf who traveled in the region near the end 
of the eighteenth century, estimating some 4,000 Russian slaves in Khiva (as well as 6,000 in 
Bukhara).
52
 In 1840, however, when the Khivan khan, as a concession to Russia, released what 
he claimed were all the remaining Russian slaves in the khanate, they totaled fewer than 500. 
Another 21 were freed on the eve of Khiva’s conquest in 1873, and not many more appear to 
have been liberated during that event. It is possible that the early estimates above were 
exaggerated; or that a great many of the Russian slaves had since been manumitted and returned 
home or assimilated totally into Central Asian communities; or—most likely—that they simply 
died and were not replaced, as the overall trade in Russian captives decreased over the course of 
the nineteenth century.  
 There is general agreement, at least, and among a greater number of eyewitnesses, that 
very few Russian slaves remained in Bukhara by the middle of the century. Witkiewicz met 
some 25 of them personally, and estimated their total number at no more than 50.
53
 Burnes put 
the number at 130,
54
 and Kostenko observed simply that they were few.
55
 Nevertheless, the 
freeing of Russian slaves continued to play a significant role in Russian diplomacy with both 
Bukhara and Khwarazm down to the age of the region’s conquest.   
 The abundance of slaves increased during times of heavy warfare along the Iranian 
frontier, and the increase could reportedly be substantial. Baron Meyendorff claimed that a 
particularly violent struggle for Merv increased the number of Iranian slaves in Bukhara by 
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25,000 (bringing the total, in his estimation, to 40,000 overall).
56
  Naturally, any great influx of 
slaves resulted in lower prices at the markets.
57
 Regardless of the abundance of slaves for sale, 
however, prices could vary considerably. The most commonly-cited market price for a slave, 
which may be taken as an overall average throughout the nineteenth century, is between 30 and 
60 gold coins (ṭilla, chervonits),58 in both Bukharan and Khivan currency. Indeed, many former 
slaves who reported their own original sale price to Russian border officials were sold for a price 
in the 25-40 coin range. But the price of a slave depended on a variety of factors, including age, 
origins, gender, and physical condition. Major Blankenagel’, a physician who visited Khiva in 
1792 in order to treat the khan for an eye malady, reported that the Kazakhs were selling Russian 
captives at the Khivan and Bukharan bazaars at a rate of 40-50 coins for a man and anywhere 
from 50-100 coins for a woman.
59
 Meyendorff observed precisely the opposite, claiming that 
“The women, as a rule, are cheaper than the men, except those still young and handsome.” He 
writes that the price of a “well-built” man of any background averaged 40-50 ṭillas, though 
knowledge of a useful craft, such as blacksmithing, could raise a slave’s price to 100 ṭillas. 
Young and attractive women, meanwhile, could sometimes fetch 100-150 ṭillas.60 Murav’ev 
writes that Iranian men fetched a lower price than Russian men—generally 20-30 ṭillas, as 
opposed to 60-80 ṭillas for a “young and healthy” Russian—but that Iranian female slaves sold 
for much higher prices than Russian women; Kurds fetched the lowest sums.
61
 Jan Prosper 
Witkiewicz, a Polish explorer who ventured to Bukhara in service to the Tsar, wrote that the 
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ruler of Kunduz was at the time of his visit “constantly conducting raids on the peoples of the 
district, taking captives; and his merchants bring them to Bukhara. 20-50 ṭillas —or Bukharan 
coins—are paid for them. A pleasant maiden fetches up to 70 ṭillas; a comely (prigozhii) boy, up 
to 40. But workers usually fetch no more than 30 ṭillas.”62  
 Slaves were sold and traded extensively beyond the bazaars, however, and they were very 
often traded for objects or livestock, especially among the Turkmens and Kazakhs. Former 
slaves report having been traded for a wide range of goods and animals. Trading slaves for sheep 
was evidently quite common; they could be sold for as few as 36 sheep,
63
 though a higher 
valuation is more customary. One slave who had previously been sold for 41 tangas
64
 was traded 
for 80 sheep;
65
 two others for 100 sheep each;
66
 another for 150 sheep;
67
 another for 22 sheep 
and a horse;
68
 another for 20 sheep and three horses;
69
 and another for 10 “big sheep,” one 
camel, one horse, and three large felt carpets.
70
 Others report having been traded for 20 Khivan 
silk robes (khalat);
71
 one camel and one horse;
72
 one camel and two horses;
73
 and nine horses, 
one fleece and fur coat, and a gun.
74
 Many slaves were sold or traded multiple times, and the 
price for the same slave could vary dramatically from one sale to the next. The slave who had 
been traded for 20 Khivan silk robes had earlier been sold by Turkmens to a Khivan for 9 ṭillas, 
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and he was later sold to a Kazakh for 29 ṭillas.75 A slave who was traded to a Kazakh for 40 
mares was, 21 years later, traded to another for just 10 mares—the difference owing no doubt to 
his advanced age.
76
 
 Among the first indignities suffered by many slaves in the region was the loss of their 
name. New owners were at liberty to change their slaves’ names, and they very often did. 
Sometimes the masters proved themselves creative in this effort, as with the Kalmyk slave who 
was renamed “Manas” (the legendary Kyrgyz hero whose chief occupation was the slaying of 
Kalmyks).
77
 More often, however, they proved themselves remarkably uncreative. In July of 
1852, a Russian border official logged the arrival of eight escaped slaves, who he identified 
(using the names given to them in captivity) as: “Nazar, Dawlat, Dawlat, Dawlat, Nazar, 
Mustafa, the women Summanaz, and Dawlat.”78 
 Having been sold, transported, and often renamed in the khanates or in the steppe, 
accounts differ wildly concerning the sort of treatment slaves could expect in their period of 
bondage. The earliest Russian reports of slaves’ treatment in Khwarazm are almost invariably 
grim. An article from 1815 reports that “[t]hese sufferers’ food consists of two unleavened 
flatbreads per day, sometimes some gruel, and very rarely a piece of lean meat. The only 
vegetables and fruits allowed to them are those beginning to spoil. By way of clothing they get 
one shirt per year, and one robe (khalat) every two years. They are rarely given shoes, and the 
ones they are given are worn out. Their bed is of straw and reeds.”79 Khwarazmian slaves’ 
starvation was likewise reported by Murav’ev, who writes that “diet of the slaves and servant 
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class is very bad, the latter have to be content with what is left from the tables of their masters, 
and they struggle and fight amongst themselves for the fragments… These wretched creatures 
frequently go a whole day without a meal, and keep soul and body together by what they can beg 
or steal.”80 Conditions were reported to be similarly harsh in Bukhara and among Teke 
Turkmens to the south.
81
  
 Many travelers reported on horrific punishments that were visited upon slaves who 
attempted escape, or otherwise earned their owners’ ill-will. Some of these punishments were 
witnessed firsthand, some reported by slaves, and some only rumored.
82
 The most terrible 
punishments, according to broad consensus, awaited fugitive slaves who had been recaptured. 
Several reports contend that such slaves were punished by impalement. “Before our arrival,” one 
Russian observer writes, “an unfortunate one was subjected to such a fate, with the spike 
entering through his flank, and this Persian lived in such a situation and in terrible suffering for 
two days. He pleaded in vain to the people around him for a sip of water to quench the terrible 
thirst that was consuming him, but under penalty of death they were forbidden from carrying out 
the request of the convicted person, and he died, cursing the Khivans and the day they were 
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born.”83 Another claims to have witnessed such a terrible spectacle with his own eyes: “[A]long 
the road” outside Khiva, “a few Persians were impaled by stakes… With their arms tied parallel 
to their legs, these unfortunate people were finishing their lives in terrible pain, filling the air 
with loud, pathetic cries: ‘Su! Su! Su!’ [Water! Water! Water!]. The Khivans accompanying 
[our] embassy explained that the crime of these unfortunate people was that, having been 
captured by [Yomud] Turkmen robbers and sold into slavery in Khiva, they conspired and fled. 
The Khivans caught them the next day, and now, in order to teach a lesson to other Persian 
slaves, and for the edification of departing Russians, the cruel khan ordered all of these 
unfortunates staked down on the same day our embassy was accomplished, and along its route of 
travel.”84 One widely-reported method of impeding slaves’ ability to flee involved cutting their 
feet or heels and stuffing horsehair in the wound.
85
 
 Notwithstanding horrors such as these, a number of visitors reported that cruel treatment 
was the exception rather than the rule for slaves in the khanates. The British adventurer 
Alexander Burnes “heard from every quarter that slaves were kindly treated,” and he writes that 
he “never heard these [slaves], in my different communications with them, complain of the 
treatment which they experienced in Toorkistan… [T]hey are never beaten, and are clothed and 
fed as if they belonged to the family, and often treated with great kindness.”86 Later observers, 
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including Arminius Vambery, Januarius Aloysius MacGahan, and N. Zalesov would follow suit 
in offering optimistic appraisals of slaves’ treatment.87  
 Later chapters will explore slaves’ treatment in terms of the opportunities available to 
them and the limitations imposed upon them. When it comes to general patterns of mercy or 
cruelty, the variation in travelers’ accounts probably indicates a diverse range of experiences that 
were possible for slaves. To characterize slaves’ treatment by emphasizing only the horrific 
cruelty of certain punishments—as some nineteenth-century commentators did—obscures the 
fact that slaves did not spend the entirety of their captivity being punished for particular offenses. 
On the other hand, claims of “good” treatment at the hands of slave owners obscure the fact that 
the slave system itself was inherently cruel and degrading even for those slaves who suffered 
minimal punishment. Finally, given that few foreign observers spent much time in the presence 
of slaves, accounts generalizing about slaves’ treatment may reveal more about the observers’ 
expectations and susceptibilities than they do about slaves’ ordeals. 
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The origins of Iranian Slavery in Central Asia  
Iranian Shῑʿites would constitute the majority of Central Asia’s enslaved people for three 
centuries, and the origins of their enslavement can be traced to particular developments in the 
early sixteenth century. This was an age of bitter Uzbek-Safavid warfare, during which Sunni 
jurists in Transoxania issued multiple fatwas which made licit not only the raiding and 
plundering of Shῑʿite communities but also the capturing of Shῑʿite individuals, and by extension 
their enslavement. Iskandar Beg, a Turkmen historian employed at the court of the Safavid Shah 
ʿAbbās I, provides a striking and rare account of the origins of Shῑʿite enslavement in his Tārīkh-
i ʿālamārā-yi ʿAbbāsī. It is worth noting his emphasis on the reciprocal nature of enslavement as 
a tactic of war:
88
   
I should comment here on a point I have mentioned before, but which can bear repetition. 
In earlier periods, when the Uzbeg rulers invaded Khurasan and the Ottoman sultans 
invaded Azerbaijan, either with the object of annexing territory or of plunder, they did 
not take captives from Shῑʿite lands, nor did qezelbas armies commit this heinous crime 
in Sunni territory. However, in the reign of the Ottoman Sultan Morad, an Ottoman and 
Tartar army invaded Azerbaijan and Sirvan and was guilty of this practice. When the 
Ottomans occupied Tabriz, many children of seyyeds, who were descendants of the 
Prophet himself, were carried off into captivity and sold to Frankish infidels in Istanbul. 
The Uzbegs adopted this practice during their invasions of Khurasan under ʿAbdollah 
Khan  and his son ʿAbd al-Mo'men Khan . For instance, at Mashhad, they took captive 
many descendants of the Imam Reza, and many children of the nobility, of the ʿolama, of 
ascetics and other honorable men, and of the military and civilians in general—several 
thousand altogether. These captives were sold in Turkestan and Transoxania, and even as 
far away as Kabul and India.  
Because the heavens so decreed, the Shah was forced to overlook these crimes at the 
time; this world is a vale of woe, and revenge for these heinous acts could safely be left 
to the Lord of vengeance. At the urging of his commanders, however, the Shah allowed 
several thousand prisoners to be taken on this campaign and exiled from their homelands. 
Subsequently too, the Safavid governors of Astarabad on several occasions led punitive  
                                                 
88
 Iskandar Beg Munshī, Tārīkh-i ʿālamārā-yi ʿAbbāsī, trans. Roger Savory as History of Shah ʿAbbas the Great, 
vol. 2 (Boulder, CO: Caravan Books, 1978), 819-820 
32 
 
expeditions  against  rebel groups of the Ūklū and Göklen tribes, which were Muslim 
only in name, and many prisoners were taken on these occasions. But if impartial critics 
will take a searching look at the Shah's actions in this regard, they will discover that he 
has earned the approval of the religious authorities, because these prisoners were not 
taken into slavery but were treated as prisoners of war. Several thousand women and 
children were brought up in Shῑʿite and God-fearing homes, and adopted the Shῑʿite faith. 
 
The name of the Sunni jurist who first made licit the enslavement of Shῑʿites, while 
absent from our chronicle sources, was preserved in Turkmen oral historical tradition down to 
the nineteenth century: both Iranian and European observers report having met Turkmens who 
identified the main jurist responsible as one Shams ad-Dīn Herātī.89 Considering that captive-
taking was already, at that time, a standard feature of warfare among Muslim groups in the 
region, this jurist’s formal legal licensing hardly seems necessary. Nevertheless, it aligned with 
and legitimized the formalized discourse of sectarian struggle that was employed by both Sunni 
and Shῑʿite statesmen and jurists. 
As for the age of conflict in which these legal developments took place, a very brief 
overview of its major features must suffice here.  As Shah Ismaʿīl (r. 1501-24) consolidated Iran 
as a Shῑʿite domain, Khurasan—a region divided from Transoxania during the partition of the 
Timurid empire—became the focus of struggles between the Shah and the Sunni Uzbeks to the 
north, which only increased after Ismaʿīl’s death. Uzbek armies led by ʿUbaydullāh Khan made 
five major forays into Khurasan between 1524 and 1538, but were unable to retain control of any 
major towns in the region other than Balkh. Significant Uzbek campaigns in Khurasan were 
resumed with the conquest of Herat in 1589, led by ʿAbdullāh Khan II, and subsequently 
Mashhad and much of the rest of Khurasan was captured by that ruler’s son, ʿAbd al-Mo’min. 
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Uzbek raids in this period proceeded deep into Iranian territory, reaching as far south as Yazd, 
and relented only with the death of both ʿAbdullāh Khan and ʿAbd al-Mu’min in 1598, after 
which the Iranian ruler, Shah ʿAbbās, was able to retake most of Khurasan. It is was likely 
during this century of Sunni-Shῑʿite conflict that we find the initial proliferation of Shῑʿite slaves 
in Central Asia.     
The work performed by slaves in Central Asia during this period, as we shall see, appears 
to have been primarily agricultural, and the new influx of slaves corresponds compellingly to a 
revolution in agriculture in the region. Maria Subtelny has shown how large plantations had 
developed turning the late Timurid period thanks to a shrewd revenue-generating strategy by a 
Central Asian ruler facing the prospect of fiscal disaster. Caught up in the conflict between a 
largely Turkic military class covetous of its traditional landholding privileges and an Iranian 
bureaucratic class interested in imposing centralizing reforms, the last Timurid ruler, Sulṭān 
Husayn Mīrzā (r. 1469-1506), was forced to find a new source of tax revenue that would alienate 
neither faction. He found it in the expansion of hydrological agriculture, which he encouraged 
elites to develop both for their own enrichment and the enrichment of the state treasury. At the 
same time, he rapidly expanded the system of pious endowments (waqf) such that Sufi shrine-
complexes could flourish into massive agricultural estates.
90
 It was through these developments 
that a Sufi master such as Khwāja ʿUbaydullāh Aḥrār could become one of the wealthiest 
landholders in the region. The Khwāja’s private correspondences reveal that he also owned 
slaves, who worked on his estates.
91
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We have reason to believe that the new agricultural “plantations” that emerged in this 
period, such as those owned by Khwāja Aḥrār and others, made extensive use of slave labor. 
R.K. Mukminova’s study of sixteenth-century waqf documents has revealed that most of the 
slaves mentioned in these pious endowments were used for agricultural labor or animal 
husbandry.
92
  Other sources reveal large numbers of slaves working agricultural jobs on the 
estates of prominent Sufi leaders such as the Juybāri shaykhs.93 Thanks to the influx of captives 
from conflicts further south, such landholders would hardly have needed to worry about labor 
scarcity in the hinterlands occupied by their expanding estates.  
In the seventeenth century, most slave laborers in Central Asia would likely have been 
drawn from the pool of captives seized in more limited campaigns into Khurasan. The series of 
conquests by Uzbek rulers ʿAbdullāh Khan and ʿAbd al-Mu’min that concluded the sixteenth 
century marked the last time for at least another two hundred years that forces from Transoxania 
would endeavor to permanently occupy Khurasanian towns. Smaller-scale military forays into 
the region, however, resumed just two decades later under Imāmqulī Khan  (r. 1611-42), and 
they intensified under ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Sulṭān (r. 1645-80) after Shah ʿAbbās’ death, though ʿAbd 
al-ʿAzīz seems to have tempered his raiding once he became khan.94  
During these formative centuries in the development of the Shῑʿite slave economy—from 
which, unfortunately, sources on slavery in the region are scarce—it would probably have been 
Uzbek soldiers, rather than nomadic Turkmens, who engaged in most of the captive-taking. 
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There is, moreover, no evidence that raiding of Khurasanian villages for captives was at this time 
the sort of near-constant phenomenon that it would later become.  
The eighteenth century witnessed the increasing influence of Turkmen tribes in the affairs 
of Khwarazm and Bukhara, and also their migration closer to what would become the main 
routes of the slave trade: the Teke migrated to northern Khurasan, while a large branch of the 
Yomut, along with the Chawdur, moved into Khwarazm. Meanwhile, the khanates were 
embroiled in ongoing political crises. In Khwarazm, the years 1685-1715 saw the succession of 
as many as thirteen khans, many of whom were installed by nomadic Uzbeks, sometimes in 
alliance with Kazakhs or Turkmens. The latter began at this time to factor more prominently in 
the Khans’ raiding forays into Khurasan. The Kazakhs too saw their influence in the khanate 
increase: from 1727 until nearly the end of the century, almost every khan appointed in 
Khwarazm was from among them. Slave-trading in the Bukharan khanate, meanwhile, was likely 
at a low ebb due to internal turmoil: Kazakhs—fleeing the steppe before the advancing 
Kalmyks—raided Bukharan towns and villages, leaving Samarqand and all but two districts of 
Bukhara itself depopulated by the time they returned to the steppe in the late 1720s. The regions 
of Ferghana, Hisar and Shahrisabz were all more-or-less independent of Bukhara at this time, 
and the influence of the Bukharan ruler—nominally the khan, but in reality his ataliq—was 
confined to the capital and its adjacent provinces.
95
   
In 1740, Nādir Shah of Iran launched an ambitious raid into the region, winning 
submission (as well as the services of a 10,000-strong cavalry force) from the Bukharan khan 
before marching on Khiva. The Khwarazmian ruler, Ilbars Khan, surrendered and was promptly 
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executed, and Khiva suffered an intense assault. The city was surrendered after just a few days. 
In the aftermath of these attacks, the Shah reportedly liberated several thousand Iranian slaves as 
well as a smaller number of Russian slaves. The former were sent to Khurasan, and the latter 
were turned over to the Russian officers Gladyshev and Muravin, who conducted them back to 
Russia. The Shah, who has since often been depicted as a liberator of captives, also took some 
corvée laborers for himself: somewhere between 4,000 and 18,000 Khwarazmian cavalrymen 
were pressed into service in the Iranian military.
96
 The presence of so many Iranian slaves in the 
khanate indicates that the slave system that would become well-known to foreign observers in 
the nineteenth century, by which Iranians from Khurasan were pressed into bondage on 
Khwarazmian and Bukharan estates, may already have been firmly in place by the mid-
eighteenth century.  
For the remainder of the eighteenth century, Iran would launch no major campaigns into 
the khanates, even as raids on Khurasanian towns, often carried out by Turkmens, continued to 
supply the Khwarazmian and Bukharan markets with Iranian slaves. The first few decades of the 
nineteenth century saw a renewed effort by Iran—now led by the dynasty of the Qajars—to 
secure Khurasan against these incursions, and to establish a military vanguard against the 
khanates and the nomads who sometimes served as the khans’ allies.  
In the 1820s and 30s, Iranian troops made considerable gains in reducing the trade in 
Qajar slaves. In 1831-32, acting as the Qajar ruler Fath ‘Alῑ Khan ’s governor of Khurasan, the 
crown prince ‘Abbās Mirzā led successful campaigns against defiant chieftains in Quchan, 
Amῑrabad, Turshiz, and Turbat, and he inspired the formerly-hostile Salar Turkmens of Herat to 
make a plea for peace. In 1832, he launched a successful attack on Sarakhs, sacking the Salar 
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stronghold and liberating hundreds of Iranian captives. After his death in 1833, however, Qajar 
fortunes in Khurasan quickly and decisively turned. From their base at Merv, the Khwarazmians 
patronized Turkmens who patrolled and plundered the border region, taking captives when they 
could; their spoils also included heavy-laden caravans bound for Iran. An Iranian campaign in 
1837 to take Herat was a disaster, due in part to the ability of the Merv-based Khwarazmian 
forces to interrupt Iranian supply lines at will. In 1841, Allāh Quli Khan, ruler of Khwarazm, 
ordered a direct offensive against Iran which was evidently a success; among the results was the 
deportation of some 15,000 Jamshidi tribesmen from Badghis to Merv. 
In the years to come, Khwarazm would lose its foothold in Merv as many of the Sarïq 
Turkmens of the oasis threw off and continually rejected their former state of subjection to the 
khan. Unwilling to abandon Merv completely, however, Khwarazmian rulers would spend the 
next decade launching annual assaults on the Sarïqs, draining both their own resources and those 
of their entrenched Turkmen adversaries. Khwarazm was sometimes supported in these efforts 
by confederations of Turkmens, which included members of the Yomut, Chawdur, Yemreli, 
Qaradashli, and Taze Qongrat tribes. Meanwhile, the Khwarazmians and their Turkmen clients 
continued to plunder caravans bound for Iran, and in 1851 the khan’s troops were among the 
forces that repulsed Iranian efforts to take Sarakhs.
97
 In short, the constant presence of 
Khwarazmian troops and mercenaries in Khurasan was a major obstacle against Iranian efforts to 
exert control over the region, and the lack of control—as well as the continual armed conflict 
fomented both by the Qajars and their opponents—allowed for new victims to be channeled 
constantly into the Central Asian slave trade.  
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Qajar Missions to End the Slave Trade  
Qajar military efforts in Khurasan during the nineteenth century were inspired not only 
by a desire to end the plague of captive-taking, but also by the Iranian government’s consistent 
ambition to expand its control northward.
98
 This fact may come as a surprise, since, for decades, 
historians have presented this era of Central Asian history as a contest between England and 
Russia, in which local powers like Iran, Bukhara, and Khwarazm were alternately pawns, 
victims, or bystanders.
99
 This Qajar project was played out on both military and diplomatic 
fronts, and gave rise to a genre of travel literature—combining intelligence-gathering, 
ethnography, geography, political commentary, and history—which thrived especially from the 
1840s through the1870s.
100
 Some of the most important and well-known works within this genre 
arose from missions that were tasked with freeing Iranian slaves from Khwarazm and Bukhara 
and ending the slave trade.  
 
The Missions of ‘Abbās Qulī Khan and Riżā Qulī Khan Hidāyat 
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The two best-known missions tasked with ending the trade in Iranian slaves are those of ‘Abbās 
Qulī Khan and Riżā Qulī Khan Hidāyat.101 ‘Abbās Qulī Khan undertook an embassy to the 
Bukharan ruler Naṣrullāh Khan  between May and August of 1844, apparently for the purpose of 
asserting Qajar dominion over Merv, for seeking Bukharan cooperation in ending Iranian slavery 
in the khanate, and—at the behest of the British—for retrieving the missionary and adventurer 
Joseph Wolff from his temporary imprisonment. The envoy successfully stakes his rhetorical 
claim to Merv and retrieves the ailing Wolff, but when it came to general emancipation ‘Abbās 
Qulī Khan’s efforts came up short. The Bukharan ruler denies responsibility for his subjects’ 
enslaving of Iranians, claiming that the blame rests exclusively upon the ʿulamāʾ who continued 
to countenance the practice. Therefore, the only solution—according to the Naṣrullāh—is for the 
ʿulamāʾ of Iran and Bukhara to discuss the matter together and arrive at some kind of joint 
resolution. Even then, the ruler cautions, old habits die hard, and it would be impossible to 
reverse this unsavory custom right away.
102
   
Riżā Qulī Khan Hidāyat traveled to Khwarazm in 1851 to meet with the ruler 
Muḥammad Amīn Khan (r. 1845-55), and his bid to free Iranian slaves in Khiva would be no 
more successful than that of his counterpart, ‘Abbās Qulī Khan, in Bukhara. Before setting off on 
his trip, Riżā Qulī Khan had received the names of a number of men and women from Astarabad 
and elsewhere who were held as slaves in Khwarazm. Some individuals whose parents were 
among the enslaved had begged Riżā Qulī Khan for permission to accompany him on the 
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voyage.
103
 The envoy recounts meeting with a great number of Iranian slaves over the course of 
his travels in the khanate. He hosts them at his residence, serves them tea, and learns of their 
backgrounds and circumstances. Some had been enslaved for more than fifty years, and some for 
less than three.
104
 At one point he overhears a cacophony of cries and moans from two of the 
slaves coming to visit him: it turns out that they are cousins who had not had any news of one-
another for some time before meeting by coincidence at Riżā Qulī Khan’s residence and 
realizing that they shared the same awful fate.
105
 Riżā Qulī Khan collects many slaves’ names, 
and he thrills them with the news that he will request their freedom from the khan. Slaves of 
diverse backgrounds gather to follow him through the streets. Their excitement is such that Riżā 
Qulī Khan nearly expected the start of a slave uprising as he and his retinue move through the 
city.
106
   
But all of the excitement is in vain. He is unable to free the slaves. The Khwarazmian 
ruler, Muḥammad Amīn Khan , after consulting with some of his top officials, declines the 
envoy’s emancipation request on the grounds that it would embolden the “qizilbāsh” (Iranians), 
reinforcing among them the notion that the concession was a result of their troop-movements 
around Astarabad and in Khurasan. The result, the khan says, would be an onslaught of new 
demands on the part of the Qajars.
107
 Simply releasing thousands of Iranian slaves at the Qajars’ 
behest was out of the question.  
 
The Mission of Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan Ghafūr 
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Along with the two well-known missions discussed above, there was at least one other Qajar 
embassy to free slaves in this period—one that appears to be largely forgotten. This is the 
mission of Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan Ghafūr, who was dispatched to Khiva in 1842.108  His primary 
aim was to negotiate for the release of the lieutenant and nephew of Mashhad’s Qajar governor, 
who had been captured by Turkmens while hunting and brought to the Khwarazmian capital. 
Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan was also tasked with making a more ambitious request—the same one 
that Riżā Qulī Khan had made: that the slave trade in Khwarazm be ended, and that the Iranian 
slaves there be freed.  
Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan arrives in Khiva at the same time as embassies from Russia and 
England, whose ambassadors he regards as amenable to his cause in liberating the slaves. He has 
good reason to assume this; indeed, Russian accounts claim that Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan  had 
been sent to Khwarazm at Russia’s behest, alleging that the Shah, having petitioned the Russians 
to intercede with the khan for the liberation of Iranian slaves, had begun preparing for war, “and 
only the combined efforts of Russian and British ambassadors in Tehran convinced him to 
postpone military action and to send to Khiva, as an envoy, Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan , offering him 
[also] the services of an official of the British mission [named] Thomson.”109 As we shall see, the 
Iranian envoy would leverage these alliances to little effect.  
Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan’s report is remarkable for including the most detailed account of 
Iranian negotiations for the emancipation of Khwarazm’s slaves. However unsuccessful, these 
negotiations are both revealing and perplexing, since they show, among other things, the sincere 
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effort exerted by an Iranian envoy in attempting to negotiate the solution of a crisis that, in fact, 
had no clear solution.  
At his first meeting with the khan in Khiva, Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan  assures the ruler that 
ending the slave trade and emancipating Iranian slaves would “bring friendship and brotherhood” 
between Iran and Khwarazm. On the other hand, he threatens, if the khan declined, he would find 
that “nothing comes of enmity but the ruin of a country and the trampling of its people.”110 The 
envoy alludes to previous Iranian missions to free captives which had been unsuccessful, and 
alleges that the khan had broken promises to stop Turkmens under his sway from taking Iranian 
captives. In response, the khan alleges transgressions by Iranian governors and elites, but at first 
he appears to agree to take a firmer hand with the offending Turkmens. As an underwhelming 
sign of goodwill, he consents to release 15 slaves. The Iranian envoy replies, “O glorious khan, it 
is not a matter of ten slaves or a hundred. The Shah of Iran wants all of his people [returned], and 
his wishes must be fulfilled.”111 The envoy then meets with the khan’s mihtar and outlines his 
demands in more detail: he asks for nothing less than the liberation of all the slaves that had been 
taken since the time of Fath ‘Alῑ Khan (d. 1838).   
What follows this initial meeting with the khan is a series of negotiations with both the 
mihtar and the ruler that are practically comical in their elaborate futility. First, the mihtar 
suggests that only those slaves taken since the relatively recent conclusion of peace between 
Khwarazm and Iran should be freed, but that Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan would be welcome to buy 
the rest of the slaves, just as the Khwarazmians had once ransomed their own people from the 
Qajars. Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan replies that this would not suffice, and stresses again that all the 
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slaves must be freed. He asks the mihtar how many, then, he was willing to offer. The mihtar 
replies with a story that, if true, reveals something of the high-handed manner in which the 
Qajars had formerly dealt with the khanate: some time previously, the khan sent a Khivan 
ambassador to Tehran along with some Iranian slaves who had been freed as a gesture of 
goodwill. In exchange, the mihtar claims, the ambassador asked for the liberation of 2 or 3 
Sarakhsi slaves that were held in Iran, but was told that this was impossible, since they had 
become close to the Shah’s mother, and that respecting one’s mother was as necessary as 
respecting the holy kaʿba in Mecca.112 Thus, the mihtar explains, the last time Khwarazm had 
offered concessions on the issue of slavery, their goodwill had not been returned; instead, the 
khan had been insulted.  
Nevertheless, the mihtar agrees to bring Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan’s entreaty before the 
khan. Because the khan was busy with some other pressing issues, however, Muḥammad ʿAlῑ 
Khan would in the meantime have to carry out further negotiations with the mihtar. At their next 
meeting, Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan and the mihtar carry out their discussions in the presence of the 
imprisoned notable that the Iranian envoy had come to liberate—the nephew of Mashhad’s 
governor. This time, Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan evokes the specter of Russian and British 
disapproval, warning the mihtar that “three countries [i.e., Iran, England, and Russia] that are 
friends of the Khan ask that the slaves of Iran be given leave to depart, and there are 30,000 
slaves in Khwarazm.” Of these, he asks, how many would the khan be prepared to emancipate 
“so that the PādiShah of Islam [i.e. the Shah of Iran] will be satisfied” with him? “The slaves,” 
the mihtar replies, “are in the hands of the citizens and the populace. Each was bought for 30 
tillas, for 40 tillas. It is not our custom to force or harass our people.” He reiterates that 
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Khwarazm had previously been forced to buy its citizens back from Iran, and that the Iranians 
were welcome to do the same. This offer does not appease Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan: “The Shah,” 
he replies, “does not give money to buy back his own slaves.”113  
Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan’s claim to negotiate on behalf of a troika of great empires was 
only partly accurate. While the Russians and British may have been sincere in their hopes of 
averting warfare between Iran and Khwarazm, they had little reason to be optimistic about the 
emancipation of tens of thousands of Iranian slaves, especially considering that a previous 
Russian embassy, less than two years prior, had made no headway on that front. The ambassador 
at that time, Nikoforov, had been coached on his mission in a revealing debriefing from March 
19
th
, 1841:
114
 
In addition to the instructions which you received directly from the Asian Department, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs entrusts you with another mission, of no small 
importance. Though it does not concern our own relations with Khiva, successful 
execution of [the mission] may nevertheless have a beneficial influence on the course of 
our affairs in Asia generally… [R]ecently the Persian government appealed to us with the 
earnest request that we render our assistance in Khiva toward the liberation of Persian 
subjects there, adding that if for some reason the Russian state finds it inconvenient to 
take part in this matter, then in such a case the Persians will need to resolve upon their 
last resort, namely the achievement of their aim by force of arms.  
We have no doubt that the fulfillment of the Persian Court’s request will meet strong 
resistance in Khiva, especially since Persians are the most numerous class of people 
being used as slaves. Nevertheless, we consider it necessary to make you aware that the 
liberation through your mediation of even some number of Persian captives would be 
extremely good for us. For that reason, do not fail to take advantage of any opportune 
moment to try to achieve that goal. Explain to [the khan] Allah Kuli what the 
consequences could be for him with respect to Persia if he continues to follow the same 
hostile system in his relations with her and, on the other hand, what he would gain in 
personal esteem if he takes as his principal neighborliness (dobroe sosedstvo) and justice. 
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And while the complete release of the Persian captives cannot be hoped for, it may be 
possible for you to at least persuade the khan to send an envoy to Tehran with the proper 
authorization to work with the Persian Court on mutually-agreed terms, on the basis of 
which the liberation of Persians from Khiva may be enacted… 
If, however, the demands of the Khivans should be entirely unmanageable, and your 
advice concerning abolition be in vain, then in that case the Khivans can by no means 
hope for the assistance of our mission in Tehran, and will have to come to an agreement 
with the Persians at their own discretion.  
  
On the basis of the above, one might conclude that the issue of Iranian slaves was of great 
significance, a crucial corollary to the primary goals of Nikoforov’s mission. But following this, 
the memorandum delivers Nikoforov a strong word of caution in raising the subject with the 
khan, urging him to remember that emancipation was not, in fact, one of the mission’s foremost 
concerns, but merely a supplementary issue to be discussed after other matters had been 
concluded, and then only if a convenient opportunity presented itself:
115
 
It goes without saying that the matter of the Persians should not harm the arrangement of 
our own affairs with Khiva. For that reason, do not initiate negotiations on this subject 
before fulfilling the other political errands with which you have been entrusted, and in 
any case only after being well received, because on top of an inauspicious reception this 
would serve only to excite greater antipathy toward you on the part of Allah Kuli. 
Consequently, it would be completely contrary to the purposes for which you were sent 
to Khiva. 
 
As it happens, Nikoforov did not find a suitable moment to broach the subject with the 
khan. He later concisely summarized the matter in a letter to his comrade, Captain Khanykov: 
“Concerning negotiations on the Persian captives… The agent did not initiate [these 
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negotiations] for the following reasons: 1) Up to now, there is nothing positive about our 
relationship with Khiva...”116   
Danilevskii, the Russian ambassador who joined Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan in Khiva the 
very next year, had no more reason to expect success on the emancipation front. Still, 
Danilevskii was commissioned to “clarify” to the khan that permitting the enslavement of 
Iranians in his domain was not worthwhile.
117
 As for Danilevskii’s British counterpart, a man 
named William Taylour Thomson, hardly any information exists in English sources concerning 
his experiences,
118
 but the mission debriefing provided for Danilevskii at least describes his 
position vis-à-vis the other ambassadors. Thomson, “according to the instructions given to him,” 
was charged “exclusively with arranging matters relating to Persian slaves,” and “has been given 
the fundamental duty to consult with the Russian agent in Khiva on this matter and act together 
with him.” He was, moreover, “positively forbidden from intervening in our agent’s negotiations 
on matters relating to Russia,”119 and it appears that Danilevskii did indeed use the occasion of 
his visit to advance a number of Russian positions, including the liberation of Russian slaves, 
who were far fewer in number.
120
  
After raising the dubious specter of Russian and British anger over the issue, and 
declining the opportunity to buy Iranian slaves at their market price, Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan  
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finally wrings a small concession from the mihtar: the latter agrees to release some captives, 
albeit only a small number of them. “If you want ten or fifteen people,” the mihtar tells him, “I 
will give them over so that you will not go away empty-handed.” Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan balks at 
this, and demands 5,000 slaves. This back-and-forth continues for three or four hours, and 
Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan eventually reduces his demand from 5,000 to 2,000 slaves, but this does 
not satisfy the mihtar. The imprisoned Khurasanian notable, Muḥammad Walῑ Khan, who was 
present as an intermediary, pleads with the Iranian envoy to reduce his demand still further, to 
1,000. Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan comes down to 1,000, and the mihtar agrees to bring the 
proposition before the khan.   
After this, the khan summons Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan before him once again, this time for 
a meeting which would prove to be, in the envoy’s retelling, far tenser than the first.121 After 
exchanging pleasantries, the khan asks the envoy what he had been discussing with the mihtar. “I 
was explaining to him my mission,” Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan replies. “The circumstances of its 
resolution are for you to decide.” The khan extends his initial offer: he is willing to give over 
those slaves who had already been manumitted, but any others would have to be purchased. Just 
as he had in his negotiations with the mihtar, Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan objects that the Shah does 
not buy slaves. The khan then makes a still less generous proposition: “The viziers of Russia and 
England wrote to me that the Shah wanted to come [and attack Khwarazm], but that they did not 
permit it… If the Shah comes, we will be here [waiting for him]. Whatever God wishes will 
come to pass.”122  
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In Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan’s telling, he meets this threat with one of his own: “God forbid 
the retinue of the Shah of Islam should venture hither. In such a case, neither your country nor 
your people would remain.”123 The khan scoffs at this: “You think you can frighten me?” “I am 
not trying to scare you, Your Benevolence,” the envoy replies. “I came to converse with you.” 
With negotiations thus deteriorating, the khan finds an opportunity to stall: he asks Muḥammad 
ʿAlῑ Khan  to contact the Shah and ask him to convey precisely how many slaves he would like 
the Khan  to surrender. Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan objects that it could take two or three months to 
go back to Tehran and return with a courier.
124
      
 Thus the talks drag on, and finally they conclude in a manner thoroughly unsatisfying for 
the Iranians: the slaves were not to be freed. Danlievskii, for his part, petitioned for the release of 
“even just 1,500” Iranian slaves, “but unfortunately all of [Danilevskii’s] admonitions on this 
subject to the khan were useless.” The one significant concession offered by the khan was the 
release of Muḥammad Walῑ Khan, the imprisoned nephew of the Mashhad governor. This, the 
Khan allegedly told the Russian envoy, “would have in the eyes of the Persian government more 
value than the liberation of 5,000 [other] people”125—a dubious assumption, of course. 
The Qajars soon resumed their hostilities toward Khwarazm, and it is worth considering 
whether Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan’s demands were merely a pretext to justify the impending 
conflicts. If, as the khan claimed, there were in fact Khwarazmians held in Iran that the Shah had 
shown no intention of freeing, then it is reasonable to sympathize with the khan’s reluctance to 
put himself in a position of such blatant weakness at the negotiating table. More importantly, 
however, the freeing of even 1,000 slaves from private hands would have been no simple matter: 
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if the khan managed it by force, he would inspire the anger of the aggrieved slave-owners, and if 
he purchased their freedom he could do so only at great expense. The objection, moreover, that 
liberating slaves would be a sign of Khwarazmian weakness and could inspire further Iranian 
demands—an argument articulated by the khan to Riżā Qulī Khan —does not seem far-fetched.   
All of this would have been well-understood by Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan and his Qajar 
patrons. They would also have known that Khwarazm’s degree of influence over those Turkmens 
funneling victims into the slave economy was highly variable. The khan’s troops may have been 
unable to patrol the Turkmens of the southern deserts, and even policing the caravan routes to 
Khwarazm would have been only a half-measure against the slave trade; the markets of Bukhara 
would surely receive any slaves that the Khwarazmians did not purchase. In other words, there is 
good reason to suspect that the failure of these negotiations was a foregone conclusion even for 
the ambassadors that took part in them. The main accomplishment of Muḥammad ʿAlῑ Khan’s 
mission, then, along with the rescue of the Khurasanian notable, was perhaps the very fact of his 
emancipation demand and its legitimation by the British and Russian ambassadors.  
*   *   * 
Though freeing slaves and captives was at the heart of these travelers’ missions, their accounts 
reveal little about the circumstances of slavery, the experience of slaves, or the slave trade itself. 
Two other little-known Qajar accounts from the mid-nineteenth century are thus all the more 
precious for having been composed by authors who had each suffered nearly a decade in 
captivity. The authors of these accounts are Ismaʿīl Mīrpanja, a military officer, and Mīrzā 
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Maḥmūd Taqī Āshtiyānī, an accountant and scribe likewise serving the Qajar army.126 Their 
respective texts are quite different from one-another, as were their ordeals; Ismaʿīl’s account 
offers more about his perspective on Khwarazm than about his own personal experiences, while 
Mīrzā Maḥmūd has left us the most detailed and exciting autobiographical narrative in existence 
concerning the experience of slavery in Central Asia. The former offers the perspective of an 
Iranian captive looking outwards, taking stock of his captors’ society in broad strokes; the latter 
offers an inward-looking account of personal suffering, endurance, and ingenuity. The second 
chapter will be dedicated entirely to Mīrzā Maḥmūd’s experiences. Here, I will turn to Ismaʿīl 
Mīrpanja’s account, which allows us a view of Khwarazm from a captives’ perspective.  
 
Ismāʿῑl Mῑrpanja: Khwarazm Through an Iranian Captive’s Eyes   
Ismāʿῑl Mῑrpanja’s remarkable account, which was evidently commissioned by the Shah, 
is divided into two parts: the first is a chronology of political events from the era leading up to 
and including his captivity, including brief sketches of his experiences; the second—and most 
memorable—part is a miscellany of ethnographic and political details concerning Khwarazm, 
laced throughout with sharp satire. Ismāʿῑl’s intention in this latter section is evidently to 
emphasize the absurdity and weakness of Khwarazm; to endorse Iranian ambitions in the region; 
and, more subtly, to critique the ineffectual leadership of his own patron, the Shah of Iran 
himself. Aside from its unusual context and the information it provides, Ismāʿῑl’s account is 
striking on two levels. First, it serves as a notable example of how the literature of ethnography 
and travel was enlisted in the service of empire-building in Iran. Second, it is a work of 
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subversive political satire, its barbs directed as much against the allegedly pathetic Khwarazmian 
state as against the Iranian regime which had failed to bring it to heel. One can perceive subtle 
hints of Ismāʿῑl’s anger toward the Shah, whose ineffectual campaigns had failed to break the 
cycle of slave-trading and captive-taking—a cycle to which Ismāʿῑl lost a decade of his life.   
Very little is known about Ismāʿῑl Mῑrpanja, and what little he tells us of his own origins 
is complicated by the fact that his concise family history is a product of obvious exaggeration. 
Ismāʿῑl claims that seven generations of his family had been supporters of the Qajar dynasty.127 
As Safā’ ad-Din Tabarrā’iyān, the text’s modern-day editor, points out, however, the period from 
the dynasty’s beginnings to the writing of the work comprised no more than four generations (ca. 
1785-ca. 1862).
128
 In any case, the basic details of Ismāʿῑl’s ill-fated mission have been 
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confirmed by other sources. It appears that Ismāʿῑl was dispatched to Khurasan in the early 1850s 
in order to offer military training and support against the intrusions of the Khwarazmian ruler 
Muḥammad Amīn Khan and the diverse armed forces under his influence. Ismāʿῑl’s voyage 
ended in disaster: several Iranian officers, along with Ismāʿῑl himself, were captured and 
transferred to Khiva. There, Ismāʿῑl remained imprisoned until he finally managed to gain his 
freedom some ten years later.  
Through a broad range of incisive observations, Ismāʿῑl endeavors to argue in his account 
that Khwarazmian governance is weak and inefficient; that Khwarazm’s relations with external 
powers are strained and fraught with conflict; that its relations with internal groups are tenuous, 
and that the groups in question are malleable in their loyalties; that its military is weak; that the 
Khan himself is naïve and petty; and that multiple paths and means exist for Iran to exert its 
influence over the country. Underlying all of the above is a fundamental nostalgia on Ismāʿῑl’s 
part—rendered repeatedly, and not always subtly—for the era of ‘Abbās Mῑrzā and his 
successful campaigns in the region, during which he freed thousands of Iranian slaves. The 
achievements of previous eras, Ismāʿῑl suggests, can be regained and expanded upon; Khurasan 
is ripe for Iranian domination.  
The Khwarazmian state, in Ismāʿῑl’s account, is wasteful and poorly-administered. 
Significant amounts of tax revenue disappear into the hands of royals and grandees. If the tax 
system was administered more capably, Ismāʿῑl claims, total revenues would be nearly twice as 
high (250,000 tumāns as opposed to 150,000, annually). He makes it clear that these substandard 
revenues are not due to a moderate rate of taxation: along with land taxes (when applicable), 
Khwarazmian subjects can also be liable for separate taxes on livestock, commercial goods, 
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textiles, tobacco, slave-dealing, and canal and irrigation maintenance. Caravans, both incoming 
and outgoing, could be taxed exorbitantly, and other kinds of customs dues were imposed as 
well.
129
 In terms of state expenditures, great sums of tax revenue are continually tied up in canal-
cleaning projects, which the khan personally oversees each year in the spring.  
Ismāʿῑl hints at the character of the realm’s administrators through sharp satire. He 
dedicates a considerable amount of text to the subject of smoking, a habit in which, he claims, 
most of them indulge. The qāzis, the muftis, and even the khan himself are alleged to smoke 
water-pipes, and high officials are seen hiding from the country’s moral policeman, the ra’īs. 
When caught, in Ismāʿῑl’s telling, they make what he (and any conscientious ra’īs) likely 
regarded as preposterous “legalistic” excuses for their patently illegal behavior. The legal 
arbiters of the realm are then punished for breaking the law themselves.
130
 Even the khan is 
forced to hide his transgression, cowering before the workaday “beat-cop” that he himself 
appointed.  
In Ismāʿῑl’s depiction, the dubious moral character of these elites—the majority of whom 
he describes as “good-for-nothing and useless”131—comes as no surprise given the manner in 
which respect is typically earned in Khwarazm: esteem can be earned by anyone who manages to 
lay hands on 100 farsakhs of land or take command of 1,000 decent fighters.
132
 Status, in other 
words, is not necessarily a function of good character, moral prestige, higher education, or noble 
parentage, but merely something that devolves on those with minions or resources, regardless of 
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how they gained them. And it is only the corrupting influence of these disreputable elites, Ismāʿῑl 
claims, that prevents the Khwarazmian people from pledging their obedience to Iran.
133
 
When it comes to Khwarazm’s relations with its neighbors, Ismāʿῑl’s estimations are no 
more generous. Enmity between Khwarazm and Bukhara, Kokand, and Shahrisabz is deeply felt 
and quite obvious, and any lessening of those tensions—for a couple of days, perhaps—is based 
only on strategic concerns.
134
 Khwarazm’s increasingly-proximate Russian neighbors, 
meanwhile, continue their unstoppable advance, absorbing both territory and local populations. 
Efforts to stall their advance have been useless, and the most notable barrier against their 
incursions—the Kazakh and Karakalpak tribes who had been loyal to the khan—are now, for the 
most part, Russian allies. 40,000 Russian soldiers and 30 warships stand at the ready, and 
Russian forts stand within striking distance of Khiva and Qungrat.
135
 Khwarazm’s strongest 
potential ally, Bukhara, has shown no inclination to join in its defense.
136
 If the Russians want to 
take these towns, Ismāʿῑl implies, as they had taken Tashkent just a few years earlier, then they 
will easily take them.   
England has shown signs of friendship, though in Ismāʿῑl’s telling these signs have been 
only sporadic, and based entirely on the ostensibly hopeless effort of keeping the Russians at 
bay. Six wheeled cannons, provided some time ago, appear to constitute the most notable 
contribution of the great British Empire in that respect. Among the world’s great powers, the 
only stable ally Ismāʿῑl aligns with Khwarazm is the distant Ottoman Empire, whose relationship 
to the former is alleged to be based entirely on Khwarazmian nostalgia and religious esteem for 
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the Ottoman Caliph. Meanwhile, the Khwarazmian populace looks nervously southward, fearful 
of Iran.
137
  
Many allied Turkmens, Ismāʿῑl contends, likewise look nervously toward Iran, unwilling 
to provide any aid to her enemies for fear of the Shah’s retaliation.138 Just as the Kazakhs and 
Karakalpaks had been subsumed under Russian authority, Ismāʿῑl suggests that these Turkmens 
could easily be persuaded to serve Iran instead. Ismāʿῑl provides a highly specific strategy for 
bringing them into Iran’s orbit: by turning northern Iran into a prime market for slaves, the 
Turkmens would reverse their present commerce; instead of plundering Khurasan for captives to 
sell to Bukhara and Khwarazm, they would raid Bukhara and Khwarazm for captives to sell to 
Khurasan.
139
 This would neutralize the threat posed by the Turkmens against Iranian villagers, 
while simultaneously destabilizing Iran’s northern adversaries.   
The Khwarazmian military, meanwhile, allegedly serves as a weak line of defense. 
Nearly one-third of their available troops—some 4,000 men—consist of these same Turkmens 
who might be turned against them. The remaining forces, consisting of Uzbeks, Kazakhs and 
Karakalpaks, amount to no more than 8,000. Strangely, there is no mention of the Iranian slave 
soldiers who were alleged by some observers to constitute a major portion of the Khwarazmian 
(as well as the Bukharan) military.
140
 Perhaps this hints that Ismāʿῑl had not gained much reliable 
intelligence about the Khwarazmian fighting forces. Or perhaps the fact of Iranians fighting for 
foreign powers was considered an embarrassment; it likewise goes unmentioned in other Persian 
accounts. In any case, Ismāʿῑl’s claim that, in Khwarazm, camels carry gunpowder while soldiers 
                                                 
137
 Mῑrpanja, Khātirāt-i asārat, 124 
138
 Mῑrpanja, Khātirāt-i asārat, 124 
139
 Mῑrpanja, Khātirāt-i asārat, 111-112 
140
 Cf., for example, N.P. Stremoukhov, “Poezdka v Bykharu. (Izvlechenie iz dnevnika)" Russkii vestnik 6 (1875), 
652; P. Shubinskii, “Ocherki Bukhary” Istoricheskii vestnik 7 (1892), 125; .N. Zalesov,  “Pis'mo iz Khivy,” Voennyi 
sbornik 1, 1859, 277. 
56 
 
are burdened with cannonballs should naturally be understood as a satire of Khwarazmian 
military “genius.”141  
As for the Khwarazmian Uzbek population, Ismāʿῑl appears to regard them with a 
bemused curiosity. He records their marriage and circumcision customs with no evident disdain, 
and appears to comment appreciatively on their rich hospitality.
142
 Elsewhere, however, he 
gently mocks their personal habits: though indulgence in locally-grown tobacco is practically 
universal, Ismāʿῑl alleges that they will not indulge in the fine fruits and melons produced in their 
own country without a doctor’s orders.143 And what more needs to be said about the religiosity of 
a people that will, according to Ismāʿῑl, wear boots into a mosque?144  
Some of Ismāʿῑl’s sharpest satirical barbs are reserved for the khan himself. The ruler’s 
plain, humble dress is contrasted with the exorbitantly expensive ornament he wears atop his 
head, hinting either at his lame pretenses to modesty or at his impoverished sense of style. His 
(alleged) unusual smoking habits are described in remarkable detail;
145
 it is not enough for the 
Khan merely to smoke the water-pipe himself; rather, he must employ a servant to force the 
smoke into his mouth, either because he is too lazy to inhale it or because his appetite for the 
smoke is so ravenous that he needs to have it driven into his head. The decadence of the image is 
enhanced by the curious sensuality, in Ismāʿῑl’s retelling, of the servant’s ministrations. 
With respect to statecraft, the khan is depicted as a doting but provincial and myopic sort 
of ruler. In a day’s work, along with smoking his water-pipe, he warmly receives gifts of sheeps’ 
testicles from his many visitors, personally seals each bundle of currency before it can reach 
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circulation, and hears out petitions and complaints from his subjects before deliberating and 
delivering the verdicts himself.
146
 In the spring, he personally attends to the cleaning of the 
canals.
147
 In the evenings, he relaxes to the tune of karnay music.
148
 All the while, the Russians 
close in on his helpless domains, and his heir apparent and grandees absorb the state’s much-
needed tax revenue.  
Ismāʿῑl’s satire-laced overview of Khwarazm’s present state is punctuated by nostalgic 
glances toward Iran’s not-so-distant past. While the distracted khan and his weak administration 
had long since turned a blind eye to Iran, Ismāʿῑl observes that previous Iranian rulers had 
commanded both fear and respect among their northern neighbors. Just a few decades 
previously, both rulers and commoners in Khwarazm and Turkistan were meek and sleepless 
before the Iranian threat.
149
 In Bukhara, Samarqand, and all the way to the furthest reaches of 
Turkistan, there were plans to free Iranian slaves and captives and to pledge obedience to Iran, 
that the latter might offer protection from the unstable and warlike country of Khwarazm. The 
Khwarazmian khan even planned to send a delegation to Mashhad in order to pledge his 
subservience to the Shah—so powerful did Iran appear in those days.150  
‘Abbās Mirzā is credited with much of the glory here: it was during the era of his two 
Khurasan campaigns that Iranian troops allegedly captured and shipped off Central Asian women 
to work as maidservants in the homes of Iran’s nobility.151 Meanwhile, Khwarazmian fortunes 
and stability continued to turn on the vicissitudes of their relations with the Turkmens.
152
 It was 
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only with ‘Abbās Mirzā’s death in 1833 that the tides turned against Iran. After the loss of this 
great leader, there was none left to inspire awe and fear of Iran in Central Asia.
153
   
We find here not only an entreaty for Nāsir ad-Dīn Shah to take action, but also a sharp 
and none-too-subtle critique of his leadership. Fear of Iran had not declined because Khwarazm 
had strengthened, but rather because Iran had weakened. The young Shah had failed to live up to 
his predecessors on the northern front. No worthy successor to ‘Abbās Mirzā, the former crown 
prince, had been found to pacify Khurasan. Ismāʿῑl’s critique clearly extends to Amῑr Kabῑr as 
well: this chief minister, who had once demoted Ismāʿῑl, had been tasked with stabilizing 
Khurasan, and he had clearly failed miserably in this effort. Granted, Ismāʿῑl offers a 
dramatically romanticized vision of ‘Abbās Mirzā and his accomplishments. While this crown 
prince had indeed campaigned successfully in the region, we have no evidence that rulers all 
over Turkistan (and beyond) had planned to declare their obedience to Iran. Nor is there any 
indication that Central Asian rulers had planned to free the tens of thousands of Iranian slaves 
who served in their militaries and labored on the region’s plantations. Nevertheless, the message 
to Nāsir ad-Dīn Shah, to whom Ismāʿῑl’s work is dedicated, is clear: the Shah must capitalize on 
Khwarazm’s weakness and reassert Iranian power over Khurasan and Central Asia.  
The foregoing pages describe several Iranian encounters with different aspects of the 
slave trade that captured many tens of thousands of Iranians over the course of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries alone. These accounts show, among other things, how the slave trade 
occupied a significant place in Iranian relations and diplomacy with Khwarazm and Bukhara, as 
well as a significant place in the era’s travel literature. In the chapters to come, I will show the 
impact that the slave trade had on those who were its most immediate victims.   
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The slave trade in Central Asia was not limited to the Iranian frontier. Many Russian 
citizens and others were also caught up in the trade, and the Tsars—no less than Qajar Shahs—
made a significant effort to safeguard and liberate their own subjects. This targeted effort was 
generally limited to the liberation of Russian subjects alone, and should not, as we shall see, be 
mistaken for an “abolitionist” campaign in the region.   
   
Russian Interventions in the Central Asian Slave Trade Down to the Nineteenth Century 
Between the mid-sixteenth century, a period marked by Muscovy’s eastward expansion, and the 
mid-nineteenth century, the risk that Russian diplomats in Central Asia would be killed, taken 
captive, or sold into slavery made such missions relatively rare. Those ambassadors who did 
venture to the region usually had the liberation of Russian slaves high on their state-mandated 
agendas, and scarcely an envoy reached Bukhara or Khiva without broaching the subject of 
Russians held in captivity. In the effort of liberating Russian slaves, these missions failed 
unanimously and miserably. A brief overview will suffice to make the point that the Russian 
Empire had hardly any impact on the slave trade or on the phenomenon of slavery in Central 
Asia down to the nineteenth century.  
 In the mid-sixteenth century, an English explorer and merchant named Anthony 
Jenkinson returned from a grueling voyage to Central Asia, leaving us a personal account of 
what would remain the most ambitious Western mission to the region for decades to come. 
Jenkinson traveled as a member of the Muscovy Company, a mercantile venture with both 
English and Russian backing, and he has left us with the earliest account of slaves being sold at a 
Central Asian bazaar. Surveying the wares on display at a Bukharan market in 1558, Jenkinson 
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observed that both Indian and Persian merchants were buying slaves, though of their origin he 
records only that they were “of divers Countreis.”154 He brought twenty-five of these slaves back 
with him, all of them Russians.
155
 He also described the awful and perilous landscape that his 
mission traversed on the way to Central Asia. In the region around Kazan and Astrakhan, he 
witnessed Tatars suffering from extreme poverty and plague, and Noghay children being sold as 
slaves.
156
 The mission was later stalled by raiders who searched the party for non-Muslims to 
take as captives, as well as terrible storms, unwelcoming locals, and a hard passage through the 
desert. There would scarcely be a Russian mission to Central Asia for decades to come; there 
would not be another British mission to the region for nearly two centuries.
157
   
In the early seventeenth century, the Bukharan ruler Imam-Quli Khan attempted to make 
contact with the newly-crowned Russian Tsar, the first of the Romanovs. After the Tsar failed to 
receive the first Bukharan ambassador, the Khan sent another, requesting the establishment of 
permanent diplomatic relations. This time, he offered in exchange to return some number of 
Russian slaves that had been purchased from Crimean and Noghay traders who were residing in 
Bukhara. The Tsar received this ambassador, and promptly sent an ambassador of his own to 
collect the slaves and to learn more about conditions in Bukhara. As Ron Sela observes, this 
ambassador, Ivan Khokhlov, would have an experience much like that of his predecessor 
Anthony Jenkinson. He visited both Khiva and Bukhara, and reported that circumstances in the 
region were extremely perilous for travelers. His party faced hostile nomads, grueling travel 
conditions, extortion-minded officials, and poor hospitality. It would be another two decades 
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before a Russian diplomat set foot once more in the region, though the Bukharans maintained 
consistent diplomatic contact in the meantime.
158
  
In the 1640s, another Russian ambassador—Anisim Gribov—was dispatched to Central 
Asia with the mission of freeing and retrieving Russian slaves, visiting both Khwarazm and 
Bukhara. He managed to ransom only three slaves. Forty others came before him in order to beg 
his intervention, but he had no choice but to disappoint them.
159
 In the years 1669-73, an 
embassy led by two brothers—Boris and Semen Pazukhin—was dispatched to Bukhara and 
Khwarazm, as well as to Balkh, and again the task of ransoming Russian slaves was high on the 
list of priorities. In Bukhara, the ambassadors were received warmly and treated to lavish 
banquets and entertainments, but negotiations for the release of captives were scarcely more 
effective than in previous missions. Upon demanding the release of all Russian Christians who 
had been enslaved, the Bukharan khan countered that there were no Christian slaves in Bukhara: 
all had converted to Islam. Finally, the khan allowed for the free release of nine slaves and 
offered that the Pazukhins could purchase another twenty-two. Discouraged, the ambassadors 
nevertheless managed to make contact with some of the Russian slaves in the khanate and learn 
valuable information about the workings of the slave trade. They learned that the Bukharans 
purchased many of their Russian slaves from Khiva; that they were often sold by Kalmyks or 
Bashkirs; and that some slaves were sold even to India by Persians or Kalmyks. The Pazukhins’ 
report estimated that 150 Russians were kept in the city of Bukhara, 100 in Balkh, and 50 in the 
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khan’s palace complex in Khiva; many more were assumed to be residing in the suburbs and 
hinterlands.
160
  
The reign of Peter the Great witnessed the most disastrous Russian mission to date: the 
infamous Bekovich-Cherkasskii expedition of 1717, which was dispatched to Central Asia in 
order, among other things, to gain the Khwarazmian khan’s submission and to establish possible 
trade routes with India. Arriving with a considerable military retinue, the Russian officer 
Alexander Bekovich-Cherkasskii reportedly found himself under siege some 120 kilometers 
from Khiva, facing a Khwarazmian army that some of the expedition’s survivors estimated to be 
more than 20,000 strong. The expedition survived the attack, and Bekovich-Cherkasskii met with 
the khan, who welcomed him peaceably and offered to accommodate his retinue in five different 
encampments. Once divided, the expedition was again attacked, and the majority of Bekovich-
Cherkasskii’s party was reportedly killed or sold into slavery. Future Russian ambassadors to 
Khiva would have to contemplate the rumor that Bekovitch-Cherkaskii himself had been flayed 
alive, his skin made into the head of ceremonial drum.
161
  
The remaining decades of the eighteenth century saw relatively few Russian diplomatic 
missions to Central Asia, and as a result little in the way of new information emerged for Russian 
observers concerning slavery in the region’s southern expanses. It was known, however, that 
some number of Russians was continually being captured, particularly Caspian fishermen and 
merchants, the latter sometimes taken in caravan raids. In 1819-20, a Russian officer and envoy 
named N.N. Murav’ev reported learning of 3,000 Russians in Khiva alone, though he—like his 
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predecessors—was unable to free them.162 In 1833, Russian foreign minister Karl Nesselrode 
corresponded with the chief of the Orenburg Border Commission, General G.F. Gens, 
concerning the possibility of launching a military mission to liberate these Russian slaves, but 
the minister expressed skepticism over the feasibility of such a mission. That same year, a 
general named V.A. Perovskii was appointed Orenburg’s military governor, who soon requested 
that a list be drawn up of all the Russians known to be held captive in Khiva. The list was some 
599 names long, and Perovskii wrote to St. Petersburg to advocate for a military expedition 
against the khanate.
163
  
Allāh Qulῑ Khan, the ruler of Khwarazm, was not insensible to the growing Russian 
anger over the question of Russians held in the khanate. In 1836, after some 500 Khwarazmian 
merchants were detained in Orenburg and Astrakhan along with their goods, the khan freed 80 
Russian captives, having freed another 25 that same year.
164
 The remaining Russians, however 
many there were, would be fewer in number than when Murav’ev visited the khanate: according 
to Zakhar’in, their numbers had been halved during a cholera epidemic in 1829.165 
Notwithstanding the Russians given over by the khan, Russian authorities found other reasons to 
proceed with Perovskii’s plan, and in any event the number of captives freed was deemed 
insufficient. Intercession by British envoys likewise came to naught, not because the khan was 
unwilling to release Russians as a concession to the Tsar, but rather because these concessions, 
along with the khan’s repeated efforts to negotiate and come to some agreement short of 
violence, were regarded with suspicion or outright disdain by Perovskii and other Russian 
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officials. Claiming that there were 3,000 Russians held in Khwarazm—a number he may have 
gotten from Murav’ev’s travelogue, then nearly twenty years old—Perovskii demanded that this 
same number of Russians be freed.
166
 Plans for the military expedition to Khiva would proceed.  
 The expedition, which set out in the winter of 1839-40, was a spectacular disaster. 
Blindsided by an especially harsh desert winter, Perovskii’s force of 4-5,000 men and as many as 
10,000 camels did not even reach Khiva. The entire expedition was forced to retreat, and 
hundreds of men perished in the cold. Despite his easy, default “victory,” the khan hoped to 
stave off future Russian campaigns: as open as ever to negotiating, Allāh Qulῑ passed a decree 
forbidding his subjects from robbing or capturing Russian citizens, under penalty of death. After 
this, he freed all of the Russian slaves that had been in his own service, and ordered that other 
Khwarazmians follow suit. The Russians that were liberated in this effort were brought to the 
Russian ambassador so that he could verify that they had indeed been captives. Once this was 
done, each freedman was given a Khivan gold coin (worth about four rubles at that time) and a 
bag of flour. One camel was provided for every two men and women, and by mid-October some 
416 freed Russians had arrived in Orenburg.
167
 E.M. Kosyrev has left an affecting description of 
these Russians’ condition:168 
 The captives were a pitiful sight. In ragged Khivan robes, with shaven heads or with 
 shaggy hair, they barely resembled people. On their faces one could read the suffering 
 they endured in captivity among the wild Khivan tribes. These unfortunate martyrs 
 discussed the horrid details of the torments they bore. They were sold into slavery, beaten 
 with whips and lashes, held in vermin-infested places without food, left at the mercy of 
 horrible insects. Deep scars on their shoulders and backs gave testimony to the tortures 
 these unlucky ones had borne. Several people had had their eyes gouged out and, 
 returning their homeland, which they could no longer see, sobbed and hugged their 
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 countrymen. What was in the hearts of these unfortunates—God only knows. The women 
 were terrible to behold: exhausted, and with mercilessly defiled honor. It was impossible 
 to look upon them without crying. The soul seethed for vengeance on behalf of this group 
 of brethren, for whom life had already withered, and for whom no rosy future opened up, 
 as their best years and the best of their strength had withdrawn under slavery, violence 
 and abuse.  Many did not survive this crushing slavery, and left their bones in Khiva; 
 many were executed for trying to escape. Some managed to flee, but their fortune was no 
 better: they died of hunger and thirst in the endless steppe, to be covered over in sand or 
 snow. There were also those who converted from their Christian faith and began to live in 
 high esteem among the Muslims, but there were very few such cases—most longed 
 violently for their homeland, keeping their faith in Christ and their love for Russia.  
 
 Russian accusations concerning the presence of Russian captives in Khwarazm—and, 
more generally, Khwarazmian interference in Russian efforts, mercantile or otherwise, to travel 
through the region—did not end upon the liberation of these 416 captives. But it would be thirty 
years before another major military expedition would be launched on the pretext of ending the 
alleged Khwarazmian threat to Russians subjects and Russian interests in the region.  
 While Turkmens took scores of Russians into captivity along the Caspian shores or at 
sea, Kazakh raiders found easy prey further north, along the steppe frontier. In 1766, an envoy 
and military officer named Bogdan Aslanov reported the presence of some 200 Russian slaves in 
Khiva and Bukhara who had originally been taken by Kazakhs near Orenburg.  Hundreds more 
were taken during the chaos of the Pugachev Rebellion, and some estimates—unsubstantiated, 
but noteworthy—posited that the khanates held anywhere from 2-5,000 Russian slaves in total.169 
These included officers and local officials, serfs, Chuvash, Mordvins, Poles and Maris. An 
unknown number of captives, rather than being sold southward, were held among the Kazakhs in 
the steppe. Early efforts to affect the return of these captives included a decree, passed in the 
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winter of 1767, commanding Russians to take “Asian” captives of their own, so that these 
captives might be ransomed in trade for their Russian counterparts.
170
 These efforts were in vain, 
however, and eventually the governors of Orenburg and Astrakhan resolved to set aside a yearly 
allocation of 3-6,000 rubles for paying off the ransom. The standard rate of ransom in the mid-
eighteenth century was 150 rubles per captive, though some could fetch a higher price.
171
 
 These allocations, according to I.I. Kraft, were not sufficient to ransom all of the 
captives, and many “laid down their lives in that distant land” (slozhili svoi golovy na dal’nei 
chuzhbine). Kraft writes of the new ransom economy as marking a new era in Russian-Kazakh 
relations:
172
 
 [These circumstances] also spawned a new view of trade between Russians and Asians 
 and of that most shameful trade, as history knows it, the trade in living people. The 
 Kazakhs took Russian people not so much in battle or as revenge for some injustice, but 
 simply for profit in the slave trade. Into that shameful trade came intermediaries and 
 large enterprises [krupnye predprinimateli], competing with one-another. It is impossible 
 to pass over in silence the fact that numbered among the large enterprises with respect to 
 the trade in Russian people were sometimes also Russians, although, fortunately, these 
 fanatics are considered but few… 
  
 The numbers of Russians taken by Kazakhs doubtless rose and fell according to the state 
of Russian-Kazakh diplomacy, the character and tenor of which fluctuated considerably 
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As we shall see in coming chapters, however, 
the capture and enslavement of Russians would be an ongoing issue in frontier diplomacy down 
to the mid-nineteenth century.  
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 Above, I have briefly summarized more than a century of failed diplomatic efforts on the 
part of Russia and Iran to negotiate for the return of their captured subjects and to end captive-
taking along their contested frontiers. Iranian efforts in this respect were generally ineffective, 
but they are worth considering because the ongoing crisis of captive-taking in Khurasan served 
as a major justification for Iranian military action in the region, defined Iranian relations with the 
khanates for decades, and in several key instances—the campaigns of ʿAbbas Mīrzā, for 
example—had an immediate impact on the lives of many slaves. Russian efforts tended likewise 
to be ineffective, but they are worth considering because the liberation of Russian slaves (and, 
more generally, the “pacification” of Bukhara and especially of Khwarazm) helped justify 
Russia’s conquest of the region. Missing from the above is an overview of British activities in 
the region. This omission may surprise some readers, given the extensive literature concerning 
British “players” in the so-called “Great Game.” For all their great adventures, miseries, and 
ambitious pretenses—Captain Arthur Conolly, for example, planned in 1838 to concoct an Anti-
Slavery Confederation in the region—173 the impact of British officers and adventurers on the 
Central Asian slave trade was negligible. The greatest British accomplishment on this front was 
the alleged role of the officer Richmond Shakespear in convincing the Khivan khan to release 
over 400 Russian slaves following Persovskii’s failed campaign in 1839.174 Certain other British 
efforts were characterized by a grandiosity that smacks of madness, such as the petition penned 
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by the independent traveler Joseph Wolff while imprisoned in Bukhara in 1844; he addressed his 
dispatch “To all the monarchs of Europe:”175 
 Sires!  
 …I do not supplicate for my own safety; but, Monarchs, two hundred thousand  
 Persian slaves, many of them people of high talent, sigh in the kingdom of Bokhara.  
 Endeavour to effect their liberation, and I shall rejoice in the grave that my blood  
 has been thus the cause of the ransom of so many human beings. I am too much  
 agitated, and too closely watched, to be able to say more.  
   
 Suffice to say, Wolff received no reply from the monarchs of Europe.  
 British and American travel writing on slavery is nevertheless precious, since visitors like 
Conolly, Wolff, Alexander Burnes, and Eugene Schuyler provide us with some of the most 
detailed ethnographic reportage in existence concerning slaves’ experiences. The abolitionist 
bias of these authors is undisguised, and should always be borne in mind, but this fact by no 
means proves that the eyewitness evidence they provide is falsified. When it comes to the role of 
the British Empire in nineteenth-century Central Asia, however, this dissertation leaves its 
officers and adventurers at the periphery—which is precisely where they ought to be, considering 
their minimal impact on Central Asian slavery.
176
   
 In the chapters that follow, I will examine slaves’ experiences in Central Asia, the nature 
of the slave trade, and the ways in which imperial intrusions into the region impacted both slaves 
and the slave trade. Chapter 1 explores the geography of slavery, using evidence from slaves’ 
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testimonials to argue that slavery was a largely rural, agricultural phenomenon in the region, and 
that the slave trade was intimately connected with overland caravan routes. Because of the trade's 
decentralized nature, I argue, it was nearly impossible to police. Chapter 2 focuses on the 
experiences of an Iranian who spent nearly a decade as a slave, first among the Turkmens and 
then in Bukhara, and has left us the richest firsthand account of slavery in the region. Chapter 
3 draws on other autobiographical sources as well as eyewitness reports to describe slaves’ 
occupations and roles, revealing that slaves could be found at all levels of Central Asian society. 
Here, I argue that slaves’ individual initiatives often played a part in defining their roles and 
opportunities. As a result, the slaves themselves often managed to define the contours of their 
slavery.   
Chapter 4 considers the curious fate of the many slaves who fled their masters for the 
Russian border, only to be pulled into serfdom as part of the Tsar’s plan to settle and cultivate 
the borderlands. Here, I challenge the notion of Russian “abolitionism” in the region while 
further exploring slaves’ means of resistance. Chapter 5 reveals how imperial powers employed 
Central Asian “native informants” in an attempt to pacify the borderlands and liquidate captive-
taking among nomads. I weigh the mixed results of these efforts, further challenging 
longstanding assumptions about the Russian “abolitionist” program. Chapter 6 concludes the 
dissertation by showing how slaves throughout Khwarazm joined together in the largest slave 
uprising in Central Asian history. I argue that this revolutionary episode, little-known even 
among historians of Central Asia, triggered the abolition of slavery in the region as a whole.  
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Beyond the Bazaars: Geographies of the Slave Trade in Central Asia

 
 
By the late nineteenth century, as we have seen, the Central Asian khanates of Bukhara and 
Khwarazm had long been notorious among Russian and Western European observers for their 
part in the region’s thriving slave trade. This notoriety would have severe consequences: as 
Alexander Morrison has recently argued, the ongoing slave trade, as a pretext for war, “played a 
crucial role in legitimizing and motivating the Russian advance” into the region, which 
culminated in the conquest of Bukhara in 1866-68 and of Khwarazm in 1873.
177
 The conquest of 
the latter was followed by official proclamations of emancipation and abolition in both khanates, 
issued by the khans at the behest of the Russian Governor-General. These events were widely 
assumed to have brought about the end of the slave trade in this part of Central Asia, which has 
been characterized—according to the standard narrative—by the phenomenon of nomadic 
Turkmen and Kazakh slave-raiders transporting their captives for sale to the region’s major 
urban centers. There has been little research into how the trade actually functioned, however, and 
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little evidence to confirm that the Russian conquests brought about its demise.
178
 In this chapter, 
I will argue two points: 1) that the urban centers of Khwarazm and Bukhara were, for many 
slaves, merely transit-points in a decentralized network of trade extending well beyond the major 
towns and their bazaars; and 2) that the decentralized nature of the slave trade demands that we 
reject long-held notions about Russian and local authorities effectively abolishing the slave trade 
in the 1870s. I will draw evidence for these arguments from eyewitness accounts of the trade, as 
well as from the firsthand experiences of Central Asian slaves themselves, preserved in 
unpublished interviews found in Central Asian archives. 
 
A Decentralized Slave Trade 
According to a longstanding consensus among historians of Eurasian economies, the rise of 
maritime trade linking Western Europe with India and China in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries had a devastating effect on the caravan trade across Central Asia, rendering it largely 
obsolete.
179
  This overland trade had formerly brought prosperity to Central Asia’s cities by 
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promoting the urban-centered production of everything from paper to textiles. Isolation from the 
new oceanic trade routes was thus (the story goes) catastrophic for the regional economy as a 
whole, and it resulted in decentralization and rapid deurbanization. In recent decades, however, 
research into overland trade in the region after the sixteenth century has revealed that it was far 
from stagnant. Audrey Burton’s landmark work on Bukharan trade networks, for example, 
reveals how the khanate engaged in extensive trade with nomadic, sedentary, rural, and urban 
peoples throughout Eurasia, thanks to overland commercial networks extending through 
Khwarazm, East Turkistan, Iran, China, Muscovy, Siberia, the Ottoman Empire, and India.
180
 
Trade by Indian merchants in Central Asia during this period has, meanwhile, been the subject of 
important studies by Scott C. Levi, Stephen Dale, Muzaffar Alam, Claude Markovitz, and 
others.
181
 While the mere existence of overland trade, as Ron Sela has observed, is not sufficient 
to prove that Central Asia as a whole was a thriving, flourishing region during these turbulent 
centuries,
182
 it is nevertheless worthwhile to consider the nature of the existing commerce and 
how some types of trade managed to flourish. The trade in slaves can be counted among those 
types of commerce that thrived in the eighteenth century and nineteenth centuries, and it was 
bolstered by continual conflict in Khurasan and the Kazakh steppe as well as by demand for 
slaves in Bukhara, Khwarazm, and among rural nomads. 
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 As we shall see, much of the slave-trade took place outside major urban centers, with 
slaves being transported along caravan routes across rural Central Asia and traded in rural 
caravanserais and settlements. They were often traded by and among nomads, and it may be for 
precisely this reason that studies describing this slave trade remain so rare. Nomadic commerce, 
after all, has most often been considered not in relation to the wide-ranging caravan trade but 
rather in relation to specific urban centers, and the most common approach has followed a 
core/periphery model: the city is the core and the nomads populate the periphery, like spokes 
radiating from a hub. In the decades since Anatoly Khazanov published his influential Nomads 
and the Outside World, the relationship between Eurasian nomads and the urban “core” has 
frequently been described as a symbiotic one, with the former providing the cities with goods or 
services in exchange for food, handicrafts and luxury items; the urban “core” constituted the 
final destination of the nomads’ goods, as well as the source of goods and revenue they gained in 
trade.
183
   
In Central Asia, slaves were undoubtedly a major source of trade revenue for many 
nomads, particularly Turkmens, and they were most certainly traded and sold in the cities. But 
the kinds of bustling slave-bazaars found in Istanbul or Timbuktu, in which hundreds or even 
thousands of individuals were displayed for purchase at any given time, simply did not exist in 
the region. While a city such as Khiva was a site of slave-trading and of slave labor, it was 
hardly the “core” of the slave trade; it was merely one possible transit-point among many. In 
fact, as I will argue here, slaves were sold and traded at caravanserais and in rural settlements 
throughout the region. Rather than searching for a “core” or “periphery,” it would be better to 
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think of the slave-trade in terms of “circulation.”184 Slaves and their sellers circulated in 
decentralized zones of commerce.   
Two aspects of the Central Asian trade contributed to its decentralized character. First, a 
significant portion of the trade took place between nomads and other nomads. Second, the nature 
of slavery itself in the region was distinctly rural: eyewitness accounts as well as studies of the 
region’s urban economies have confirmed that the predominant type of work that slaves 
performed was agricultural.
185
 The primarily rural character of slavery was a consistent trait over 
the course of centuries, although the trajectory of the trade in slaves shifted over time. The 
demographic of slaves from India, once prominent in the region, was fast disappearing by the 
end of the seventeenth century, with Iranian Shīʿite slaves from Khurasan taking the Indian 
slaves’ place.186 The Turkmen deserts north of Khurasan became increasingly prominent zones 
of captivity, transport, trade and sale. By the nineteenth century, Iranian Shīʿites would, by all 
accounts, constitute an overwhelming majority of the region’s slaves. Through the northward 
trajectory of these trade networks, they came to form a significant demographic in Khwarazm 
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and Bukhara. Estimates of the number of slaves in Khwarazm in the nineteenth century generally 
range from 30-60,000 individuals; similar numbers were estimated for Bukhara.
187
  
 
Evidence from the Lives of Slaves 
As the region’s slave-traders have left us no ledgers or diaries, the best way to reconstruct the 
trade itself is through eyewitness accounts, as well as through the declared experiences of the 
slaves themselves. For much of the Muslim world, detailed information on the lives of individual 
slaves, and especially accounts authored by individual slaves, appear to be few and far 
between.
188
 Based on the recent ethnographic literature on Ottoman slavery, for example, it 
seems that there are precious few enslaved persons for whom we know the full complement of 
basic information: their birthplace; their age at capture, if captured, along with the location and 
circumstances of their capture and who captured them; their sale-price and the location(s) of their 
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sale(s); the length of their captivity; the sort of work they did; the identity and character of their 
owner(s); their treatment at the hands of their owner(s); their marital status; and the manner and 
means of their manumission, if freed, as well as what became of them afterwards.
189
 
This was precisely the sort of data collected from Central Asian slaves and former-slaves 
by the officials of the Orenburg Border Commission and other Russian border authorities,
190
 
however, and the scarcity of such information for the broader Eurasian world would render even 
a few such interviews precious. For the present work, I have collated data on 45 of these slaves 
and former-slaves for whom the documentary record is particularly rich; for each of these 
individuals, most or all of the above information was collected at the Russian border.
191
 In some 
documents, their lives are recounted in the first person (albeit usually translated into Russian by 
interpreters, who were present and named). Most of these biographies and autobiographies 
follow a common formula, as if in response to a questionnaire, and the formula remained 
consistent throughout the nineteenth century. The accounts are short on sentiment, but the 
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consistent nature of the information they provide lends itself well to a comparative assessment. 
With tens of thousands of slaves in the region at any given time, such a small sample cannot be 
taken for a comprehensive prosopography of Central Asian slaves in general. But certain striking 
commonalities which emerge from this small sample cannot be dismissed as mere coincidence; 
and at times, these commonalities defy common conceptions. The evidence provided by these 
biographies, when combined with evidence offered in other sources, points to a re-envisioning of 
the nature of nomadic trade in Central Asia, as well as to a revision of the standard narrative of 
how slavery came to an end in the region.  
The origins of these 45 slaves and former slaves are recorded as follows: 13 were 
described as Persian; 7 as Kalmyks; 4 as Afghans; 3 as Arabs; 2 as Hazaras; 2 as Turkmen; 2 as 
“Bukharans”; 2 as Kirghiz; 2 as Karakalpaks; 2 as “Central Asians”; 1 as a Tatar; 1 as an Uzbek; 
and 4 as of unknown origin.
192
 These 45 individuals—41 men and boys, and 4 women and 
girls—had lived a combined 683 years in captivity. It is claimed in some sources that slaves in 
the Muslim world could very often expect their freedom after a period of roughly seven years, 
since it was at this point that slaves became eligible to purchase their own freedom.
193
 Indeed, 
this alleged peculiarity of slavery in the region has been used to argue that Central Asian 
slaves—and slaves in the Muslim world more generally—had an easier time of it than slaves 
elsewhere, as they were rarely held in perpetuity. Of the 35 slaves in the present cohort whose 
total period of captivity is recorded, however, only three individuals had spent fewer than 15 
years in bondage. Only two had been enslaved for a period of less than seven years before 
                                                 
192
 Typically, those of unknown origin had been taken captive very early their childhood.  
193
 Cf., for example, Toledano, As If Silent and Absent, p. 91. William Gervase Clarence-Smith provides a 
comparative overview of slaves’ periods of captivity throughout the Muslim world: cf. Islam and the Abolition of 
Slavery (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006), 67-68. The period of seven years’ captivity before 
manumission appears to have had deep roots as a tradition in the Judeo-Christian world; it is mentioned in the Old 
Testament (Deuteronomy 15: 1-18): ibid, 222. 
78 
 
gaining their freedom. (Both of these two had been presented at the Russian border by their 
owners after the circulation of Imperial decrees threatening punishment for all Kazakhs under 
Russian dominion who did not bring forward their slaves.
194
) 16 others, having been presented to 
the Russian authorities, requested to be sent back with their owners in order to continue in their 
present circumstances—their captivity was open-ended at the time of their interview, in other 
words. In all, the mean period of captivity among this cohort of slaves was 19.51 years, with a 
median of 15 years. This tells us, among other things, that these slaves had substantial experience 
of captivity by the time they were interviewed.  
Though nearly all of these 45 slaves had come to the Russian authorities from among the 
Kazakhs, their generally long duration of captivity cannot be considered a trait unique to the 
Kazakh context: these statistics alone do not reflect the fact that a great many of these slaves had 
several owners over the years. Indeed, the prominence of traffic from owner to owner is another 
striking commonality that emerges in their biographies. This “horizontal” transit is especially 
pronounced among those slaves who were initially taken captive by the Turkmens: for this 
cohort of 16 individuals, 10 were sold more than once, and on the whole they were sold an 
average (mean) of 2.43 times per individual. This mobility from one owner to another is worth 
bearing in mind as we come to consider slaves’ transit across the region. We will now turn to the 
autobiography of one of these slaves, whose story unfolds across a remarkably broad 
geographical and cultural range.   
                                                 
194
 On these policies and decrees, cf., for example, TsGAKaz 383.1.184, ff. 11b-19a; TsGAKaz 383.1.89, ff. 10a-
14b. The earliest of the decrees which ordered general manumission among Kazakhs under Russian dominion 
appears to have been issued in 1859, with similar decrees following in 1860, 1861, and 1869 (cf. G.I. Semeniuk, 
“Likvidatsiia rabstva v Kazakhstane,” repr. in Zh.O. Artykbaev, et al [eds.], Raby i tiulenguty v kazakhskoi stepi 
[Astana: Altyn kitap, 2006], 238). Slaves manumitted at the border before this period were generally escapees.  
79 
 
Received by Russian border authorities in November of 1852, a man named ʿAbdullāh, 
son of one Mullā Walī Yār, described himself as 40 years old, a Shiʿite, originally from Herat. 
Fourteen years prior, he had been living with his parents, his elder brother, his wife, his two sons 
(Begrashīd and Sayfullāh), and six servants (prislugi) on a farm the family owned near Herat. 
One day, they were attacked by a host of some 2,000 Teke Turkmens, who were in some sort of 
relationship of dependency to Merv, and had been—according to ʿAbdullāh—at the command of 
Tabsad Khan [sic]. The attacking party robbed the family of their property, making off with 200 
sheep, 60 horses, and 50 head of cattle. The Turkmens took the family captive, along with their 
servants, numbering 13 people in all. (ʿAbdullāh’s third son, Iskandar, and his daughter, A___,195 
had been living with his father-in-law, who was an official in Herat, so they were spared from 
the attack.) The captive family was taken to the Turkmens’ camp, southwest of Merv, where they 
remained for four days. During that time, the Khan freed ʿAbdullāh’s parents and sent them 
home, returning to them from among their stolen goods a carpet, some cattle, a cooking-pot, a 
blanket, and all of his father’s books (his father had a reputation in the region, being a well-
known mullā). ʿAbdullāh’s brother was sold to some Turkmens for the very low sum of 7 tillas, 
and ʿAbdullāh was sold for 8 tillas to a Turkmen named Berdi-Kilich, who in turn sold him at a 
profit to a Khivan two months later, earning 12 tillas. The sale evidently took place in the 
Turkmens’ camp near Merv. The Khivan, named D___, immediately took ʿAbdullāh to the town 
of Urgench and sold him to another Khivan, this one named Palvān Niyāz, for 18 tillas. After 
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five days, Palvān Niyāz sold him to another Khivan, identified as “yuzbāshi Yakub,”196 for 25 
tillas. In less than three months, ʿAbdullāh had already been sold four times.  
Soon after arriving at the yuzbāshi’s house, Abdullah received the news that his father-in-
law, Arbab Zulfikar [sic], the Herati official, had written to Tabsad Khan regarding the 
manumission of ʿAbdullāh’s wife and two sons, who had also been sold off. He learned also that 
their servants had been sold to Khiva, but he did not find out where they and his elder brother 
were currently residing.  
ʿAbdullāh lived with the yuzbāshi for the next four years, evidently in Urgench, doing 
agricultural labor for him, and after four years his master sold him to a Khivan named Yusuf 
Khop-Khar [sic] for 25 tillas, earning back sum he had initially paid for ʿAbdullāh four years 
prior. After five days, this Khivan turned around and sold ʿAbdullāh to a Karakalpak named 
Mullā Bishbay [sic] for 37 tillas, and he lived with the Mullā for the next 7 years, performing 
domestic labor (domashnaia rabota) for him. At the end of seven years, the Mullā sold 
ʿAbdullāh for 30 tillas to a Kazakh of the Tabïn clan who was a nomad in Khivan territory. He 
lived with this nomad for a month before being sold once again, this time for 3 horses and 20 
sheep, to a Kazakh named Chin-Timur [sic], who was from the Shekti clan and lived as a nomad 
along the river Emba. He lived with Chin-Timur for a little over a year before this owner 
presented him to Sultan Arslan Jan-Turin [sic], who gave him over to the Russian authorities. 
ʿAbdullāh reported that seven of his owners subjected him to no manner of abuse or 
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mistreatment—implying, however, that one of his eight total owners did mistreat him. He 
requested that the Orenburg Border Commission convey him back home to Herat, at long last.
197
      
  Over the course of 14 years, ʿAbdullāh was enslaved by a remarkably diverse cross-
section of Central Asian society. He was held and sold by Turkmen raiders, by Khivan traders, 
by a Karakalpak mullā, by an Urgench yuzbāshi, and by two different Kazakh nomads. We know 
that he worked both as a domestic servant and as an agriculturalist, and one can only imagine the 
range of households to which he became accustomed—from Turkmen camps to Kazakh tents to 
the yuzbāshi’s estate. His price ranged from 7 tillas, near the site of his capture, to 37 tillas as an 
“import” at an urban center. “Horizontal” mobility and demographic diversity characterize his 
ordeal, and in both of these traits ʿAbdullāh’s narrative is no great exception in our cohort of 45. 
His story also follows a general pattern among our biographies in that a significant portion of his 
experience took place beyond the “urban” sphere.   
The first half of ʿAbdullāh’s story is quite in keeping with common perceptions of how 
the slave trade functioned: archetypically, Turkmens raided Khurasan and brought Iranian 
captives to the bazaars in Khiva or Bukhara, where they would enter the service of urban 
notables. Here we find the standard model of nomadic economic networks, with nomads 
supplying cities whose markets were the nexus of the slave-trade. The nomadic and sedentary 
economies thus become inseparable, as in the widely-repeated observations of Murav’ev: “The 
practice of catching human beings and selling them to the Khivans has become an absolute 
necessity to the nomadic tribes; that is to say, the latter have to depend for grain on Khiva, and 
grain cannot be grown there without extraneous labour, so that this abominable trade has become 
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an institution for the mutual benefit of Khiva and the predatory tribes, without which neither 
could exist.”198    
Soon after, however, ʿAbdullāh passes from the cities back into the hinterlands, where he 
is traded among nomads. Rare indeed is the study which emphasizes trade among and within 
nomadic groups, and scholars attuned to the many reminders that nomadic and sedentary 
economies were inextricable may begin to wonder whether there was any such thing as an intra-
nomadic economy, and whether there is any alternative model for nomads’ trade-relations other 
than symbiosis (or, according to older models, parasitism) with respect to settled regions. For our 
purposes, two questions emerge in light of ʿAbdullāh’s story: firstly, did a significant slave-trade 
exist beyond the urban bazaars? And, secondly, could the slave-trade persist without the bazaars?   
 At first glance, the travelers and diplomats who provide much of our data on the 
nineteenth-century slave-trade do not give us much cause to depart from the standard “urban 
core/nomadic periphery” models sketched above, or even to elaborate on them. In source after 
source, we are told of a linear progression: captives were dragged from the peripheries to the 
urban bazaars of Khiva and Bukhara, with Turkmens—and, less commonly, Kazakhs—as their 
vector. The center of the trade was the urban bazaar, and the nomads themselves were ever the 
captivators, armed chaperons, sellers, and nothing more. Thus, we have it since the very earliest 
Russian appraisals of the slave-dealing economy, such as the following, dating from 1815:  
The Kirghiz [Kazakhs], marauding raiders in Russian lands, and the Turkmen in Persian 
lands, abduct no small number of people, and sell them as slaves to the Khivans, who, 
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being squarely between Russia, Persia, and Bukhara, have for some time maintained for 
themselves a healthy trade. Without their mediation, the thieves would not be able to 
have so much success and [such a level of] dissemination; for the [Kazakhs], if they had 
not always such ready and generous bidders in the Khivans, would not be so eager to go 
and take captives, inasmuch as they are but little kept as slaves [for themselves].
199
 
 
 The idea that Kazakhs and Turkmens kept few slaves among themselves plays into the 
notion that they were exclusively raiders, transporters, and dealers, and it is likewise a 
longstanding misconception. One can trace the idea from early Russian travel reportage through 
Soviet scholarship. A.I. Levshin, who traveled among the Kazakhs in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, was perhaps the earliest to propose that they kept no slaves among them—
other than their women, who, Levshin characteristically claims, generally took the place of 
slaves, given the alleged laziness of Kazakh men.
200
 In the many years since, some scholars have 
flatly denied that slavery could develop in nomadic societies in general, and particularly among 
the Kazakhs. Their reasoning usually concerns: 1) the relative lack of labor-intensity involved in 
herding; 2) the weak development of agriculture and crafts among the Kazakhs; 3) the 
availability of alternative sources of inexpensive or free labor; and 4) the prohibitive expense of 
slaves when compared with the average Kazakh’s worldly holdings.201   
 The first three points presume that owning slaves was merely a matter of perceived labor 
necessity—a simplistically “rationalist” vision of slavery which overlooks the many tasks 
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performed by slaves, throughout human history, which have been neither rational nor necessary 
nor always readily identifiable as “labor.” This leaves us with the notion of prohibitive expense. 
Semeniuk, for one, argues that a slave typically cost, among the Kazakhs, an average of 75 
sheep, while, according to my collation of his data, only 21.1% of Kazakh households in his 
sample (from mid-nineteenth-century Omsk) had more than 50 sheep, and only 9.6% had more 
than 100.
202
 By considering ʿAbdullāh’s biography, however, among others, we can see that 
prices fluctuated wildly. ʿAbdullāh’s price rose by nearly 500%--from 8 tillas to 37 tillas—in 
different contexts and at different times. At a mere 8 tillas, ʿAbdullāh would have been an 
obtainable commodity for many. And some slaves were free: they could be captured, and they 
could reproduce.   
 If one is still inclined to question whether the Kazakhs kept significant numbers of slaves, 
the Border Commission’s tally of freedmen—those who either fled captivity in the steppe or 
were freed by their masters, and arrived safely at the border—can be illuminating. The earliest 
numbers I have seen are already impressive: between 1749 and 1753, no fewer than 1,024 former 
slaves from among the Kazakhs turned up at Russian defensive posts.
203
 862 of these individuals 
claimed to have fled their owners.  
 The most compelling evidence concerning slavery among the Kazakhs, however, is the 
testimony of the slaves themselves. It is with this in mind that we return to ʿAbdullāh, whose 
journey eventually took him in precisely the opposite direction from the standard model of 
nomadic trade: he went from the city of Khiva to the domains of nomadic Kazakhs and 
Karakalpaks, rather than vice-versa. Here, his story is similar to the others in his cohort: all spent 
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some portion of their captivity among the Kazakhs, as one might expect, given that they emerged 
from the steppe; more surprisingly, most spent nearly the entirety of their captivity among 
Kazakhs. The sedentary centers of Khiva and Bukhara emerge in these biographies as merely 
two transit-points in a series of sales. Generally, major towns are rarely mentioned in these 
documents. Another example will further illustrate the common feature of broad mobility beyond 
the bazaars and urban centers.    
 Like ʿAbdullāh, Kalbay Hamzin [sic] was interviewed by Russian border officials in 
November of 1852. He was then 24 years old, a Shīʿite from the town of Kalyan, one-and-a-half 
days’ caravan journey from Mashhad, where his parents and brother were evidently living at the 
time of his interview. Six years prior, at the end of a winter night, Kalbay and 12 companions 
were grazing sheep about 12 versts (8 miles) from town, when they were attacked by 40 Teke 
Turkmens who had been based at Ashgabat. These Turkmens took them captive and brought 
them to the town of Alkabad, where they were divided up, and Kalbay was sold to a Turkmen 
with whom he lived for one month. This Turkmen then sold Kalbay to another Turkmen, named 
Khwāja Bulak [sic], for 37 tillas. Khwāja Bulak was from one of the tribes which had 
accompanied the raiding party. He immediately took Kalbay to the Khivan village of Pars 
[sic],
204
 two days’ caravan journey from the town of Urgench, where he sold him to a Khivan 
named Kut-Muḥammad [sic] for 30 tillas. He lived with Kut-Muhammad in Pars for the next 
five years, serving him by planting grain and working the land. Finally, he was sold by Kut-
Muhammad to a Khivan trader of Persian slaves named Palvān, for 30 tillas. This trader turned 
around and sold him for the same amount to a Kazakh of the Tabïn clan, living within the 
domain of Khiva. Kalbay lived with this Kazakh for two months before he was traded to another 
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Kazakh, this one named Murat-Bek [sic], of the Karakesek, in exchange for 10 large sheep, a 
camel, a horse, and three large felt carpets. Kalbay stayed with Murat-Bek for 7 months, and he 
was then sold to a Kazakh named Butunbay [sic] of the Nazar clan,
205
 with whom he lived for 
another four months. This last master finally presented Kalbay to the sultan of the Middle Horde. 
At the conclusion of this narrative, Kalbay adds the details that all of his masters treated him 
well, that they did not beat or abuse him, and that he possessed no livestock or holdings of his 
own, or of his former masters.’206  
 As with ʿAbdullāh, Kalbay spent much of his captivity in the steppe. It is not clear that he 
ever passed through the urban bazaars of Khiva, Urgench, and Bukhara, and his time in the 
Khwarazmian khanate was evidently spent in remote, rural quarters. This rural orientation is, as 
mentioned, something his narrative shares with nearly all others in the cohort, and in order to 
appreciate the magnitude of this commonality, we will now step back briefly from particular 
narratives and have a look at trends related to acts of sale. 
 Of these 45 slaves, 7 were kept by their original captors, and the other 38 were sold—so 
far as their biographies reveal—a total of 67 times altogether. For 63 of these recorded sales, 
something of the origins of the buyer and seller is recorded, i.e. whether they were “Kirghiz” 
(Kazakh), “Khivan” (a category which seems to exclude Turkmens and Kazakhs within Khivan 
domains); Karakalpak; Turkmen; and so on. Given the urban-centered model offered by our 
eyewitness accounts and by later secondary literature, one would naturally expect that most of 
the sales took place between Turkmens and Khivans, between Khivans and other Khivans, and—
because these slaves issued from the Kazakh steppe—between Khivans and Kazakhs. After all, 
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the best-known sources are unanimous in emphasizing that the bazaars of Khiva and Bukhara 
served as the crux of the traffic in slaves. But in fact only 5 of the 63 detailed sales took place 
between Turkmens and sedentary Khivans. Another 4 took place between Khivans and other 
Khivans. In other words, only 14% of the recorded sales involved a sedentary Khivan buyer, and 
only 11 sales (17%) involved a sedentary Khivan seller. Bukharans were involved in 6 of the 
sales, and in 4 of these cases they were recorded selling slaves to the Kazakhs. On both the 
buying end and the selling end, Turkmens and Kazakhs predominate. 16 of the sales involved 
Kazakhs selling slaves to other Kazakhs, with another 8 being sales in which the buyers were 
Kazakhs and the sellers were, based on context clues, very likely other Kazakhs. Another 11 
sales involved Turkmens selling slaves to Kazakhs. There were 2 sales by Turkmens to other 
Turkmens, 2 by Kazakhs to Karakalpaks, and 2 by Karakalpaks to Kazakhs. In all, among the 63 
detailed sales, these sources document 50 buyers from nomadic or semi-nomadic groups 
(Turkmens, Kazakhs, Karakalpaks); at least 36 sellers from these groups; and no less than 33 
cases in which both seller and buyer were from one of these (generally non-sedentary) groups. 
The predominance of urban centers—Khiva, Bukhara or others—is nowhere in evidence, nor is 
the predominance of urban, sedentary traders.  
 Four brief examples, all of which will be drawn, like the biographies of ʿAbdullāh and 
Kalbay, from the autumn of 1852, will give some further idea of how these slaves changed hands 
beyond the urban, sedentary sphere: 1) A Turkmen whose name is recorded as Kul-Murat 
Sagdiev was 25 years old when he was interviewed by border officials. After the death of his 
parents, he passed into the care of his brother, who quickly sold him to a Kazakh for a camel and 
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two horses. This owner surrendered him to the Russian authorities, and Sagdiev requested of 
them that he be sent back to his original homeland.
207
    
2) An Afghan, whose name was illegibly recorded, was 45 years old when he was 
interviewed by border officials. He did not know the details of his original captivity, only that 
Turkmens sold him to a man named Khuday-Berdi for 60 tillas, and that this man resold him, 
when he was 4 years old, to a Kazakh, for the same amount. He lived with this owner for the 
next 37 years. He was married to a Kazakh of the Bayulï clan, and he had three sons, two 
daughters, and his own kibitka (yurt) among the Kazakhs. His owner presented him to the 
Russian authorities, who formally freed him, but he requested to be sent back to live with his 
present family among the Kazakhs.
208
  
 3) A Karakalpak whose name is recorded as Mamandat Imaraliev was 30 years old when 
he was interviewed by border officials. After the death of his parents, he likewise passed into the 
care of his brother, who sold him for 100 sheep to a Kazakh, with whom he “traveled” for 10 
years. At the time of interview, he had a wife and a son among the Kazakhs. His owner 
surrendered him to the Russian authorities, who granted him his freedom, but he requested that 
he be returned to his home among the Kazakhs.
209
  
 4) An Afghan whose name is recorded as Midman was 34 years old when he was 
interviewed by border officials. He relates that he was originally from Herat. Nineteen years 
prior, he had been tending to some cattle when he was taken captive by Turkmens. These 
Turkmens carried him along with them for the next two years before finally selling him to a 
Kazakh for 40 [?] sheep. He lived with this owner for the next 14 years before being presented 
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by that same owner to the Russian authorities. Midman did not wish to be returned to his original 
homeland, and requested that he be sent back among the Kazakhs.
210
   
 Despite the scarce mention of Khiva and Bukhara in these sources, it may be wise to 
assume that those sales involving sedentary Khivans and Bukharans took place in or near a town, 
for the simple fact that townsmen did not often venture out into the hinterlands unless joining a 
caravan. But in those cases when Kazakhs sold slaves to other Kazakhs (for example), it is 
equally likely that these sales took place in the steppe. Transport to a town prior to sale is never 
mentioned in such cases, nor would it be necessary: not only did neighbors trade with one-
another beyond the bazaars, but it turns out that the bazaars themselves—and urban spaces more 
generally—were not as essential to the slave trade as they were elsewhere in the Muslim world. 
As we shall see, this hypothesis is borne out by the available descriptions of urban slave-trading 
in Central Asia.
211
 
 
The Slave Trade Observed 
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 Most of the eyewitness reportage on urban slave-trading in the cities of Khiva and 
Bukhara concern the latter, given the relative inaccessibility of Khiva (and Khwarazm as a 
whole) for European travelers. Notorious as it was as a hub of the slave trade, the city of Khiva 
remained fundamentally obscure to most Western explorers and diplomats well into the mid-
nineteenth century. A powerful indication of this obscurity comes in the form of an annotated 
map of the town which was published in the Russian journal Syn otechestva in 1842. Here, this 
map, which in its sparseness resembles a Piet Mondrian painting sans color, is presented on the 
pretext that it should help provide some military knowledge in support of Russian expeditions, 
since the Russians knew so little of the layout of the town. The problem—such as it is—is that 
the map itself was drafted more than a hundred years prior, not long before Nādir Shah’s troops 
caused significant damage to the city. The idea that this map from 1740 should offer valuable 
military intelligence to the armies of 1842 may lead us to suspect that few Russians had, in the 
intervening years, become intimate with the city (except under circumstances of captivity); and 
that fewer still would have personally observed slave-dealing there.
212
  
 The earliest eyewitness account which I have yet seen of an actual Khivan slave-bazaar 
is that of Murav’ev, published in 1822. His description is very concise indeed, and it is not clear 
if he is describing a scene he saw for himself. Of Iranian captives coming to Khiva, he writes, 
“On arrival at Khiva their owner sets himself down with them in the market, and purchasers 
surround him, inspecting and examining the poor wretches, and haggling about their prices, as if 
they were buying horses. Sometimes the Turcomans kidnap them out of Khiva and take them 
back to their parents in Persia, who are often able to pay them handsomely. During my stay in 
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Khiva several such batches were brought into the market, sold, and taken off to the villages.”213 
Though Murav’ev had much to say about the trade in slaves and their experience of captivity, he 
had nothing more to say about the spaces where they were sold. As far as I have seen, there 
would not be anything like another eyewitness report on a Khivan slave-bazaar for nearly four 
decades thereafter.  
  The next account I have found—and perhaps the first which truly resembles eyewitness 
reportage—is by N. Zalesov, from his 1859 “Letter from Khiva.” The passage is striking for its 
luridness; for our purposes, it is still more striking for the modest scale of the bazaar itself, and 
its scant offerings:  
 
Not far from the court there is a small pool, bounded on all sides by high buildings, 
among which a narrow passage serves as the only throughway. Arriving at this pool, you 
will find yourself in a slave-market, which is mostly supplied with Persian captives, male 
and female, recently delivered here by Turkmens, though the trade for this commodity 
decreased significantly during the Turkmen revolt [sic], and throughout the period of our 
stay in Khiva, we saw in the market only an old women of around 60 years old, two boys 
between 9 and 12, and a lovely girl who was about 14 but already perfectly formed. All 
of these unfortunates sat in the aforesaid lane leading to the pool, which was fenced off 
with sticks. With the arrival of a purchaser for a male or female slave, [this purchaser] 
would be conducted to an inner [part of] the market, where, in specially-arranged rooms, 
they would undress and examine the goods in every detail. Among the male [slaves], 
attention is paid to the firmness of their muscles; among the women, to their beauty and 
litheness of figure. When we examined the market, the girl for sale looked at us 
coquettishly and it seemed that she wanted very much to strike the fancy of the young 
“Urus” [Russian] rather than some old Uzbek. The girl was assigned a price of 30 tilla 
(60 silver rubles), but the acquisition of her—as with the other slaves—was permitted 
only for a Muslim.
214
   
 
 Another decade would evidently pass before any traveler offered further observations 
about the specifics of a Khivan slave-bazaar, and we have reason to doubt that the traveler in 
question—Arminius Vambery—actually saw the market with his own eyes. While listing the 
                                                 
213
 Murav’ev, Muraviev’s Journey to Khiva through the Turcoman County, 58.  
214
 N. Zalesov, “Pis’mo iz Khivy,” Voennyi sbornik, No. 1 (1859), 285.  
92 
 
various bazaars of Khiva in his Travels in Central Asia, Vambery writes: “I must also class 
amongst the bazaars the Kitchik Kervanserai, where the slaves brought by the Teke and the 
Yomuts are exposed for sale. But for this article of business Khiva itself could not exist, as the 
culture of the land is entirely in the hands of the slaves.”215 This is all Vambery has to say about 
the bazaar, though he elsewhere dedicated ample space to discussing the plight of Iranian 
captives in the region. Indeed, he is one of our most impassioned commentators on the subject. 
Had he seen the bazaar for himself, we can be sure he would have provided more detail than this. 
His comment is helpful nevertheless, as it identifies the site of sales not as a typical bazaar, but 
rather as a caravanserai—a hint, perhaps, that slave-trading was the sort of thing which tended to 
take place in venues with interior rooms and out-of-the-way dwelling spaces.   
Amazingly, this appears to be the full extent of our eyewitness reportage on Khiva’s 
slave-bazaars.  In all, firsthand evidence regarding the nature of those market-spaces is 
inconclusive—despite a general sense of certainty among sources (especially those who never 
saw the bazaar) that, as V.A. Tugan-Mirza-Baranovskii put it, “Until 1873, the main locale for 
the sale of slaves was in Khiva, in whose markets one could always meet with Tekes trafficking 
in this commodity.”216  
 We are more fortunate when it comes to eyewitness reportage on the slave-bazaar of 
Bukhara. One of the earliest accounts of the bazaar, offered by the English explorer Alexander 
Burnes, gives a wealth of detail: 
I took an early opportunity of seeing the slave-bazar of Bokhara, which is held every 
Saturday morning. The Uzbeks manage all their affairs by means of slaves, who are 
chiefly brought from Persia by the Toorkmuns. Here these poor wretches are exposed for 
sale, and occupy thirty or forty stalls, where they are examined like cattle, only with this 
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difference, that they are able to give an account of themselves viva voce. On the morning 
I visited the bazar, there were only six unfortunate beings, and I witnessed the manner in 
which they are disposed of. They are first interrogated regarding their parentage and 
capture, and if they are Mahommedans, that is, Soonees. The question is put in that form, 
for the Uzbeks do not consider a Shiah to be a true believer; with them, as with the 
primitive Christians, a sectary- is more odious than an unbeliever. After the intended 
purchaser is satisfied of the slave being an infidel (kaffir), he examines his body, 
particularly noting if he be free from leprosy, so common in Toorkistan, and then 
proceeds to bargain for his price. Three of the Persian boys were for sale at thirty tillas of 
gold apiece; and it was surprising to see how contented the poor fellows sat under their 
lot. I heard one of them telling how he had been seized south of Meshid, while tending 
his flocks. Another, who overheard a conversation among the by-standers, regarding the 
scarcity of slaves that season, stated, that a great number had been taken. His companion 
said with some feeling, “You and I only think so, because of our own misfortune; but 
these people must know better.” There was one unfortunate girl, who had been long in 
service, and was now exposed for sale by her master, because of his poverty. I felt certain 
that many a tear had been shed in the court where I surveyed the scene; but I was assured 
from every quarter that slaves are kindly treated...
217
 
  
 In this account, it sounds as if the bazaar in question was capable of accommodating a 
fair amount of merchandise, with 30 or 40 stalls available. But again, as with the extant 
descriptions of the Khivan markets, our eyewitness saw just a few captives for sale. We see not 
the faintest glimmer of the kinds of teeming slave-bazaars for which Istanbul (for example) was 
known. As with Zalesov’s visit to Khiva, it appears that Burnes visited Bukhara during a low 
point in the trade, a season when slaves for sale were generally scarce.  
 Another traveler of the early 1830s—P.I. Demaisons,218 sent to Bukhara to secure the 
release of Russian captives—offers some further information about the structure of a Bukharan 
slave-bazaar, though there is no indication that he saw one for himself. He writes: “In the dirty 
yard by the Registan there is a slave-market. It is open at dawn on Mondays and Thursdays, 
usually [staying open] for no more than three hours. Here they merely exhibit the slaves, and the 
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commercial transactions are almost always concluded in the caravanserais, where those who 
come to Bukhara to sell these unfortunates reside.”219 Demaisons later identifies the caravanserai 
by name: the Sarāy-i pā-yi astāna (literally, “Palace at the Foot of the Threshhold,” or simply 
“Gateside Palace”).220  
 Concise as it is, the information Demaisons offers here is significant: slaves, he tells us, 
were not actually sold at the bazaar, which served merely as a showroom. The fact that much of 
the trade took place in peripheral spaces, beyond the public eye, is likewise confirmed by 
Vambery, who writes:  
 
The sale [of slaves] takes place either in the dealers' magazines, or in some market-place 
outside the town, to which place the goods are removed some days previous. The most 
important depots are to be found in the Khanat of Khiva, first of all at the capital, then in 
Hezaresp, in Gazavat, in Giirlen, and in Kohne. Besides these, every place of any 
pretensions has a retail dealer, who is in connection with the large wholesale dealers, or 
sells goods on commission. In Bokhara is to be mentioned first of all Karakul, and next 
the capital; besides these, Karshi and Tchihardjuy.
221
 
 
 
 The cumulative impression here is of a trade which was perhaps deliberate in its remove 
from the public eye. The general absence of slave-traders from the main bazaars is nowhere more 
palpable than in the account of Mohan Lal, the brilliant Kashmiri munshī who served as an aid to 
Alexander Burnes during his voyage to Bukhara. Lal, like Burnes and Vambery, was repulsed by 
the trade in Iranian slaves, and dedicated extensive commentary to the subject in his travelogue. 
He too interviewed a number of Iranian slaves, and he extensively describes the circumstances of 
their captivity, both in specific and general terms. He was also a connoisseur of Central Asian 
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bazaars: in the course of his travels, Lal visited bazaars in nearly every major town he passed 
through; he comments on the bazaars of Charju, Mashhad, Bala Khayaban, Turbat, Herat, 
Shikarpur, Ghazni, Jalalabad, Balahisar, Kabul, Kulum, Balkh, Karasan, and, of course, Bukhara. 
But for all his time in the bazaars, he reports only a single eyewitness experience of slave-
dealing, which he observed in Qarshi, a town identified by Vambery (above) as one of the major 
slave “depots” of the region. Lal writes: 
On my return from the bazar, I asked my companion to shew me the house of a slave-
dealer; so I was conducted through numerous hot streets, and after a short walk, I got into 
the caravansarae where the merchant resided. He received me with courtesy and sent for 
three women from the room next to his own. They sat unveiled, and their master asked 
me which of the three I liked the best. I pretended to select the younger one; she had 
regular features and most agreeable manners, her stature was elegant, and her personal 
attractions great. On my choosing her, the others retired to their lodgings, and she 
followed them, but sat in a separate room guarded by an old slave. The merchant told me 
to go to her, speak to and content her. After a good deal of conversation, she felt pleased 
with my choice; but told me to swear not to sell her again. She was thirteen years of age, 
and an inhabitant of Chatrar, a place near Badakhshan. She said that she belonged to a 
large family, and had been carried off by the ruler of the country, who reduced her to 
slavery. Her eyes filled with tears, and she asked me to release her soon from the hands 
of the oppressive Uzbeg. As my object was only to examine the feelings of the slave-
dealer, and also to gratify my curiosity, and not to purchase her, I came back to my camp 
without bidding farewell to the merchant.
222
 
 
 In this account too, we find the trade based not at the bazaars, but in the chambers of a 
caravanserai, seemingly well out of the public eye. Again, the scale of the trade is strikingly 
small: here, only three women for sale.  
 One might expect to gain further details on Khivan and Bukharan slave-markets from 
freed Russian slaves, many of whose biographies were preserved either in the Russian press or in 
Russian travelogues. But here too, eyewitness reportage is scarce, and by the early 1840s the 
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trade in captive Russians had subsided so much that the Russian officer I.F. Blaramberg wrote of 
it in his journals as a distant memory: “August 21st, [1843]. I went to Orsk. Upon arrival at that 
place, I visited the exchange yard, the hospital, and the Cossack settlements, and I met Major 
Lobov, who was for many years a slave in Bukhara. When he was just a young man, he was 
abducted by the Kirghiz and sold into slavery. He told me horrifying details about the treatment 
of Russian slaves in Bukhara and Khiva in those days. Thank God those days are long gone!”223  
In the 1860s and 70s, the Russian conquests further reduced the visibility of slave-
trading. Captain L.F. Kostenko, reporting on the Russian mission to Bukhara in 1870, evidently 
learned that the slave-market there was no longer in existence: “There had previously in Bukhara 
been a slave-bazaar, in which male and female Persians were sold like beasts of burden. But with 
the Russian occupation of Samarkand, when many slaves fled from Bukhara to this city, where 
they were freed by the Russian government, the slave market in Bukhara has been discontinued, 
owing to bidders’ fears that whatever goods they purchase can escape.”224 Emil Schmidt reported 
a similar state of affairs in Khiva, where slavery was formally abolished in 1873: “Latterly… 
the slave trade had considerably diminished, and a thousand individuals per annum were no 
longer brought to the Khivan markets.”225 The open trade in slaves, then, which had evidently 
never been especially visible to foreign travelers in the region, was by the late nineteenth century 
assured to remain mostly out of sight.  
 
Russians as Emancipators? 
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According to some Russian officials as well as foreign observers, the conquest of Khiva in 1873, 
which resulted in a proclamation of abolition jointly prepared by General Kaufman and the 
Khivan khan, signaled not only the emancipation of Khwarazm’s slaves but the effective end of 
the region’s slave-trade. Herbert Wood, writing soon after the conquest, praised the Russian 
“civilizing mission” in the most generous terms: “Though Russia's position in the Central Asian 
Khanates may not yet be assured,” he wries, “it is certain that without her leave no dog may bark 
in the bazaars of Khiva, Bokhara, and Kokand. And if a strong government which preserves 
social order and has put down brigandage, slavery, and man-stealing is worthy of sympathy, it is 
impossible not to feel that in undertaking the thankless and costly task of introducing civilisation 
into Turkestan, Russia is fully entitled to the good wishes and gratitude of every Christian 
nation.”226  
It is no surprise that European observers would have expected abolition to constitute a 
major feature of the Russian “civilizing mission” in the East, given that Western European 
powers tended to cast many of their own conquests and interventions in this era as emancipating 
enterprises. Indeed, the nineteenth century was an age of global abolitionist intercessions, even if 
not all interventions were successful, and even if many were mere foils for more pressing 
motivations. The British Empire led the way, officially abolishing the slave trade throughout its 
imperial holdings by 1807, and other colonial powers soon followed suit: Portugal signed a 
treaty stifling the importation of slaves into its colonial possessions in 1810; Sweden banned the 
trade in 1813; the Netherlands did the same the next year; and Spain and France followed soon 
after, the former promising to abolish the trade by 1820 and the latter by 1819. In the decades to 
come, the freeing of Christian captives was presented as a major incentive for the French 
                                                 
226
 Wood, The Shores of Lake Aral, 182-83 
98 
 
conquest of Algiers (though, as W.G. Clarence-Smith observes, “they failed to extend their 
liberality” to non-Christian slaves),227 while, the British Empire attempted to foster abolition 
throughout the Ottoman world, sometimes with the assistance of Ottoman rulers and elites and 
sometimes in spite of their opposition.
228
 The British likewise led the way in efforts to undermine 
the Atlantic slave trade, though the last slave ship to arrive in the American South did so as late 
as 1858.
229
 As Clarence-Smith has shown in his wide-ranging survey of abolition in the Muslim 
world, colonial emancipation projects often achieved their ends, if at all, only very gradually, 
sometimes over the course of decades.
230
 Nevertheless, in this climate of global abolition, the 
Russian efforts in Central Asia, which came not long after the abolition of serfdom within the 
Empire itself, would naturally have been regarded by Western observers as yet another mission 
to end the misery of bondage, whatever its other motivations may have been.  
 A vision of Russian conquests in the East as an abolitionist enterprise has been offered 
in recent historical studies as well, particularly those by Liubov Kurtynova-D’Herlugnan and 
M.D. Farah.
231
 But the overall mechanism of abolition, and the means by which the region’s new 
Russian rulers would patrol the slave trade and ensure that it had in fact ended, were evidently 
never articulated even among the Tsar’s top generals and officials. If indeed there had been a 
grand, overarching plan for general emancipation in Central Asia, it was certainly implemented 
in a scattershot—perhaps even improvised—manner. First, we must observe that, although the 
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Russian conquest of Bukhara in the late 1860s had resulted in a number of Bukharan concessions 
rendered in ambitious treaties, an order of general emancipation was not among them. It was 
only in the autumn of 1873—some five years after Bukhara’s conquest—that, by Russian 
demand, the universal emancipation of slavery became a law in the territory. The enforcement of 
the law involved a striking concession on the part of the Russian Empire, however: General 
Kaufman, the architect of the treaty, allowed the Bukharan Emir an entire decade to provide 
complete emancipation, during which time all slaves would stay with their present masters. 
Attempts to escape to freedom were punishable by death.
232
 In all, we find here a remarkably 
hesitant approach to emancipation for an “abolitionist” Empire.  
 Moreover, while it was the liberation of specifically Russian slaves that, as Morrison 
observes, was frequently evoked to justify military expansion, multiple eyewitness accounts 
confirm that Russian slaves were already quite scarce in the khanates by the mid-nineteenth 
century. Jan Prosper Witkiewicz, a Polish explorer who ventured to Bukhara in service to the 
Tsar in the 1830s, wrote that “There are not many Russians in the Khanate; perhaps one could 
count up to 50 of them, and these ones are elderly, imported some time ago.” Some 20 of them, 
he estimated, belonged to the Khan.
233
 Alexander Burnes, who likewise visited the khanate in the 
1830s, put the number of Russian slaves at not more than 130.
234
 The Russian officer L.F. 
Kostenko, reporting on Bukhara circa 1870, wrote: “Aside from fugitives, there are still Russian 
captives in Bukhara, but now they are not many—two or three people. Previously there had been 
many more. In 1869 the Emir sent them to Charjuy where they all died, due to the swampy 
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climate and foul accommodations.”235 As for Khwarazm, as Kaufman and his forces approached 
the city, the Khan made a desperate attempt to placate him and stave off invasion by rounding up 
and sending to the General what he claimed to be all of the Russian slaves that remained in the 
khanate. They totaled 21 people in all.
236
 
 Notwithstanding the scarcity of Russian slaves to liberate, popular opinion that 
conquest was necessary to end Russian enslavement in the khanates was rooted in a widespread 
feeling in Russia of perennial victimhood on the frontiers. This feeling manifested itself, as 
Bruce Grant has shown, in a vast popular literature, consisting of everything from short stories 
and novels to popular songs and ballads, all concerning Russian captivity in the East, generally 
among Muslims.
237
 To the extent that these captivity narratives had historical roots, these roots 
might be found in the long, traumatic period during which Russians were regularly captured and 
carried off by the soldiers and raiders of the Crimean Khanate. Up to 200,000 Muscovites were 
estimated to have been taken into slavery by Crimean Tatar and Nogai captors between 1600 and 
1650.
238
 The total number of Ukrainians, Russians, and Poles captured by Tatars between 1468 
and 1694 has been estimated at 1,750,000.
239
 As recently as the eighteenth century, Russians 
were frequently captured along the steppe frontier and the eastern Caspian shores; many were 
ransomed, but some were sold into slavery.  
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The Slave Trade Continues 
By the mid-nineteenth century, the age of Russian enslavement had mostly passed. Meanwhile, 
as we shall see, the trade in Iranian slaves, who constituted the vast majority of slaves held in the 
khanates, seems to have continued in some quarters even after the fall of Khiva. Nevertheless, 
Russian military presence in the sedentary heartland of Central Asia does appear to have 
occasioned some changes in the volume of the slave trade. One significant change evidently 
concerned the demographics of the highest registers of power in Bukhara, as many functions of 
state were carried out by slaves. P. Shubinskii described the alleged inconveniences the 
Bukharan Emir ‘Abd al-Aḥad (r. 1885-1910) occasioned for himself in proposing general 
abolition: 
Sayyid ‘Abd al-Ahad passed this measure, and brought upon himself some very 
significant challenges, since a considerable portion of the Bukharan military and almost 
all of the minor court officials and palace servants were slaves. Receiving their freedom, 
all of these people hastened to return to their homeland, and in their place unfamiliar 
salaried people had to be recruited, the maintenance of whom bought about substantial 
new expenditures.
240
 
 
 It is unlikely that “all” of the slaves who had been serving as court officials—however 
minor—would have departed upon receiving their freedom, and we have no further evidence, so 
far as I have seen, to support the claim. Nevertheless, it is plausible that manumission, if it had 
really been effective, would have had a cumulatively dramatic effect on the military, on the 
government, and on the domestic sphere among the nobility. But a trade that occurred largely in 
out-of-the-way spaces—rural nomadic settlements, backrooms in caravanserais—must have been 
difficult to abolish while demand for slaves still existed. Indeed, according to N.P. Stremoukhov, 
who traveled to Bukhara in 1873, demand still existed, and it was still satisfied: 
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Officially, the trade in slaves was banned in Bukhara by the command of the Emir, and 
the caravanserai where slaves used to be sold is now permanently closed. Violators of 
this command are subject to punishment, a fine of 1000 tenga, and six months in prison. 
Even so, a large number of people (mostly merchants) engage secretly, in their own 
homes, in the buying and selling of slaves. As before, the main suppliers of slaves can be 
identified as Turkmens, whose raids have not stopped. Most of those who fall into 
captivity are Persians (I have already said that there are very many Persians among the 
troops of the Bukharan Emir, and these are all unfortunate ones who had been captured 
by Turkmens). But especially vast is the traffic in women: even those from within our 
own borders are taken by Bukharans [sic], by means of deception, using all sorts of 
tricks; and they are secretly sold in Bukhara, and this is done so discretely that there is 
absolutely no way to keep track of them. The traffic in women is conducted 
predominantly by Tatars.
241
 
 
 
 Given the occult nature of the practices Stremoukhov describes, it is unfortunate that he 
provides no hint as to how he gathered the foregoing information. He testifies, in any event, that 
the trade continued not only among merchants, but at the highest levels of state: 
 
 Although a formal ban exists, it exists only nominally, as the very Emir himself 
patronizes this despicable trade. Two things impel him in this respect: first, this trade 
provides him with recruits for the army; and second, by these means he can acquire for 
himself young and beautiful women, and get rid of those of whom he’s grown tired. For 
the purchase and sale of slaves, Muzaffar maintains certain secret agents, who he pays 
very handsomely.
242
 
  
 Along with these bold claims, Stremoukhov provides one anecdote concerning the 
continuance of the trade which was drawn from his own personal experience:  
On the morning of the 6
th
 of June, some poor old man dressed in rags… ran to my tent 
and began asking for my protection. He turned out to be an Uzbek, and complained that 
two of his daughters, despite the publicized prohibition against selling slaves, had been 
forcibly captured and sold to a wealthy Bukharan who, paying no attention to the order of 
the kadis and the command of the Emir, did not want to return them to freedom at any 
cost.
243
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 Elsewhere in Central Asia, travelers, military personnel, and other eyewitnesses were 
turning in similar reports. In Badakhshan, where Shīʿites had long been taken into captivity, and 
where groups of them had long been sent off into slavery as tribute to local Afghan rulers, the 
announcement of abolition from Kabul evidently had mixed effects. According to Thomas 
Edward Gordon, the more visible forms of trafficking had ceased, but the trade went one: 
 
Slavery still continues to be the curse of many of the Shiah states round about 
Badakhshan. Notwithstanding its prohibition by the Amir of Kabul, the disgraceful trade 
in human beings, with all its attendant crime and cruelty, still flourishes…The open 
slave-market certainly is closed, but beyond that nothing seemingly is done to suppress 
the shameful and horrible traffic, which is otherwise carried on as briskly as ever. The 
Affghan occupation of Badakhshan has had the good effect of abolishing the tribute in 
slaves which used to be demanded and enforced by the ruling Sunni Mirs from their 
feudatories with subjects professing the heretical Shiah creed. Futteh Ali Shah of Wakhan 
told me that the tribute he paid in September 1873 was the first ever given of which 
slaves did not form a part.
244
 
 
 It would not be long before a traveler attempted to conduct a more intensive and 
personal investigation into the persistence of the slave trade. The traveler in question was the 
American diplomat Eugene Schuyler, who visited Bukhara in his Central Asian travels, having 
departed St. Petersburg for the region in March of 1873. He made his first attempt to observe the 
trade when he arrived at Qarshi, the town whose slave-dealing had been noted by Vambery and 
Mohan Lal. Here, he saw nothing: “I asked to see the slave market and was shown the sarai, but 
saw no slaves, though I was told that the next day (Tuesday), being bazaar day, some would 
probably be brought in for sale.”245 He apparently never had a chance to return the next day, but 
in the town of Bukhara he would resume his search. His curiosity was piqued by a disparity 
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between the claims of some Russian officials and those of local merchants and others he had met 
in the region. He writes: 
In visiting Bukhara I was especially anxious to learn something about the slave trade, and 
if possible to see for myself what was going on. The Russian authorities had expressed 
their desire that the slave trade should cease, and had been of course informed by the 
Bukharians that it had long since come to an end. Nearly all the Russian officials who 
had been in Bukhara had been deceived in this respect, and an official report had been 
made to General Kaufmann that the slave trade no longer existed there. Merchants, 
however, told me that they had frequently seen public sales of slaves in the bazaar, and 
my interpreter said that, on two visits to Bukhara during the preceding year, he had seen 
the slave market filled with Persians who were dying of cholera and hunger, for, in the 
panic caused by the epidemic, they had not been fed; and the Agent of the Ministry of 
Finance had been able, in the spring of 1872, to see slaves publicly exposed for sale. He 
had made a report of this, but the matter had been passed over without notice by the 
Russian authorities.
246
   
  
 Schuyler knew that he could not reveal his intentions to the Bukharan officials around 
him, since they would be likely to deny the existence of the trade. Seizing an opportune moment, 
he asked someone less beholden to the Bukharan government whether he might be shown a 
slave-market, and he was promptly taken to “a large sarai,” where he proceeded up the stairs into 
a gallery and found “several rooms, some of which were locked, and a number of slaves — two 
little girls of about four years old, two or three boys of different ages, and a number of old men 
— all Persians.” Schuyler reports that there were no women in sight, as both young women and 
old—excepting, apparently, the very young girls—were purchased immediately upon their 
arrival in Bukhara. The slaves were shown off by “an old Turcoman, who acted as a broker,” and 
who explained to Schuyler that “the market was rather dull just then, but that a large caravan 
would probably arrive in the course of a few days.” At this point, curious to learn about how 
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such sales were conducted, Schuyler began bargaining for a “lively looking lad of fifteen” who, 
he was told, had been taken captive near Astarabad five months previously.
247
  
 The ensuing negotiations drew a small crowd: “I was immediately asked to take a seat 
on a mat,” Schuyler writes, “and the room soon filled with people, all of whom seemed to take 
much more interest in the sale than did the boy himself, who did not understand what was being 
said, the conversation being in Turki. The first price asked was more than 1,000 tengas, which I 
gradually reduced to 850 tengas; the seller constantly dilating on the good points of the boy, 
what an excellent jigit he would make, and so on, the bystanders joining in on one side or the 
other.”248 At first, Schuyler vacillates on the price, and searches the building’s other rooms for 
other slaves. When he and his guide find none, he finally agrees to buy the boy, evidently for 850 
tenga, planning to take him to Russia and, eventually, to secure his safe return to Iran. At this 
point he is confronted with “a broker, a swarthy, thick-set fellow from Kara-kul, a well-known 
slave dealer,” who tells him that a rival bidder had agreed to pay 900 tenga for the boy, along 
with two “gowns” on top of that. An additional complication, according to this “broker,” was 
that the boy’s real owner was not present, so that he himself had no right to part with the boy on 
his owner’s behalf—the result being that Schuyler agreed to pay a portion of the price to the man 
as an advance in order to secure the later delivery of the boy, who he failed to take with him.  
 In short, Schuyler was swindled. He never received the boy, nor, apparently, did he 
ever get back the money he had already paid for him. He sent an acquaintance back to the place 
of sale two days later in order to seek out the boy, but this man found only two very young girls 
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and one other boy for sale.
249
 Later, Schuyler mentions his adventure to a Bukharan official, who 
insists that the slave trade had indeed been ended, and that these few items of sale were nothing 
more than remnants. “I told him,” Schuyler writes, “that I did not doubt his words, although, at 
the same time, it appeared very strange to me in this case, that when a caravan of sixty slaves had 
arrived at Bukhara the night before, at nine o'clock, he himself had given order that it should 
remain outside the Kara-kul gate, in order that I should not see it.” Schuyler did not see it, nor 
would he ever see it, but by his own account the official did not deny the accusation.
250
  
 Undeterred, Schuyler resolves to buy another slave. He sends his wagon-driver, Pulat, 
to search the town for one to buy. Pulat spends the day searching, and returns the same evening 
with the news that he had found a boy for sale, about seven or eight years old, offered for 700 
tenga “and a good gown.” Schuyler buys him, and he turns out to be “very small and feeble, 
although intelligent,” a Persian from Maymana who had been taken captive by Salor Turkmens 
some three years earlier. According to Schuyler, the boy had little recollection of his parents, and 
seemed not to know his own name, in light of which he “took the liberty, which in these 
countries is always allowed on the purchase of a slave, and named him Hussein.” He managed to 
retain this boy, despite the efforts of the boy’s former owner to steal him back (fearing, after the 
sale, the he would be punished by officials for selling a slave to a foreigner who could expose the 
ostensibly illegal trade).
251
 Schuyler later tells us that his purchase caused a stir in Samarkand 
and Bukhara, with some notables further denying the existence of the trade and others glad to 
have it exposed.
252
 Ultimately, Russian authorities seem to have taken the reports of slave-
trading in Bukhara seriously: after the fall of Khiva, the Russian Court Councilor K.V. Struve 
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negotiated a treaty with the Emir which resulted in a new injunction, signed in the autumn of 
1873, that the slave-trade be ended in Bukharan domains. This action, according to Schuyler, 
was still insufficient: “Unfortunately, the Russians have always found it more easy to make 
treaties in Central Asia than to enforce their observance, and I have received information from 
Russians as well as from natives that since this treaty the slave-trade has rather increased than 
diminished, although slaves are no longer sold publicly in the open market, as was done when I 
was in Bukhara.”253  
 Schuyler was perhaps the most deeply invested among foreign observers investigating 
the persistence of the slave trade. There is likewise, however, significant evidence from native 
Central Asian sources which confirms the continuation of the trade after the Russian-fostered 
“official abolitions” of the 1870s. When it comes to Bukhara, for example, we can observe the 
persistence of slavery through the lens of Islamic law, thanks to a document collection published 
by Turgun Faiziev. This collection is comprised of some 52 documents, most of a legal nature, 
including everything from bills of sale to manumission contracts and correspondences among 
Bukharan notables concerning slaves. The compilation contains no fewer than seventeen such 
documents dating from the year 1886 alone.
254
 One document contains a brief register of the 
names and jobs of slave-boys—fifteen in all— owned by the Emir, some serving in the royal 
household and some in the government chambers.
255
 In another document, two Muslim notables 
write to the Emir notifying him that one Sardar Ishāqjān, residing along with “several 
households” of people in Qubādiyān province, remains in possession of three male and seven 
female slaves, despite the fact that these slaves had been freed by official decree. Evidently, the 
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slaves had come before a Bukharan general and a Russian official and explained that their 
masters had agreed to set them free, but that these masters were declining to issue them 
manumission documents in order to make their freedom legitimate within the context of Islamic 
law. The masters were duly ordered to issue the necessary paperwork.
256
 The implications are 
remarkable: the official decree was not enough; for these slaves, and perhaps also for their 
owners, in order for manumission to be valid, it needed to issue—in the traditional fashion—
from legitimate Islamic juridical authorities.
257
   
 Other documents preserve petitions requesting that the Emir validate and ensure the 
release of slaves, in keeping with his general manumission decree. There are two ways of 
understanding such petitions: on the one hand, the fact that denizens of Bukhara felt that they 
could affect change by appealing to the highest authority might hint at a degree of action on the 
part of the Emir and other high officials when it came to enforcing manumission; on the other 
hand, the fact that these same residents felt they needed to address their petitions to the royal 
court indicates the failure of more “local” organs of change, and for each petition naming a 
particular slave, we must wonder how many other slaves went unmentioned by any appeal.  
 
Conclusion 
Acknowledging that the slave trade appears to have persisted after the period of “official 
abolition,” it is nevertheless difficult to get a sense for the scale of the commerce. As we have 
seen, even Schuyler—who, among our eyewitnesses, sought it out most intensively—saw no 
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more than a few slaves being sold, and, like many others before him, he was informed that he 
had chosen an inauspicious day if he had wished to see many slaves for sale. Better that he 
should come back the next day; better that he should have come earlier. Not a single eye-witness, 
so far as I know, reported seeing a caravanserai or marketplace overflowing with victims of the 
trade. And yet none denied that the region itself was flush with slaves: however invisible their 
sale and exchange, they were visible at all levels of society, from the royal court to the nobles’ 
estates to the tents of nomads.  
 In this disparity between the low visibility of the trade and the evident wealth of slaves, 
we can ascertain something of why the commerce would have been so difficult to stop. First, it 
appears that slave-selling did not tend to take place openly, in public markets and bazaars. Slaves 
were sometimes exhibited in such spaces, but it appears to have been more common for sales to 
take place in out-of-the-way spaces: in backrooms, or in the chambers of caravanserais. Granted, 
a shipment of 60 slaves may indeed have been waiting beyond the gates as Schuyler did his 
shopping. But the balance of our evidence points to the conclusion that slave-dealing took place 
predominantly in caravanserais, at least some of which were specially appointed for this sort of 
business.  
 If the trade in slaves was a business for caravans and their members—a proposition 
which makes intuitive sense, given the great distances the “merchandise” had to travel between, 
say, Khurasan and Bukhara, and the dangers of the road in between—then we might look to 
caravanserais, rather than the main bazaars of major towns, as our nexuses and points-of-sale as 
we attempt to recreate a “geography” of the slave trade in Central Asia. The region, moreover, 
was traversed by caravan routes, and dotted with so many caravanserais that, in the last decade, 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) launched a 
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multi-national project to inventory all of the caravanserai structures which can still be found 
there.
258
 A map released by UNESCO reveals, by my count, more than two dozen known 
caravanserais stretching from Khurasan across the territory of the Khanates.
259
 Presumably, 
dealers in slaves—or any other merchandise—could have stopped at any one of these which may 
have been operational in the nineteenth century, and plied their trade while in residence. This 
could help explain the dispersal of slaves across the rural landscape observed by Burnes as he 
traveled through a small village in the region: “Though the village in which we were now 
residing could not boast of more than twenty houses, there were yet eight Persian slaves; and 
these unfortunate men appear to be distributed in like proportion throughout the country.”260 
 We may now recall the former slave Kalbay Hamzin whom we met earlier in this 
chapter. He was held for some time at the Khivan village of Pars, which he describes as a two-
day caravan journey from Urgench. Kalbay never mentions having been sold at Urgench, 
however, and when he was resold by his owner at Pars—to another “Khivan,” and then to a 
Kazakh—we may ask ourselves whether it seems likely that each subsequent owner needed to 
travel to a major town in order to buy or sell him, when caravans of slave-dealers and other 
merchants were passing through the hinterlands all the while. The more likely site of sale would 
have been the caravanserai closest to where the owner lived, and only for some owners would 
this have meant towns like Khiva, Urgench, and Bukhara. All caravanserais were sites of 
commerce, and there is no reason to believe that slaves were different than any other commodity 
in terms of where they could be sold. Stopping the trade in slaves, in other words, would have 
involved, at the very least, patrolling the caravanserais.  Beyond the caravanserais, moreover, 
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there was slave-trading among nomads. Kazakhs of the remote steppe evidently exchanged 
slaves with other nomadic Kazakhs, and Turkmens did the same further south. 
 In short, the generally-accepted view that the Russians ended the slave trade by 
enforced decree from the towns of Khiva and Bukhara becomes still harder to believe in light of 
contrary eyewitness evidence; and especially in light of native documents, dating from well 
beyond the 1870s, which prove that Islamic jurists were still receiving cases concerning slaves at 
that time, and dealing with slavery in the familiar legal framework. When we turn to the 
geography and mobility of the trade itself, we can cast further doubt on the effectiveness of 
Russian-sponsored abolition. In light of the evidence that caravanserais served as points where 
slaves were trafficked, and in the absence of any evidence that the vast network of Central Asian 
caravanserais was patrolled by any “abolitionist” force (whether Russian or native), we should 
wonder how probable it is that dealers would have been caught with any frequency. Finally, in 
light of evidence suggesting that nomadic groups traded and sold slaves among themselves, we 
can easily understand why Russian authorities had to rely increasingly on native informants to 
track down offenders and free captives. While we cannot accept, for the reasons above, the 
proposition that Russian- and locally-fostered abolition actually stopped the slave-trade, we 
cannot dismiss the numerous reports which suggest—contrary to Schuyler’s claim—that the 
volume of the trade did indeed decline. To find the reasons for this decline, however, we must 
look beyond the bazaars, turning our attention from the urban centers and markets to those steppe 
and Iranian borderlands from which the supply of captives had long been taken.  
 Here, we have considered some major aspects of the trade in slaves across Central 
Asia. In the next chapter, we will explore the experience of slavery in the region through the eyes 
of a man who spent a decade in bondage.   
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Chapter 2 
 
From Despair to Liberation: Mῑrzā Maḥmūd Taqῑ Āshtiyānῑ’s Ten Years of Slavery  
 
When Mῑrzā Maḥmūd Taqῑ Āshtiyānῑ, an Iranian scribe, artist and accountant (karguzar), arrived 
at his family home in Tehran in 1870, his loved ones may have thought they were looking at a 
ghost. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd had been away for nearly a decade. He had fallen into captivity among a 
group of Sarïq Turkmens while accompanying the Qajar military in a campaign against Merv in 
1860-61, and had spent the next ten years as a slave. After making his way back to freedom, he 
authored the richest firsthand account of Central Asian slavery in existence.
261
 Having been 
enslaved both as a laborer in a Turkmen desert village and as a well-compensated servant of 
Bukharan elites, his decade-long ordeal offers us a window onto the remarkable diversity of 
experiences possible for slaves in the region. As we shall see, the many clever strategies Mῑrzā 
Maḥmūd used in guiding his own fate, whether by manipulating his owners or by shrewdly 
deploying his artistic talents, likewise reveals something of the individual initiative slaves could 
exert to survive their ordeals and better their positions.  
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 For the study of slaves’ experiences in Central Asia, there is no better point of entry than 
Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s account. Rather than breaking up the momentum of his narrative with 
analytical asides, this chapter will provide a detailed, uninterrupted retelling of Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s 
ordeal, concluding with some thoughts on what his experiences can tell us about slavery in the 
region more generally.  
 
Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s Story  
Soon after taking Mῑrzā Maḥmūd into captivity, the Sarïq Turkmens take his clothes. His proper 
hat is swapped for an ill-fitting hat that hangs over his eyes, and he is given an old green shawl—
the shawl of a sayyid (an esteemed direct descendent of the Prophet Muḥammad). At first he 
declines to wear it, on the grounds that donning the attire of a sayyid is inappropriate for a man 
of a lesser lineage. For several days he attempts to make do without any covering at all, but 
eventually he caves to the elements and takes to wearing the shawl, leading many of his fellow-
travelers to assume—notwithstanding his vehement denials—that he is of sacred lineage.262 As 
he marches through the desert in his green shawl, he has no way of knowing his ultimate 
destination. He knows only that slaves were sent off to all parts, urban and rural: Bukhara, 
Shirgen, Urgench, Labab, Khiva, Balkh, Qaraqul, and “other, worse places.” Day by day, 200 or 
300 individuals were sent off to slavery as if they were “ugly wares and dirty commercial 
goods.”263 For the time being, he would be the property of a Sarïq named Khan Muḥammad, who 
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is determined to ransom him back to Iran for no less than 100 tillas, a very large sum for any 
slave.  
Khan Muḥammad refuses lesser offers, and he begins tormenting Mῑrzā Maḥmūd in order 
to force him to correspond with Iranians in Mashhad to secure a higher ransom. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd 
is shackled at night with stocks (bukhaw-i pā) on his legs, weighted ring-cuffs on his hands (ṭās-i 
ḥalqa) and a chain on his neck (zanjῑr). The chains wound him where they dig into his skin, and 
he cannot sleep due to the excess of filth and lice (chirk o shipish). He is given no carpet or 
blanket to use at night, and his hat, which blackens from the smoke of the dwelling’s wood-fire, 
is all he has with which to cover himself. He is given stale barley bread to eat, bread so hard that 
it cuts his mouth, though he observes that the Turkmens themselves partook of the same.
264
   
 Mῑrzā Maḥmūd soon begins planning his escape. He and six others pool their resources to 
hire a guide, figuring that it is too dangerous to try to make their way alone to Herat, Mashhad or 
Sarakhs. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd secures a loan of 14 tillas from his master, promising to pay him back 
20 tillas in one month’s time—a hint of the privileges that could be enjoyed when a slave 
convinced a master of his or her talents. Altogether, the group of seven slaves gather over 90 
tillas, and a man named Rustam agrees to guide them. At the captives’ prompting, Rustam 
swears on a Qur’ān and vows to divorce his own wife (sawgand-i zan talāqῑ) if he fails to live up 
to his end of the bargain. He receives 82 tillas with which to buy horses for all involved, and 
another 10 tillas as payment for his services. He returns with the horses, and the group sets off 
toward freedom. Just a few miles down the road, however, Rustam stops them. He asks for more 
money, for reasons that Mῑrzā Maḥmūd cannot ascertain. Then Rustam disappears into the 
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desert, leaving the group stranded. They return to their masters, who are fortunately unaware of 
the attempted escape.
265
  
 A month passes, and Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s debt to his master comes due, but—to the slave’s 
good fortune—Khan Muḥammad is thoroughly distracted: he is enraptured by a “beautiful” ten 
or twelve year-old slave boy named Shahbāz, whom he had recently purchased. Khan 
Muḥammad dresses the boy in such fine clothes that it is impossible to tell that he is a slave 
(hālat-i asῑrῑ dar u hīch maʿlūm nabūd). He takes the boy everywhere, and, in Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s 
words, intended to “tame” him and use him for sodomy (livāṭ). He prepares the boy’s bedding 
close to his own, and sleeps beside him. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd, meanwhile, finds it difficult to sleep 
more than a couple hours a night, and on one sleepless night he hears the boy weeping. He 
attempts to comfort the boy, but suddenly Khan Muḥammad arrives and beats Mῑrzā Maḥmūd 
for bothering his beloved slave. The next morning, Shahbāz comes to Mῑrzā Maḥmūd and 
explains how Khan Muḥammad mistreats him at night (shabhā-rā bā man ʿamal-i bad nimāyad), 
and that he sometimes suffers punishment when he refuses his master’s advances.266    
 Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s heart aches for Shahbāz, and he hatches a plan to liberate him from 
their master. He conspires to inform Khan Muḥammad’s wife of her husband’s doings. One 
night, while Khan Muḥammad is busy abusing the boy, his wife rushes in and yanks the blanket 
from them. In Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s words, she “saw his pantless ass and gave him a kick” (kūn-i bῑ-
shalvār dῑda lagadῑ bar u zāda). She shouts at him, pulls his beard and rips his clothes. In the 
end, Khan Muḥammad sells Shahbāz to a man from another village.267  
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 Soon after, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd would come to the aid of another fellow-slave held in the 
village. The slave, named Muḥammad, was purchased by a wealthy shepherd named Aqqi who, 
despite his wealth, was so stingy that his usual meal was nothing more than an onion and a dish 
of water. This tight-fisted master had turned down multiple offers of ransom for Muḥammad, and 
it was clear that he—like Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s own master—was holding out indefinitely for an 
unrealistically high price. This inspired anger among the people from Muḥammad’s native 
village, and in the meantime Muḥammad was made to herd sheep and work the land. One day, a 
Sarïq named Baylï tells Mῑrzā Maḥmūd of his intentions to rob the stingy slave-owner. Baylï was 
famous for his thieving, but he evidently had disdain for the slave trade; he was also competent 
in shoemaking (kaffāshῑ), and he earned his keep both as a shoemaker and as a thief. At dawn, he 
robs Aqqi’s residence and carries off the goods to Herat in order to sell them. When Baylï 
returns, he announces to Mῑrzā Maḥmūd that he had come out 100 tillas richer than expected, 
and that his next plan was to free Muḥammad from his master. He provides the slave with 
money, bread, food and water, and Muḥammad prepares to make his getaway.268   
 On the night of his escape, Muḥammad meets Baylï at an agreed-upon place and they ride 
off to Herat. It is a windy night, with dust blowing all around, and Aqqi shouts out to 
Muḥammad, reprimanding him for failing to close the tent-flaps. He soon realizes that his slave 
is gone. A month later, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd receives a letter from Muḥammad, who reports that he 
managed to make it safely back home to Mashhad. His successful escape has the incidental effect 
of worsening Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s own servitude, however: Khan Muḥammad, paranoid of losing 
his valuable slave in a similar manner, keeps a stricter watch on him, rising twice each night to 
check the tightness of Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s chains.269  
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 With the coming of summer, the Turkmens spend their time working the land, and Mῑrzā 
Maḥmūd is forced to lug stones and tend to the chickens. He suffers terribly from the heat and 
from his shackles, and finds that he cannot endure the labor. He cries out behind Khan 
Muḥammad’s residence at night like a man possessed, and at one point he throws himself to the 
ground and faints (khod-rā be zamῑn afkānda va bῑhūsh shoda). Khan Muḥammad and his 
brother come and carry Mῑrzā Maḥmūd into the house, where he behaves as if insane, striking 
out at anyone who comes near and bashing his head against the ground. His master, 
understandably, laments that he had not sold Mῑrzā Maḥmūd when he had the chance.270 
  Mῑrzā Maḥmūd soon realizes the benefits of madness: he is excused from lugging stones. 
He keeps up the act for 23 days, and word spreads among the village children about the “crazy” 
slave. He frightens them away whenever they gather to see him. He also takes to scaring Khan 
Muḥammad’s wife away from her meals, snatching the bread she leaves behind. With the extra 
sustenance and exemption from labor, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s health improves, and he hatches a new 
plan to escape. He takes advantage of his free access to the “postal” system, by which his master 
had formerly made him contact possible ransom-payers, as well as his connections to other 
slaves and former-slaves he had met in the village. One of these slaves was a Qandahari named 
Mullā Riżā, who had done taqῑya (claiming to be a Sunni rather than a Shῑʿite) in order to 
improve his lot, but was still treated harshly by his master. Mullā Riżā’s captivity came to the 
attention of the Afghan chieftain Dost Muḥammad Khan, and he was ransomed for 44 tillas. 
Mῑrzā Maḥmūd contacts the liberated Mullā Riżā, and makes an unusual request: he asks him to 
send some arsenic (sam al-fār) and a file (sūhān). Mullā Riżā sent him two misqāls of arsenic.271  
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 It would not be long before Mῑrzā Maḥmūd gets his chance to deploy the poison. One 
day, Khan Muḥammad asks Mῑrzā Maḥmūd to prepare some tea for him. Seizing the 
opportunity, he poisons the tea-water with ½ misqāl of arsenic. But just as he is adding it to the 
water, Khan Muḥammad’s brother arrives and requests milk-tea instead. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd pours 
out some of the water, since milk-tea requires less of it, and then adds milk to the poisoned water 
remaining in the pot. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd had no intentions of poisoning Khan Muḥammad’s brother 
along with Khan Muḥammad himself, but soon enough the situation becomes still more 
complicated: his master’s sister, son, brother, wife, and one daughter all arrive to enjoy some of 
the freshly-made tea.
272
  
 Khan Muḥammad and his sister sip the poisoned tea, and they complain about its strange 
flavor. Khan Muḥammad’s brother echoes the complaint, and spills his cup on the ground. The 
others, too, declare it to be bad tea, and soon enough a change comes over them all. They go 
pale, grow weak, and begin to vomit. They all complain of suffering great thirst, and they begin 
to speculate that they had been poisoned.
273
 
 Khan Muḥammad accuses Mῑrzā Maḥmūd of trying to kill the lot of them, and the ḥākim 
of the Turkmens is summoned along with a Herati Jewish doctor, who examines the tea and tests 
it with instruments. In response to their accusations, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd objects that he had been a 
slave there for some two years and lacked both the money and the means to get hold of any 
poison. He claims that the dirty copper teapot was to blame for the poisoning, and he wins 
enough support for this hypothesis that his life is spared. He is nevertheless beaten brutally (for 
good measure), and he is never again permitted near the cups and pitchers. His master learns to 
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fear him, and Mῑrzā Maḥmūd reaps the benefits of being feared: for two or three months, he is 
exempted from some of his former labors.
274
  
 Not long after, a number of slaves from the village would make another attempt to 
escape. After spending the night hiding in a pit that had been dug at a local residence, the group 
ventures toward Balamurghab along with a group of Turkmens. They are intercepted in the 
desert by a band of alamanchis (raiders), however, and after a fierce fight in which several 
Turkmens are killed, the slaves are dragged back to Panjdih. Although Mῑrzā Maḥmūd is not 
among them, he again suffers incidentally from the escape-plans of other slaves; once again, 
Khan Muḥammad grows paranoid about losing his slave, and he tightens Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s 
chains.
275
  
 One of Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s duties had been to give fodder to Khan Muḥammad’s camel, a 
task he seems usually to have performed within sight of his master. One day, however, Khan 
Muḥammad gives him a rope and a sack, unchains him, and instructs him to go retrieve more 
fodder on his own. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd seizes the opportunity: once he is out of sight, he sets off 
toward Balamurghab. He ties his shoes on backwards in order to deceive any pursuers (kaffashῑ 
ki dar pā dāshtam ān-rā vārūna pūshῑda). Eventually, the cord with which he had strapped on 
the shoes frays, and he continues barefoot through the desert. He soon loses his way. That night, 
he finds himself at a Salor settlement. He stays out of sight, and attempts stealthily to steal a 
horse. He cannot get the animal untethered, however, and so he travels on, still barefoot. By 
morning he is tired, hungry, and terribly thirsty. He comes to a deep canyon with a river at its 
bottom, but the river is unreachable. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd climbs a hill to get his bearings and sees, in 
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the distance, the village of Murghab; with freedom in sight, he resolves to press on toward the 
village under the cover of night.
276
  
 Suddenly, he sees five Turkmens some distance down the hillside—three on horseback, 
two on foot. They see him too. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s hair had grown long, “like an Afghan’s,” and 
the Turkmens on foot take him for an Afghan from Balamurghab. But the horsemen knew better: 
they were from Panjdih, and they recognize Mῑrzā Maḥmūd, shouting out to the others that he is 
an escaped slave. They capture him and Mῑrzā Maḥmūd pleads that they not bring him back to 
the village; he promises a reward if they sell him instead in Balamurghab. The Turkmens on foot 
immediately agree, but the horsemen from Panjdih at first refuse. Eventually, however, they too 
consent to the idea. Settling in for the night, they swear an oath that they will sell Mῑrzā Maḥmūd 
somewhere nearby the very next day.
277
 
 Their promise turns out to be a ploy, probably intended to placate their prisoner. Khan 
Muḥammad is informed of Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s recapture, and the slave is taken to the Salor 
settlement of Marchaq, where Khan Muḥammad is waiting to retrieve him. There, Mῑrzā 
Maḥmūd finds his master “sitting like an angry boar” (chūn gurāz-i khashmgῑn nishasta). Mῑrzā 
Maḥmūd is beaten and chained. The next morning he is taken back to Panjdih, where he is 
beaten yet again until a local resident intervenes, counseling Khan Muḥammad that there is no 
point in beating a slave, since a caged bird will inevitably think of flying to freedom.
278
  
 Not long after, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd, remarkably undeterred, makes yet another attempt to gain 
his freedom. He slips from his chains one night while Khan Muḥammad is asleep, and heads 
again toward Balamurghab. He stays some distance from the main road, hoping to stay out of 
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sight, but once again he loses his way. Wandering without water in the brutal heat of the day, the 
elements push him to the brink of death. Dazed from thirst, he finds the bones of a sheep and 
tries ravenously to break them open, hoping to find some blood with which to wet his parched 
mouth. The effort serves only to weaken him further, and he begins to speculate that living in 
slavery is better than dying of thirst in the desert. He scrambles up a hill to get his bearings, and, 
from on high, he sees the glitter of water some distance away. By night, he travels toward it.
279
 
 Suddenly, in the night, he hears the bark of a dog, followed by two or three gunshots. He 
would later learn that the dog belonged to a shepherd, who had fired into the air to scare off what 
was assumed to be a thief. Khan Muḥammad later came upon the shepherd in his hunt for Mῑrzā 
Maḥmūd, and the shepherd described the runaway’s footprints: they must belong to a fugitive, 
the shepherd shrewdly reasoned, since if they had been the footprints of a Turkmen they would 
not have passed through Egyptian thorn (khar-i mughῑlān).280  
 Meanwhile, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd had made his way down to the river that he had seen from 
the hilltop. Thanking God that he had not died of thirst, he went down to the waterside. Just as he 
is about to drink, he hears a voice behind him, warning him that the water is bitter and salty. He 
turns to see Khan Muḥammad, who greets him with brutal blows from a horse-whip (qamchï). 
Khan Muḥammad drags him into the water and bids him to drink it; Mῑrzā Maḥmūd vomits from 
a single sip. His master then gives him some bread and clean water, and brings him to a Turkmen 
tent where he is given a yogurt drink (dūgh). Khan Muḥammad assures him that if he had not 
consumed the bread, fresh water, and yogurt, the foul river-water would have killed him.
281
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 When they return together to Panjdih, Khan Muḥammad beats Mῑrzā Maḥmūd once more 
and shackles him so tightly that escape is impossible. In his manacled state, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd 
assumes, at the very least, that he would no longer be made to work the hand-mill (dastās) or 
graze the camels. But he is made to graze the camels anyway, though he is no longer much use in 
this line of work. Khan Muḥammad’s wife, noticing his poor work with the camels, insists that 
Mῑrzā Maḥmūd be starved, so that he can suffer the same fate as the camels he looks after. He 
goes hungry until, in a stroke of luck, he finds two small melons (kharbūza) and a watermelon 
(hindivāna) along with two discs of bread out in the fields.282 
 One day, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd hears a local Turkmen crier (jarchi) announce to the people of 
Panjdih that a raid was being organized in the direction of Mashhad, and that any who wished to 
partake should begin preparing provisions and readying their horses (literally, keeping the horses 
“raw” [khāmῑ]). Khan Muḥammad is not up for raiding himself, but he has a fine horse and he 
plans to lend it to a raider in exchange for one-half of any spoils the raider earns. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd 
is assigned to look after the horse in the meantime. The thought that the animal might be used to 
drag another human being into slavery is more than he can take; he fetches his arsenic. The horse 
dies that very night from the poisoned barley Mῑrzā Maḥmūd puts in its feedbag, and Khan 
Muḥammad seethes with rage, cursing anyone who comes near.283   
 The raid, as it turns out, ends in disaster for the two hundred horsemen who gathered to 
take part in it. They encounter strong resistance on the way, and 96 of them perish in the 
resulting battle. Another 82 are taken prisoner and dragged to Mashhad, where, according to 
Mῑrzā Maḥmūd, they are all beheaded, and their heads are sent to Tehran (majmūʿa-i ānhā-rā sar 
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burῑda ravāna-i dār al-khilāfa namūdand). A number of Turkmens flee to the mountains, saving 
themselves, and after eight or nine days they return to Panjdih, describing their ordeal to their 
townsmen.
284
  
 Mῑrzā Maḥmūd still has some arsenic left, and it is not long before he comes up with yet 
another plan to torment his cruel master. One day, a Turkmen trading caravan passes through 
Panjdih, and Khan Muḥammad plans to make some money by paying a camel-driver to convey a 
load of grain to Herat using his camels. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd mixes arsenic with their doughy fodder 
(khamῑr), and when the camel-driver comes to collect the camels they are already dead. Khan 
Muḥammad loved his camels more than any son or brother, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd recalls, and he is 
bitterly saddened by their deaths.
285
  
 Sometime thereafter, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd falls terribly ill for a period of several weeks, nearly 
dying from his mysterious sickness.
286
 When his condition finally improves, he learns something 
intriguing from the members of a Bukharan caravan passing through the village: in Bukhara, 
slaves are neither chained nor injured by their masters; those with skills in calligraphy, 
composition and crafts are respected. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd wishes badly to make his way to Bukhara, 
although he cannot help but recall an ominous verse from Rumi: "If you're going to Bukhara then 
you're insane / worthy of the dungeon and the chains.” Poetic advice notwithstanding, he begins 
to gather information on the Iranian merchants who trade and live in Bukhara, and he gradually 
develops a plan of action.
287
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 The plan that materializes is a brilliant one. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd forges a letter to Khan 
Muḥammad from three known merchants trafficking goods between Bukhara, Panjdih and parts 
south: Āqā Muḥammad Kāzim, Āqā Mῑr Taqῑ and Qāsim Bay. The letter says, among other 
things, that the merchants would give Khan Muḥammad 250 tillas for Mῑrzā Maḥmūd, as the 
elites of Bukhara had use for a highly literate slave like him. To make the forged letter more 
realistic, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd steals some soap and carves a seal for each of the three merchants. All 
that remains is to make sure the letter is delivered to Khan Muḥammad by someone ostensibly 
unrelated to Mῑrzā Maḥmūd, so as to avoid any suspicion of his role in the ruse. The perfect man 
for the job was a Turkmen named Niyāz Qul whose father was a surgeon. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd tasks 
him with delivering the letter to Khan Muḥammad at the bazaar, and he tells the young man to 
explain that he had received the letter from a Salor Turkmen who was traveling from Bukhara to 
Herat. In return, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd agrees to knit Niyāz Qul a pair of socks for the winter.288    
 The ruse works. Khan Muḥammad receives the letter and is ultimately convinced of its 
veracity. He reads it in front of Mῑrzā Maḥmūd and exclaims, “I’ve struck it rich!” (ganjῑ yāfta!). 
Instead of his usual nickname of “Demon” (ghol), Khan Muḥammad begins called Mῑrzā 
Maḥmūd the respectful “Āqā Mῑrzā.” Before long, the news arrives that “Āqā Mῑrzā” is to leave 
on a caravan for Bukhara. He is introduced to a caravan-leader named Qara Bay, who chains him 
by the neck to a camel, and when they leave Panjdih on the long road to Bukhara, Mῑrzā 
Maḥmūd is forced to march shackled and on foot during the night. Khan Muḥammad sends along 
a reply to the merchants’ fabricated letter, saying that he was sending along his slave, and that he 
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himself would follow in some ten days’ time, but that he would not sell Mῑrzā Maḥmūd for any 
less than 300 tillas.
289
   
 The road to Bukhara brings fresh tortures for Mῑrzā Maḥmūd. He is put to work driving 
the camels, collecting firewood, and cooking for the other members of the caravan. Qara Bay 
beats him repeatedly, and Mῑrzā Maḥmūd sees no rest. Passing through the hinterlands, he 
observes other Iranian slaves: he sees many of them occupied with working the land (dehqānῑ) in 
places like Lubāb and Ghanjū. When the caravan comes to Qaraqul, news spreads that a literate 
slave has arrived, and Mῑrzā Maḥmūd is brought before a potential buyer. He is taken to a majlis 
with a number of Turkmens arranged around a felt carpet, and he is invited to drink with them. 
But he is warned, mysteriously, not to point his feet toward the verses of the Qur’ān that are in 
their presence, nor to drink before them. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd looks around in confusion, seeing no 
verses anywhere in sight, and he remarks that he can see nothing of the Qur’ān around them. His 
hosts reply that a group of “qizilbāsh feltmakers” (namadmālān-i qizilbāsh)290 had added 
Qur’ānic verse inscriptions to the margins of the felt carpet before them. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd glances 
at the felt and observes that it is only poetry, and not scripture, that is woven there, and he teases 
his hosts for the error. Hoping to save face, one of the inquisitors engages him in a debate on the 
subject of ritual ablutions, and Mῑrzā Maḥmūd—to the discomfort of the Turkmens around 
him—quickly proves his superior erudition on matters of Islamic ethics.291  
 The debate soon turns to the relative merits of Shῑʿites and Sunnis, and whether it is licit 
for Sunnis to take Shῑʿites into slavery. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd proposes to his hosts that they are 
contravening their own religion by holding Shῑʿite slaves, but they dismiss the idea. Man-selling, 
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they say, was a custom from ancient times (ādamfurūshῑ az qadῑm rasm būda). Why else, after 
all, did the sons of Ya’qūb sell their own brother Yusūf? (And Mῑrzā Maḥmūd, they scoff, is no 
more honorable than Yusūf.) Why else, moreover, do Shῑʿites themselves sell the Qur’ān, when 
they are no dearer than the holy book? At this moment, it dawns on Mῑrzā Maḥmūd that he is 
talking to Sarïqs, who, he writes, have no other trade besides thievery (duzdῑ). He jokingly 
observes aloud to them that they themselves are mentioned by name in the Qur’ān: al-sāriq, in 
the scripture, means “thief.” At this taunt, the party grows openly hostile, and Mῑrzā Maḥmūd 
hastens away.
292
  
  Mῑrzā Maḥmūd accompanies the caravan to the city of Bukhara without further incident, 
and upon arrival there Qara Bay takes Mῑrzā Maḥmūd to the man he was perhaps least eager to 
see: Āqā Muḥammad Kāzim, whose name and seal he had forged. Naturally, Āqā Muḥammad is 
flabbergasted to meet his supposed purchase, having no knowledge of any alleged 
correspondence with the slave’s owner. His predictable objection leaves Mῑrzā Maḥmūd 
histrionically heartbroken, and Āqā Muḥammad reassures the poor slave that he needs only to 
have patience; the merchant agrees to liberate him from Khan Muḥammad. Āqā Muḥammad’s 
plan is that a man named Shahrukh Khan would buy Mῑrzā Maḥmūd and send him off to 
Mashhad.
293
  
 Mῑrzā Maḥmūd is also permitted to stay at Āqā Muḥammad’s residence while awaiting 
his master Khan Muḥammad’s arrival in Bukhara, and the merchant permits him to venture out 
on an errand, giving him some money to fetch ice from the bazaar. On his way there, Mῑrzā 
Maḥmūd finds a blackened coin on the ground. The occasion provides the perfect catalyst for a 
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display of his keen entrepreneurship. At the bazaar, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd finds a man selling dyed 
eggs, and he uses the found coin to buy a red egg (bayza-i qirmizῑ) from him. Returning home 
with the ice in his hands and the egg under his arm, he borrows a pen-knife from Āqā 
Muḥammad’s retainer, Qāsim, and sets to work making fine engravings (naqash o hakākῑ) in the 
egg. When the work is done, he returns to the bazaar, showing off the egg to great acclaim. One 
onlooker buys the egg for 14 pul—14 times what Mῑrzā Maḥmūd had paid for it in its plain form. 
He uses the money to buy 14 more eggs, which he engraves and sells for 8 or 10 pul each. From 
his earnings, he keeps no more than 20 pul and gives the rest to Qāsim, both in payment for the 
use of his pen-knife and, perhaps, in the expectation that he would prove to be a valuable ally 
later on.
294
   
 Mῑrzā Maḥmūd takes his remaining earnings to a bathhouse, where he meets another 
potential ally: an elderly barber and bath attendant who reveals that he is likewise a Shῑʿite, but 
that he has been practicing taqῑya (pretending to be a Sunni) for many years in Bukhara. He 
reassures Mῑrzā Maḥmūd that he never fails to help his Iranian brothers who are enslaved in 
Bukhara, and Qāsim later confirms the old man’s claims. Within just a few days, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd 
has already begun to establish a network of friends and admirers.
295
 
 The next day, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd returns to the bazaar and finds a paper-dealer’s shop 
selling fine Samarqandi paper. He engages the shopkeepers in conversation and again quickly 
proves his erudition. They ask him for a lesson in Qur’ānic study and naḥv (reading and 
grammar in Arabic), and he corrects their mistakes as they practice recitation. Ashamed of their 
blunders, they ask for the chance to evaluate a sample of Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s calligraphic skills, 
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and in nastaliq he pens a verse from Saʿadi: “Skill is the greater fault in the eyes of the opponent 
/ Saʿadi is a rose, but in the enemies' eyes a thorn.” He then produces lines in a variety of 
classical calligraphic forms: naskh, thuluth, shekasta and taʿliq. Students gather around to 
observe him, and they all notice his poor state of dress: Mῑrzā Maḥmūd goes barefoot. “If this 
man was not a Shῑʿite,” one student remarks, “I would pay all the money in the world for him” 
(agar ῑn mard shῑʿa nabūd man u-ra be har qῑmatῑ ke bāvad mῑ-kharῑdam). The student reflects 
that it is for the best that he remains in slavery: if Mῑrzā Maḥmūd is ever to be emancipated, 
according to the young man’s logic, he will never become a Sunni (hargiz sunni nakhwāhad 
shod).
296
   
 Mῑrzā Maḥmūd continues the very next day with his energetic networking. He meets the 
Shῑʿite barber at the bazaar, where the latter introduces him to man named Ḥajji Muḥammad 
Sāliḥ who quickly proposes to be Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s patron. The man offers him some money as a 
stipend. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd replies that it would be wrong of him to accept charity, but that he 
would be happy to go to work as an employee.
297
 
 With new friends and new prospects of employment, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd returns to Āqā 
Muḥammad’s residence, where, unfortunately, a complication had arisen: his master Khan 
Muḥammad had arrived from Panjdih, eager to collect his expected payment. Khan Muḥammad 
quickly learns from Āqā Muḥammad that he will get nothing like the price he had anticipated. 
This was not to say, of course, that there was no demand for Mῑrzā Maḥmūd: Khan Muḥammad 
learns that his slave had indeed stirred up some interest in Bukhara. A slave-dealer (ghulām-
jallāb) named ʿAẓῑmbay is summoned to appraise Mῑrzā Maḥmūd, and—likely in collusion with 
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Āqā Muḥammad—he estimates the slave’s value at the low sum of 20 tumans. At this, Khan 
Muḥammad is speechless. Without another word, he returns to the caravanserai that served as his 
lodging-place.  
 Two or three days later, a Jewish man named Musa negotiates with Khan Muḥammad 
and Āqā Muḥammad to buy Mῑrzā Maḥmūd for 22 tumans. Thus begins a curious series of 
transactions. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd lives at Musa’s hujra for no more than two days before Hajji 
Muḥammad, his would-be patron, buys him from Musa. Hajji Muḥammad explains himself by 
saying that it is not acceptable for a Muslim to be the servant of a Jew (rāẓῑ nashod ki musulmān 
khidmatkār-i yahūdῑ bāshad). Two days later, he turns around and sells Mῑrzā Maḥmūd to a man 
named Ḥājjī Raḥīm Herātῑ, who buys Mῑrzā Maḥmūd for 20 tumans, and then promptly re-sells 
him to Āqā Muḥammad, who promises once again that eventually Mῑrzā Maḥmūd would become 
a free man.
298
 In the meantime Mῑrzā Maḥmūd goes to work as an accountant for an 
acquaintance of Āqā Muḥammad.    
 Soon enough, Khan Muḥammad appears once again at the merchant Āqā Muḥammad’s 
residence, accompanied by two or three Bukharans. He grabs Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s collar, 
announcing that he still owns him, regardless of the present circumstances. At that moment, all 
of the injuries Mῑrzā Maḥmūd had suffered under that cruel master rush into his mind, and he 
grabs Khan Muḥammad’s beard and gives it a yank, punching him in the face with his other hand 
and knocking out the two or three decaying teeth which remained in his mouth. Khan 
Muḥammad, helpless, can do nothing more than complain to Āqā Muḥammad, who declares that 
the Turkmen no longer has any business with his former slave, as his ownership had been 
terminated when he agreed to sell Mῑrzā Maḥmūd some days previously. Taking stock of the 
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intensity of Khan Muḥammad’s agitation, however, the merchant must have wondered if 
swindling this man out of his property would really be worth the effort: Āqā Muḥammad, in the 
end, shows some willingness to negotiate with Khan Muḥammad for the eventual return of Mῑrzā 
Maḥmūd to Panjdih.299  
Upon hearing this, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd flees the merchant’s residence, and he eventually 
makes his way to the home of a man named Mῑr ʿĀsad, who was rumored to have freed several 
slaves and to have aided them in their journeys to elsewhere. Arriving at his door, however, 
Mῑrzā Maḥmūd learns that the man is out shopping at the bazaar, and he is told to return later. 
Terrified of being found by Khan Muḥammad, Āqā Muḥammad, or any of their helpers, Mῑrzā 
Maḥmūd takes refuge for some time among the worshippers in a nearby mosque. He later returns 
to Mῑr ʿĀsad’s house once more, only to find that he still had not returned home. With nowhere 
else to go, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd heads back to the mosque—“there is,” he writes, “no better hiding-
place than that.”300   
Mῑrzā Maḥmūd pretends to sleep at the mosque until the crowd gathers once more for 
their prayers. As he prays with them, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd wonders what he will do if Mῑr ʿĀsad has 
not returned by nightfall. On his way back to the man’s residence, he runs into one of Āqā 
Muḥammad’s retainers—evidently a fellow slave, and a man with whom Mῑrzā Maḥmūd had 
become friends. He learns from this man that Khan Muḥammad, enraged, had taken his case to 
the ḥākim of Bukhara. The retainer’s best suggestion for Mῑrzā Maḥmūd is that he take refuge 
with Mῑr ʿĀsad. They go to his residence together, and they wait for him for some time, but he 
does not appear. Unable to wait indefinitely at the stranger’s house, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd realizes—
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surely with profound sorrow—that he has nowhere else to go, and no better option than to return 
to Āqā Muḥammad and hope for the best.301   
When he arrives at Āqā Muḥammad’s residence, he finds Khan Muḥammad sitting there, 
eyeing him with rage “like a shot bear” (misl-i khirs-i tῑr khwārda). Mῑrzā Maḥmūd attempts to 
explain his disappearance by claiming that he had needed to attend the wedding of a friend. Khan 
Muḥammad insists that Mῑrzā Maḥmūd must return with him to Panjdih that same day. Mῑrzā 
Maḥmūd replies simply that there is a problem with this plan. “What is the issue?” Khan 
Muḥammad asks. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd replies: “That I must either drown you or drown myself in the 
waters of the Jayhūn” (bāyad tū-rā dar āb-i daryā-yi jayhūn ghurq o halāk kunām yā khodam-
rā). Āqā Muḥammad, meanwhile, understandably wanting nothing more to do with the conflict, 
declares simply that Mῑrzā Maḥmūd is Khan Muḥammad’s slave, and that he can do with him 
whatever he wishes.
302
  
With Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s sad fate seemingly sealed, the news comes that Shahrukh Khan—
the man who was initially expected to purchase Mῑrzā Maḥmūd and, eventually, to free him—
has returned to Bukhara. As quickly as the news arrives, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd is spirited off to 
Shahrukh Khan’s residence by his friend Qāsim, unbeknownst to Khan Muḥammad and Āqā 
Muḥammad, and Shahrukh interviews him about his background and his past work for the 
Iranian military. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd stays there for two or three days. Eventually, Āqā Muḥammad 
arrives to investigate, and he and Shahrukh Khan hatch a plan together to convince Khan 
Muḥammad that Mῑrzā Maḥmūd had fled to Kabul.  
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For once, however, Khan Muḥammad is not to be fooled, and he arrives, furious, at 
Shahrukh Khan’s door, demanding the release of his slave and threatening to take the matter to 
the Amῑr of Bukhara himself. Shahrukh Khan replies that Mῑrzā Maḥmūd is a sayyid, and that he 
never should have been bought or sold in the first place; moreover, if Khan Muḥammad insists 
on bringing the case before the Amῑr, Shahrukh would describe Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s high birth and 
talents before the court and observe that such a gifted slave belongs only in the service of His 
Majesty. In that way, Khan Muḥammad could expect to end up with no slave and no payment.303   
Khan Muḥammad sees that his case had become hopeless, but Āqā Muḥammad, perhaps 
mindful of the Turkmen’s unpredictable temper, negotiates with Shahrukh Khan to offer a 
settlement of 30 tumans in exchange for the slave. He counsels Khan Muḥammad that it would 
be wise to take the offer. Khan Muḥammad replies that he had paid 14 tillas when he bought 
Mῑrzā Maḥmūd; that the slave had outstanding debts to him totaling 18 tillas; that on two of the 
occasions when he had run away, Khan Muḥammad had paid a 3 tilla reward leading to his 
capture; that he had covered the 3-4 tilla customs toll for transporting his slave to Bukhara, along 
with another 3 tillas to rent the camel that conveyed him there. Why, then, after all this, should 
he sell Mῑrzā Maḥmūd for 30 tillas? Āqā Muḥammad answers bluntly: because, he says, there 
would be no higher offer. Khan Muḥammad agrees to the deal, announcing that, henceforth, he 
intended to quit the business of slave-dealing (man baʿd tark-i asῑrfurūshῑ-rā khwāham), 
repenting of the fact that he had ever gotten involved in it and vowing never again to buy or sell 
a slave (tawba kardam ke dῑgar asῑr nikharam va nifurūsham).304  
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Shahrukh Khan immediately shows Mῑrzā Maḥmūd his hospitality, as does his brother, 
Muḥammad Ḥassan Khan, and Mῑrzā Maḥmūd impresses them in the days to come such that he 
is assigned to oversee their household’s kitchen and stables. He is provided with a stipend 
equivalent to three Iranian tumans per month. In his spare time, he is given the freedom to work 
in other occupations, some of which prove quite lucrative: in just five months’ time, Mῑrzā 
Maḥmūd reports earning 70 tumans  from his labors as well as six or seven suits of clothing. 
Meanwhile, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s erroneous reputation as a sayyid reasserts itself thanks to Āqā 
Muḥammad Khan, who spreads rumors of his noble birth and urges him to maintain the charade, 
which, he says, could come to benefit him in Bukhara. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd soon finds himself 
dubbed “Āqā Sayyid Taqῑ,” an honorific he does little to shake off, despite his guilty 
conscience.
305
  
 Some two months later, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd finds himself on his way to Samarqand, tagging 
along with his master’s retinue. His trip to the ancient city offers him an opportunity to reflect on 
the region more generally, revealing some of his thoughts on nature and society in Turkestan. He 
observes that the climate in Samarqand is vastly superior to that of Bukhara, and that it is 
generally free from the ravages of guinea worm, a problem that in Bukhara had reached epidemic 
proportions. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd describes Bukhara’s guinea worm crisis with a palpable horror—
and in sickening detail—and reveals another of the jobs he worked while living in that city: he 
had been tasked many times with drawing guinea worms from the bodies of unfortunate victims. 
He is understandably relieved to find that the ailment hardly exists in Samarqand, which he 
attributes to the good quality of its air and water.
306
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Less appealing in his eyes, however, is Samarqand’s social climate: he describes 
Samarqand as a city of hedonists (ʿayyāsh), strewn with multiple opium dens (kūknārkhana), in 
each of which could be found a “simple youth with curly hair” (javānῑ-i sāda ba gῑsūvān-i 
mujaʿad) serving tea and passing around the opium pipes. Smoking cannabis mixed with tobacco 
(chars) and opium-eating (taryāk-khurdan), he claims, are also exceedingly common in the city, 
and as a result the men of Samarqand are generally lazy, timid, sickly, lacking in energy, and 
yellowish in pallor.
307
  
With unrest growing in the region on the eve of the Russian conquest of the khanate of 
Kokand, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd soon finds himself headed to the capital city of Kokand itself as his 
master, Shahrukh Khan, is appointed to oversee the Bukharan armory (tupkhana). Shahrukh 
Khan is welcomed by many of the city’s elites, but he and his retinue are soon on the move again 
in the face of hostilities from the forces of a Kazakh leader named Mullā Qulῑ Khan. It seems 
that Mῑrzā Maḥmūd did not see much of the city of Kokand, as he offers a scant description of it, 
noting only the presence of esteemed burial sites along with his impression that the city’s men 
are yellowish and lean, while its women are ravishing (dilrubā) and lively (rūḥparvar). With 
this, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd heads back on the road again, journeying with his master and his retinue to 
the mountains near Osh as violence engulfs the region. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd here offers valuable 
reportage on local struggles that destabilized Kokand on the eve of the Russian conquests, as the 
population of the capital city was split in their allegiances between Khudaydād, the incumbent 
ruler, and Mullā Qulῑ Khan.308 
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Mῑrzā Maḥmūd stays at Shahrukh Khan’s side even as the latter begins to slander his own 
ruler, the Amῑr of Bukhara (out of jealousy, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd alleges), calling him a traitor. The 
Amῑr does not take kindly to these slights, and rumors soon surface that the Amῑr plans to place 
Shahrukh Khan under arrest. This revelation must have come as a traumatic one for Mῑrzā 
Maḥmūd, who under Shahrukh Khan’s stewardship was considered a retainer of the court 
(nökar-i dῑvān) and had even been confirmed as chur-aqasi, a title, in Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s telling, 
higher than that of yuzbāshi.309 When Mῑrzā Maḥmūd goes to Shahrukh Khan’s residence one 
day to discuss the frightening rumors going around, he finds that he is too late: his master’s place 
is swarming with men tasked by the Bukharan Amīr with emptying it. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s own 
goods were expropriated, his master’s horses were gathered in the yard, and all of the women 
and servants of his mobile estate had been stripped “as naked as captives” and carried off, 
weeping.  
Mῑrzā Maḥmūd is taken to a government dungeon (maḥbūs-i ḥukūmatῑ) in the citadel of 
Sar Teppe. The citadel is home to multiple prisons, each heinous in its own characteristic way. 
One is called the “Damphouse” (narm-khana), so called because of its intolerable humidity. 
Another is called the “Tickhouse” (kana-khana), where prisoners would suffer ticks “as big as 
camels” that would suck their blood so vigorously that they would be dead within just two days. 
Prominent prisoners, such as Shahrukh Khan and his brother, were held in one of two or three 
small, private yards. The grave of Siyāvush Dāmād Afrāsiyāb was also said to be in the 
dungeon.
310
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Within three days, the Amῑr of Bukhara ordered that all of the goods and prisoners should 
be sent onwards to Bukhara, and that all of Shahrukh Khan’s horses should be sold for profit. 
Mῑrzā Maḥmūd gains at this point a preview of his most likely fate, as two Iranian slaves that 
Shahrukh Khan had bought and freed were re-sold to buyers elsewhere. Some employees of the 
Amῑr then demand money from Mῑrzā Maḥmūd, offering him his freedom in return, but he 
assures them that all of his worldly holdings had already been taken; Mῑrzā Maḥmūd figures that 
the hope of extorting money from him is all that delays his inevitable fate of being sold.  
Soon enough, for reasons that are unclear to him at the time, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd is told that 
he is to have a personal audience with the Amῑr. He finds himself being led to a caravanserai, 
within which he is taken to a room illuminated with dozens of candles. He realizes that he has 
been taken to some secret cell, and asks his captors where they have taken him. One laughs, and 
replies that he is in the “house of pain” (manzil-i taʿb)—another of the Amῑr’s dungeons. In this 
dungeon he sees just one other man: a Jew, who shares a water-pipe with him and says that he 
was imprisoned after a quarrel over silk with two men who later requested his detainment. Mῑrzā 
Maḥmūd requests that the guards move him to a more hospitable place, and they consent, 
shifting him to a room where some of Shahrukh Khan’s men were being kept.311 
Mῑrzā Maḥmūd is not imprisoned there for long before he learns that the time for his 
audience with the Amῑr has come. He is brought out before the Amῑr and some of his men, and 
he realizes upon being brought into the light that his place of detainment was in fact part of a 
complex of stables. The Amῑr’s men demand money from Mῑrzā Maḥmūd, but he replies once 
more that whatever he had was already taken from him “except for this depressed body and 
oppressed heart” (savā-yi ῑn jism-i afsarda va jān-i sitam rasῑda). This answer does not satisfy 
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the Amῑr, who orders that Mῑrzā Maḥmūd be stretched be between two posts and branded (dāgh 
kardan va ʿuqābayn kashῑdan). Before the hot brand can touch the slave’s flesh, however, the 
Amīr changes his mind, and instead of proceeding with the torture he tells Mῑrzā Maḥmūd of his 
intentions to take ownership of him. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd, perhaps dazed from his ordeal, replies that 
he would never consent to this, and asks to be sold to some other owner instead.
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The Amῑr, angered, has Mῑrzā Maḥmūd turned over to his vizier, who receives him 
kindly and, offering to purchase him with a payment of 30 tillas to the state treasury, plans to put 
Mῑrzā Maḥmūd to work tutoring his son. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd  goes to work, and he soon proves his 
talents as a scribe as well, so that the vizier gives him over to work as an accountant for his 
brother, a merchant at the silk bazaar. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd likewise performs admirably in his new 
position, earning the esteem of the silk merchants and settling into a comfortable new routine. He 
later learns that his former master, Shahrukh Khan, has not been as lucky: on the Amῑr’s orders, 
both he and his brother were beheaded, their bodies buried dishonorably.
313
 
Some days later, an international scandal is precipitated as the Amῑr orders the 
imprisonment of some English travelers and the confiscation of their goods. A spy of Armenian 
descent named Mῑrzā Yaʿqūb Khan is dispatched to investigate this and other matters, posing as 
a merchant. This secret agent soon learns of Mῑrzā Maḥmūd and endeavors to interview him as a 
possible source and ally. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd passes on the news of Shahrukh Khan’s brutal murder, 
along with details concerning the military and finances of Bukhara. According to Mῑrzā 
Maḥmūd, Mῑrzā Yaʿqūb Khan records this information in a letter to officials in France. The spy 
manages to extract covert information from several others too before arousing the suspicion of 
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some individuals loyal to the Amῑr, who inform the vizier of his covert activities. Mῑrzā Yaʿqūb 
is imprisoned in a small, dark room, and his possessions are scoured for evidence. (Fortunately, 
Mῑrzā Maḥmūd reports, the Amῑr’s henchmen were unable to read his letter to France.) Mῑrzā 
Yaʿqūb claims to his interrogators that those he had met with privately in the khanate, including 
Mῑrzā Maḥmūd, were simply old acquaintances. But this is not enough to secure Mῑrzā 
Maḥmūd’s safety: he is beaten so brutally that he fears for his life, and he learns that the vizier 
has ordered his execution as a punishment for talking with the spy.
314
  
 Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s life is saved only through the intervention of Iranian friends and 
acquaintances, who convince the vizier to sell him instead of having him killed. A slave-dealer 
(barda-furūsh) is summoned, but because Mῑrzā Maḥmūd is still badly bruised from his beating, 
the vizier decides to imprison him until he heals enough to be sold. Thus Mῑrzā Maḥmūd finds 
himself in a dungeon for the third time. This time, he is held in a small room “darker than night 
and more dreadful than the heart of the aggrieved” (tārῑktar az shab-i dῑjūr va mūḥishtar az dil-i 
ranjūr).  
 Once more, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd manages to improve his situation by using his wits. Each 
day, after evening namāz, the vizier would pass by Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s cell, and Mῑrzā Maḥmūd 
would perceive the light of his lantern moving past the cell door. One evening, as he passes by, 
evidently unaware that Mῑrzā Maḥmūd knew he was near, the prisoner shouts out prayers and 
lamentations to the effect that God knows of his innocence and that he has committed no 
betrayal. The vizier comes closer to his cell, listens for a time to Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s cries, and then 
leaves. A half-hour later, the cell door opens; the vizier’s servants bring Mῑrzā Maḥmūd a candle 
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and a carpet, telling him that their master’s heart ached for his predicament and that he had been 
forgiven.
315
  
 Mῑrzā Maḥmūd is freed from the dungeon, interrogated once more about his connections 
with Mῑrzā Yaʿqūb Khan, and for some time held in Ghijduvān, and afterwards in a smaller 
settlement some distance from Bukhara. In the meantime, the Amῑr of Bukhara was facing one of 
the greatest crises in the khanate’s history: the armies of the Russian Empire, having subjugated 
the town of Kokand, were now headed for Tashkent, the Kokand khanate’s most important city. 
In the midst of the long siege that followed, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd claims that his master, the vizier, 
occupied himself with a lavish circumcision ceremony for his son, for which he paid the 
outrageous sum of 4,000 tumans. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd explains that the manumission of slaves often 
served as a key element in circumcision ceremonies among Sunni elites (chūn qaʿida-i ahl-i 
tisnan dar chūnῑn jashn azād kardan-i usārā hast), and that the vizier had intended to liberate 
twelve Iranian slaves during the course of the event. The Amῑr of Bukhara, however, evidently 
desperate for revenue, forbids him on the grounds that the slaves could be sold and the proceeds 
given over to the treasury.
316
  
 Mῑrzā Maḥmūd, noting the vizier’s disappointment over the Amῑr’s greed, attempts to 
convince the vizier to free him and allow him to return to his homeland. It is no use, however, 
and soon enough Mῑrzā Maḥmūd receives an unusual new assignment: the Amῑr arranges to have 
a room in his residence elaborately painted, and he orders for Mῑrzā Maḥmūd to join eight artists 
from Bukhara for the task. Among them, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd recalls, three—Nāẓim and Aḥmad 
Kalla, and ʿAbd al-Qādir Khwāja—were quite famous in the khanate. The walls of the residence 
                                                 
315
 Āshtiyānῑ, ʿIbratnāma, 134-35 
316
 Āshtiyānῑ, ʿIbratnāma, 139-40 
140 
 
were to be decorated with human and animal figures as well as floral motifs. Here, Mῑrzā 
Maḥmūd provides a window onto the workings of decorative artists in Bukhara. Observing that 
drawing human likenesses was prohibited in Bukhara (ṣuratkashῑ-ra mamnūʿ o mażmūm būd), 
Mῑrzā Maḥmūd relates that his fellow artists were unskilled at it and relied on old images by 
Iranian artists that they had carried with them under their arms. They traced these images through 
the process of pouncing and then outlined the images in black with a brush before adding color. 
Mῑrzā Maḥmūd allows that they had considerable skill in drawing arabesque designs (islῑmῑ) as 
well as flowers and other elements from nature, though he cannot help but add that their skill in 
these areas was still inferior to his own. In his own telling, they soon recognize this fact as well, 
referring to him as “master of masters” and seeking his guidance on their own work.317  
The Amῑr likewise praises Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s artistry, and rewards him generously. At one 
point, the Amῑr asks him about his circumstances, wondering whether Mῑrzā Maḥmūd 
considered himself a slave or a free man while under the vizier’s dominion. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd 
cleverly—if evasively—replies that “the free people of the world all wish to be slaves to Your 
Excellency” (āzādān-i jahān hama-hama ārzū-yi bandagῑ-i janābli dārand). The Amῑr, pleased 
with his answer, thanks Mῑrzā Maḥmūd. “I will give you a family and make you a man of the 
house [i.e. one of my own servants],” he tells him. “I will give you a wife from among my slave-
girls” (az chūrῑhā-yi andarun zan be tū mῑ-deham). The offer would surely have thrilled many 
slaves, but Mῑrzā Maḥmūd realizes that if he marries a woman from the household of the Amῑr 
then it will become all the more unlikely that he can ever be freed. He obsequiously demurs and, 
delicately, asks the Amῑr for his freedom instead. His evident ingratitude angers the Amῑr, who 
remarks on how inappropriate it would be if a Shῑʿite was sent back to live among his fellow 
                                                 
317
 Āshtiyānῑ, ʿIbratnāma, 140-142 
141 
 
“infidels” after having passed into the “abode of Islam.” Mῑrzā Maḥmūd reports (perhaps 
dubiously) that he offered a tart reply to this insult, and the enraged Amῑr storms off, leaving 
Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s fellow artists wondering over his audacity, which seems to them like a death-
wish.
318
 
Mῑrzā Maḥmūd continues to prove his worth as an artist, however, and he suffers no 
punishment for his impudence. But he cannot find a means to free himself, even after he 
manages to receive a letter of manumission sealed by a chief judge in Bukhara. In the months to 
come he petitions the Amῑr repeatedly for his freedom. He does this so often that the Amῑr, 
finally losing patience, tells him that if he brings one more petition then he would end the 
conversation by killing him (ay ghulām agar yakdafaʿa dῑgar ʿariża-i tū be ḥużūr-i man bῑ-āyad 
bedūn javāb o savāl koshta khwāhῑ shod).319  
Distraught as the prospect of gaining his freedom through official channels slips away, 
Mῑrzā Maḥmūd nevertheless continues to put his many talents to work in Bukhara. One evening 
at the vizier’s house, after hearing a recitation by a poet favored among Bukharan elites, Mῑrzā 
Maḥmūd is asked teasingly by the Amῑr if he likes the poet’s work. He replies that he does not, 
much to the amusement of the gathering, and proceeds to offer insightful critiques of its failings. 
The poet too appreciates his corrections, and soon enough Mῑrzā Maḥmūd finds himself in the 
role of a minor court poet, occasionally writing verses that he would submit to the Amῑr or have 
others recite for him. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd complains bitterly about the paltry remuneration he 
receives for his work—no more than a few ceremonial robes. (We, however, as observers, are 
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more likely to be struck simply by his progression from a field-slave distributing camel fodder in 
a Turkmen village to a court-poet among Bukharan royalty.)
320
 
Meanwhile, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd uses some of his savings to help fellow slaves on their 
journeys home. He offers 60 tumans toward the price of freedom for a slave-woman from 
Mashhad, and he assists with the travel expenses for three other manumitted slaves on their way 
to Herat. He also finds work as a calligrapher, working on several copies of the Qur’ān. During 
this period of steady work but limited prospects for freedom, he hangs his hopes on the only 
possible means of emancipation he could still imagine: if the Russians conquered Bukhara, he 
reasons, he could potentially find himself a free man amid the chaos.
321
 
 In the months to come, this once-distant possibility starts to seem increasingly likely. 
After the fall of Tashkent, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd observes the Russians advance into Bukharan 
territory, while the Amῑr of Bukhara declines opportunities to ease tensions and to forestall a 
conquest that seems increasingly inevitable. Desperate to increase his fighting force, the Amῑr 
issues an order that all Iranian slaves in his domains must be brought to Bukhara, where any of 
them willing to enter military service would be purchased by the Amῑr and outfitted for war. 
Within three weeks, 4-5,000 slaves had gathered at various caravanserais, and from among them 
1,000 entered the armed forces. These new troops fought the Russians at Ura-Teppe, but their 
assistance could not secure the city, which fell to the Tsar’s army.322 
 With the Amῑr increasingly panic-stricken before the Russian onslaught, Mῑrzā 
Maḥmūd’s thoughts turn again to the possibility that he might gain his freedom simply by 
requesting it, figuring that his poetic and artistic talents would be little use to the Bukharan elites 
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amid the present chaos. He contacts the vizier, who replies that both the Amῑr and the city of 
Bukhara were indeed in dire straits. Finally, he agrees to grant Mῑrzā Maḥmūd his freedom.323   
 The vizier gives Mῑrzā Maḥmūd a letter to help secure his free passage back to Iran. The 
letter states that Mῑrzā Maḥmūd is the vizier’s slave and that no Turkmens should block his way 
at the river-crossings or otherwise interfere with him on the way to Mashhad. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd 
receives letters from Mullā ʿAbd al-Karῑm and some other well-known merchants as well, and he 
readies his belongings and prepares a horse for the journey home. He pays 70 tumans to a guide 
who promises to convey him safely to Iran, and two days later he joins a Turkmen caravan bound 
for Merv. The party suffers an attack on the way, but Mῑrzā Maḥmūd and some of his fellow-
travelers finally arrive in the town, where Mῑrzā Maḥmūd finds lodging with a merchant who had 
made his fortune shipping goods between Mashhad and Bukhara.
324
  
 A few days later, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd leaves the merchant’s house in the company of four 
soldiers, all headed for Sarakhs. They lose the road, however, and wander for a few days, trying 
to find their way. At night, they resist the urge to make fires for fear of Turkmen thieves. Finally, 
they see Sarakhs before them in the distance. In celebration, they make tea and share a water-
pipe.
325
   
 Mῑrzā Maḥmūd stays in Sarakhs for 45 days, likely fearing to continue onwards because 
of the presence of raiders from Merv said to be decamped not far outside the city, at the shrine of 
ʿUlaq Bābā. This saint, also known (according to Mῑrzā Maḥmūd) as Luqman Sarakhsῑ, was held 
in such esteem by the Turkmens that runaway captives who managed to reach his shrine were 
permitted to remain free, and that if a Turkmen hunting party chased prey into the vicinity of it, 
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the hunters would give up the chase. Finally, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd joins a large party for the three-day 
journey to Mashhad, where he finds lodging at an Uzbek caravanserai. He remains in Herat for 
12 days before heading home to Tehran. Home at last, he sees his mother and his brother for the 
first time in a decade.
326
  
 Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s narrative is, above all, a story of how one slave managed, through the 
force of his own ingenuity, to influence his fate against extraordinary odds. Nevertheless, it 
would be naïve to see Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s story in purely optimistic terms, stressing nothing more 
than his triumph over adversity. Notwithstanding the gains in quality-of-life that Mῑrzā Maḥmūd 
gradually achieved, desperation was the driving force behind his audacity and his creativity. If 
we are to speak of his “agency,” we must remember that he was his masters’ agent in most 
things. Meanwhile, in matters where he seized some personal initiative, danger was ever-present, 
and his efforts to improve his circumstances sometimes left him brutally beaten. More than once, 
he reports being beaten so badly that he expected to die from his injuries. Good luck was as 
much a factor in Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s eventual success as his own considerable genius: he was 
lucky that he was not beaten to death; he was lucky that Khan Muḥammad did not conclude with 
certainty that Mῑrzā Maḥmūd had poisoned him and his family; he was lucky to find his way 
while lost in the desert; and he was lucky that the unusual trick he deployed to get himself to 
Bukhara worked as well as it did.  
 Mῑrzā Maḥmūd deserves much credit, however, for making expert use of the freedoms 
available to him. In Panjdih, these freedoms were much more limited than in Bukhara, but even 
while shackled, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd evidently had access to a rural postal system—a concession that 
Khan Muḥammad allowed, we may assume, because he hoped his literate slave would use it to 
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negotiate for his own ransom. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd also appears to have enjoyed free social exchanges 
with his fellow slaves as well as with various townsmen and visitors, and he made key allies. He 
draws on the postal system and his village alliances to effect his escape, as well as to torment his 
master. In Bukhara, he enjoys much more extensive freedoms: here, he even has the time and the 
liberty to earn a living above and beyond the support offered by his various masters. At times, he 
also has the freedom to travel around the city on his own. He improves his position much more 
quickly here than he had among the Turkmens. He reveals himself to be an entrepreneur, a 
skilled artist, and a valuable companion to Bukharan elites.  
 The range of different jobs and roles Mῑrzā Maḥmūd occupies during his time as a slave 
is revealing on two counts. First, it reveals how the author’s many talents could, given the right 
setting, serve to define the nature of his captivity. Second, it reveals the many sorts of jobs that 
could be delegated to slaves in Central Asia. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd worked as a herdsman, a domestic 
servant, a water-bearer, a stable-keeper, a doctor, a painter, a calligrapher, a craftsman, an Arabic 
instructor, an accountant and a poet. Single-handedly, he reveals the social mobility that could be 
available to talented, fortunate slaves in an urban environment like Bukhara. He also reveals the 
veritable dead end of slavery in the hinterlands: for all his talents, there was no work available to 
him in the village of Panjdih other than the meanest physical labor. Given that most slaves in 
Bukhara and Khwarazm worked in rural settings that were more similar to Panjdih than to the 
capital cities, we can assume that his experiences in Panjdih were closer to the norm. The nature 
of Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s survival strategies, moreover, differed in either location: in Bukhara, he 
exercised productive talents; in Panjdih, where those talents were useless to him, he exercised 
trickery. Instead of craftwork and poetry, he feigns madness and plots his escape. His talents 
define the nature of his captivity, but the nature of his captivity defines which talents he can use.   
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 Mῑrzā Maḥmūd frequently meets with other Iranian slaves, and we find them working as 
messengers, domestic servants, soldiers, and agriculturalists. We never meet another slave who 
had attained such high stations as he himself achieved in Bukhara, however. The scarcity of 
educated slaves in Bukhara factored into his easy mobility, but also played a part in the 
perpetuation of his captivity: his kind were always in demand, such that letting a slave with his 
talents get away was unthinkable. His skills were a blessing and a curse.  
 Along with information on slaves’ jobs and conditions of labor, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd also 
reveals much about the inner workings of the slave trade. He shows clearly how the slave trade 
followed caravan networks from cities like Mashhad to Bukhara. We learn that the trade in 
Iranian slaves was sometimes conducted—at least in part—by Iranian merchants, who financed 
caravans and loaded them with diverse shipments of goods for sale. It was by these same caravan 
routes that manumitted slaves were conveyed back to their homelands. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd provides 
evidence of merchant-specialists who may have dealt predominantly in slaves, but upon his 
arrival in Bukhara, when he is bought and sold repeatedly by various individuals in quick 
succession, only one of these individuals is identified as a “slave-dealer.” This series of sales 
also hints at a trait slaves shared with any other commodity: they were sometimes bought and 
sold purely in the interests of market speculation. It was easy to find buyers for Mῑrzā Maḥmūd, 
both because his initial liaison in town was a well-connected merchant and because his literacy 
made him a relatively safe investment.  
 To what extent can we believe Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s narrative? Even if we allow that some of 
the episodes Mῑrzā Maḥmūd recounts seem far-fetched, the remarkable level of detail 
accompanying his most memorable achievements lend the narrative an overall atmosphere of 
earnest documentation. When he claims to have accompanied Shahrukh Khan across the region, 
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for example, he provides extremely specific details concerning shrines and other major sites that 
they pass by. When he claims to have been imprisoned in multiple dungeons, he takes the time to 
recount conversations and particulars that are not directly related to the development of his 
narrative. Throughout the text, in other words, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd provides details that one would be 
unlikely to include merely as fabrications. It is also worth noting that not all of the tactics Mῑrzā 
Maḥmūd describes having used to better his situation cast his wits in a positive light; especially 
while in Panjdih, his ploys were more likely to fail miserably than to succeed.   
 Nevertheless, Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s skilled prose alone suggests an author who may be 
acutely aware of his audience and their expectations. Such an erudite man would not have been 
unaware of genre conventions that were then prevalent in the realm of “adventure” literature. 
One particular area in which embellishment seems likely is in the invariably witty, audacious 
repartee that Mῑrzā Maḥmūd delivers at every opportunity. Did he really insult the Sunni 
tradition while standing amidst a hostile (and probably armed) group of Sunni Turkmens? Did he 
really mock the religiosity of Bukharans in the presence of the Bukharan Amῑr himself? It is 
possible, but seems unlikely. We can be sure, meanwhile, that such dialogue would have earned 
appreciate laughs from readers in Iran.  
 As we shall see in the chapters to come, the best indication of Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s reliability 
is in the numerous instances in which later travelers—who would never have read his 
unpublished account—confirm and corroborate his claims about the workings of the Central 
Asian slave trade. Mῑrzā Maḥmūd himself is remarkable in every respect, but his experiences, for 
all their inherent drama, are not altogether unique. He was not the only Iranian slave to have 
gained a high station in Bukhara; to have earned a good living for himself through his talents; to 
have served the Amῑr. And he is certainly not the only slave to have suffered miserably in the 
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desert, to labor in the hot sun for months on end, and to be beaten and abused by a cruel master. 
His account is valuable in part because his ordeal shares so much with that of other slaves: he 
provides something like a voice for those who suffered a similar fate.    
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Chapter 3 
 
The Slaves’ World: Jobs, Roles and Families 
 
 
Mῑrzā Maḥmūd’s narrative reveals the remarkable range of occupations a slave could hold in 
different parts of Central Asia, but his experiences hardly exhaust the possibilities for slaves’ 
roles in the region. In this chapter, I will focus on the diversity of slaves’ jobs and roles, along 
with the various environments in which they lived and performed their work. Some types of 
work were designated especially for slaves, while other types of work appear to have been off-
limits to them. I will show how slaves’ origins and capabilities played a part in defining the kind 
of work they did: Russian slaves, for example, were much more likely to be found doing certain 
types of labor, while other types were largely the purview of Iranian slaves. In light of slaves’ 
varied labor roles, I will argue that a limited and contingent degree of social mobility could be 
available to seemingly any slave, though elite political posts were reserved exclusively for men. I 
will also explore slaves’ marriages, examining a variety of possibilities and outcomes related to 
family life among slaves. In all, considering the diverse roles and environments occupied by 
slaves reveals that slaves were ubiquitous in many parts of the region; they formed nothing less 
than a fundamental aspect of some Central Asian societies down to the late nineteenth century. 
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Legal Frameworks 
The legal lexicon of Central Asia in the nineteenth century recognized at least six distinct types 
of slave, distinguished by the means of their acquisition and by certain circumstances of their 
use. Each category carried with it particular legal obligations on the part of a slave’s owner. The 
Sharḥ-i mukhtasar-i viqāya-i turkī, published in 1901 in Tashkent, describes these categories, all 
of which are familiar (though sometimes under different names) in the broader context of Hanafi 
law on slavery:
327
 
 1) Zarkharīd. This is the category of slave which, ostensibly, enjoyed the fewest 
protections. The word literally means “bought for gold,” and presumably applies to most of those 
slaves bought in Central Asian bazaars and caravanserais. Such slaves could be given by their 
masters as gifts; pawned; left as an inheritance; rented out for use by others; or made to 
constitute part of a dowry.  
 2) Khanazād. This category encompasses the children of slaves; the word means, 
roughly, “house-born.”328 These slaves could not under any circumstances be sold at the market. 
Vambery observed that the law, in this case, had pervaded social mores as well: “The sale of a 
khanezad is regarded as a disgraceful action, and one who commits such an act is branded as a 
thief and a robber.”329 
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 3) Mukātab.330 Slaves in this category could not be sold, given as gifts, pawned, left as 
inheritance, or made part of a dowry, because the terms of their servitude included a contract 
(kitāba) stipulating that they would be able to buy their own freedom after a certain period. To 
accomplish this, the slave would be allowed to save whatever proceeds he or she could manage 
to earn during the period of servitude. (In the context of ancient Roman slavery, such proceeds 
were called the peculium). Vambery explains that these proceeds often came directly from the 
slave’s owner: many slaves, he writes, “receive after a certain time either monthly wages, or else 
a share of the produce of the land or cattle committed to their care.”331  Petrushevskii, writing 
about slavery in Iran, adds that a female slave under such a contract (the mukātaba) would 
traditionally be exempted from the necessity to submit to sexual intercourse with her master.
332
 
Interestingly, Vambery seems to conflate all Central Asian slaves other than the khanazād with 
this category: “As the Iranian is generally more active and frugal than his Turanian neighbour, 
the slaves in Turkestan, in a remarkably short time, get together a little capital. This is employed 
by most of them in ransoming themselves from slavery, which they have the right to do after 
seven years’ service.”333  
 4) Mudabbar.
334
 Slaves in this category, as with the mukātab, could not be sold, given as 
gifts, pawned, left as an inheritance, or made part of a dowry. This is because the terms of their 
contract included a tadbīr (pledge) from their master that they would be freed upon their 
master’s death.  
                                                 
330
 This and several other categories in evidence in our Central Asian sources can easily be found in the traditional 
Hanafi fiqh canon. See, for example, ʻAlī ibn Abī Bakr Marghīnānī, The Hedaya, trans. Charles Hamilton (London: 
Allen & Co., 1870), second edition,  267; 637.  
331
 Hedaya, 547.   
332
 I.P. Petrushevsky, Islam in Iran (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 157.  
333
 Vambery, Sketches of Central Asia, 226. Emphasis added.  
334
 See Hedaya, 488; 267; 637.   
152 
 
 5) Umm walad.
335
 Slaves in this category (which means “mother of the child”) had borne 
children by their master. Such a slave likewise could not be sold, given as a gift, pawned, left as 
an inheritance, or made part of a dowry; like the mudabbar, her manumission was guaranteed 
upon the owner’s death. We can find at least one famous example of an umm walad in a 
proximate context: the Bukharan Amīr Muzaffar’s own mother had been a slave, purchased at 
the public market.
336
  
 6) Istīlād.337 A slave in this category has been impregnated by her owner. Upon the 
child’s birth, she will become an umm walad. A slave in the category of istīlād, like an umm 
walad, cannot be sold, given as a gift, pawned, left as an inheritance, or made part of a dowry, 
and is automatically manumitted upon the death of her owner. 
 These, at least in theory, were the legal categories that governed the slave system in 
sedentary Central Asia. Among nomadic Kazakhs, meanwhile, legal practices concerning slaves 
are alleged by some historians to have been based on “customary law,” but evidence of legal 
proceedings involving slaves in the steppe are so scarce that we cannot clearly distinguish 
“customary law” on slavery from Hanafi sharīʿa in the Kazakh context. In any case, it must be 
remembered that the existence of such legal categories as those above reveals only legal norms, 
and not necessarily observable phenomena. The social ideals and customs indicated by these 
norms are not often clearly evident in other kinds of sources—eyewitness reports and 
autobiographies, for example—that concern slaves’ experiences. It is to these kinds of sources 
that I will now turn.  
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Slaves’ Roles and Occupations 
One of the earliest European sources on slavery in Khiva, published in 1815, focused exclusively 
on the agricultural labor performed by its slaves, and noted differences between the mechanics of 
labor in urban and rural contexts: 
The usual work of slaves is as follows: 1) to fertilize and cultivate the available lands, 
gardens, and orchards. Land is plowed by a small two-ox plow; in the cities it is plowed 
with pickaxes. 2) To sow and harvest grain; in the cities, to plant vegetables in the 
gardens, clean the canals and channels, and prepare them for [the] irrigation [waters]; 3) 
daily, to grind flour in the hand-mill (ruchnyi zhernov) and pound grains in the “leg” 
(nozhnyi) mortar; 4) to carry out [the necessary work involving] the wagons and 
agricultural implements; in a word, to bear all domestic burdens. Thus we have the 
exercise of the captives, which continuously occupies them, such that they have not the 
slightest leisure time during the day, save for a few minutes to take their nourishment and 
a few hours of calm sleep. The slightest mistake or pause in their labor is punished 
severely.
338
 
 
 As we will see, the “usual work” of slaves extended far beyond the agricultural sphere, 
but the field-labor and grain-processing of slaves appears to have played a very significant role 
in Khwarazmian agriculture. Major Blankenagel’, who traveled to Khiva in 1793-94, presented 
the field-labor done by slaves as a central element in the cycle of production and trade: “The 
fields are in large part cultivated by slaves. [Any] one of these [slaves] succeeds so much in this 
that he can provide for more than a large family through his field-cultivation, and not a small 
fraction of that [surplus] produce is sold off. In this way, regardless of the small number of 
people put to work cultivating the land when compared to the total number of residents, [the 
Khwarazmians] have sufficiently abundant fruits and produce that the surplus can be sold to 
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neighboring Kirghiz [i.e. Kazakhs] and Turkmens.”339 He elsewhere hints that these fieldworkers 
were generally Iranian, noting that a “large part” of the 20,000 Persian slaves he estimated to be 
in Khiva “tend the fields.”340 Some twenty years later, Murav’ev would make a similar 
observation, claiming that Iranian slaves brought into the region by the Turkmens were 
“generally the ploughmen.”341 
 Many slaves worked the land on the large estates and gardens owned by Uzbek elites. 
Zalesov reports that some of these wealthy Uzbeks owned “lots of lands and gardens,” which 
were “worked almost exclusively by Persian slaves.”342 The situation was similar in Bukhara, of 
which Meyendorff writes: “There is not, I think, a single Bokharian citizen who is in easy 
circumstances that does not possess a garden and a villa outside the town, in which he spends the 
hot days of the summer. Owners of land let their property, or else have it worked by slaves.”343 
An individual landowner could keep a great number of Iranian slaves for this sort of business: 
“The wealthy Bokharians,” Meyendorff writes, “possess generally about 40 slaves, but some of 
the most distinguished, as, for instance, the Koosh-beghi, have about a hundred, for they require 
a large retinue, and have, besides, many gardens and much land, demanding a greater number of 
hands to labour.”344 Some Iranian slaves interviewed by Russian border officials reported that 
their duties included grain-planting and other agricultural labor, though they generally offered no 
other information about the nature and conditions of their work.
345
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Muḥammad Raḥim Khan, ruler of Khwarazm, evidently put some of his slaves to work 
on the irrigation canals, and Murav’ev’s description of the khan’s labor-force hints at the diverse 
backgrounds of the workers involved in this aspect of agriculture: “[The khan’s] estates are full 
of canals, and are carefully cultivated by slaves, and by Sarts and Karakalpaks, who have settled 
and built villages on them, and whose contribution to the kettle-tax has in consequence been 
remitted.”346 Lieutenant Gladyshev, visiting Khwarazm nearly a hundred years prior, likewise 
reported on diverse laborers cleaning the canals, though he identified them exclusively as slaves, 
witnessing “Russians, Kalmyks, and foreigners numbering three thousand people, of whom he 
became aware because in the spring they were put to work cleaning the canals around the 
city.”347 It was not only among the Khwarazmians and Bukharans that slaves were employed in 
agriculture; we find mention of slaves working the land for Turkmens too, as Mῑrzā Maḥmūd 
occasionally had done, though evidence for agricultural slavery among Turkmens is not very 
extensive.
348
  
We rarely find reports of Russians working in agriculture, though Vitkevich met one 
Russian in Bukhara who had previously worked in the Khivan khan’s garden. This man, named 
Igor’, seems not to have liked the work—or the khan: “[Igor’] escaped from Khiva, where he had 
lived with the khan, and he says that he repeatedly planned to use the hoe with which he worked 
the khan's garden to bash the khan’s brains in [lit. ‘chop the khan's forehead’], but he would 
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rather not give himself up to the torture which would inevitably await him thereafter, and so he 
fled to Bukhara.”349  
Herding and livestock-raising was sometimes undertaken by slaves, though the scholar 
Semeniuk cautions that this would have been a rare occupation for them among pastoral nomads, 
who had the greatest volume of herds, and his claim is supported by the relative scarcity of 
sources which mention slaves engaged in herding.
350
 Nevertheless, some slaves mention in their 
own autobiographical accounts having served Kazakh masters by herding livestock.
351
 Mīrzā 
Maḥmūd, likewise, cared for his Turkmen master’s camels. The Scottish explorer Alexander 
Burnes met an Iranian slave who had been put to work herding sheep;
352
 and the English 
governess Lucy Atkinson, while adventuring in the region with her architect husband, met a 
Russian enslaved by Kazakhs who had been engaged as a cowherd among them.
353
  
The military was another sphere occupied by both Iranian and Russian slaves, though the 
lower-ranking soldiers were, it seems, more likely to be Iranian (some Iranians held higher 
military posts, however). The general predominance of Iranians in the military appears to be a 
common trait of both Khwarazm and Bukhara. While travel-reports rarely distinguish among 
Central Asian soldiers except in terms rank, our efforts to ascertain the military roles of slaves 
are aided greatly by Central Asian narrative chronicles, such as the Khwarazmian chronicle 
Firdaws al-iqbāl by Shir Muḥammad Mīrāb Munis and Muḥammad Riẕa Mīrāb Agāhī.354 Slave 
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soldiers are mentioned under several names in Munis and Agāhī’s history. They sometimes 
appear simply as “qul” (apparently the most neutral and general term for a slave in 
Khwarazm).
355
 We also find reference to a “mamlūk” engaged in battle,356 and slaves in the 
personal retinue of the khaqan are referred to as mamālīk-i khāṣṣa.357 Several slave soldiers 
grouped together are referred to as qullar nökari (“slave retinue”).358 Another group is referred to 
as consisting of qullar sipāhi, a term which seems to have denoted more specifically an 
organized military detachment.
359
 A military detachment of slaves is also called, at one point, 
qullar dastasi.
360
 We also find slaves working as envoys, dispatched by powerful amīrs—in this 
capacity, the slave is referred to as toghma.
361
 Finally, Khwarazmian khans frequently made use 
of a private corps of slave bodyguards; these individuals were called altun-jilaw (“golden 
bridle”), and Yuri Bregel notes that they could on occasion hold posts in the khan’s court.362 It 
was perhaps this sort of access which allowed for one of the most significant acts of rebellion in 
the annals of Khwarazmian slavery: the assassination, in 1727, of Shīr Ghāzī Khan by his own 
slaves. (The Firdaws al-iqbāl notes an interesting chronogram of this khan’s death-date:  “Dād 
az ghulāmān”— “Help against the ghulāms!”)363    
 Our European eyewitnesses also confirm the prominent role of Iranian slaves in the 
Khwarazmian and Bukharan militaries. Zalesov, approaching the town of Khiva after an arduous 
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journey through terrible heat and a veritable fog of dust, arrived at the city walls to find it ranged 
with Iranian guardsmen: “At the entrance to Khiva, we saw for the first time the khan’s regular 
army, arranged in a row on either side of the gate. Its guards were up to 50 men, being without 
exception Persian captives.”364 The army was not exclusively Iranian, however: Murav’ev 
reports that Khwarazmian artillerymen were generally Russian slaves, while Vitkevich met a 
converted Russian slave who served as high-ranking Bukharan artillery officer, though he notes 
that the head of the Bukharan artillery—the töpchibashi—was an Uzbek.365 P.M. Stremoukhov, 
who had served as director of the Asiatic Department for the Russian foreign ministry (among 
other positions), claims that the Bukharan infantry was recruited almost entirely from the Iranian 
slave population, of whom there were more than 10,000 in the armed forces.
366
 The Russian 
officer P.P. Shubinskii similarly observed that “a considerable portion of the Bukharan military” 
were slaves.
367
 
Slaves could also be found in the Bukharan officer corps, and we have a firsthand 
account of a slave’s promotion through its ranks thanks to Fillip Efremov, who had been 
captured by Kazakhs in 1774. Efremov was sold to an agent of the Bukharan atalik Daniyal Bek 
for “four dressed hides of red calf-skin.” He was made a harem-guard, overseeing the atalik’s six 
Kalmyk and Persian concubines, and he was eventually promoted to dahbāshi, a military post 
implying command over a group of ten men.
368
 He was further promoted thereafter, 
accompanying his master on excursions, and he eventually distinguished himself in battle by 
fighting valiantly and taking a Samarqandi prisoner. As a reward, he was promoted, once more, 
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to yuzbāshi (commander of one hundred men), with 20 Russians among those serving in his unit; 
he also received income-producing lands—all this while still a slave.369  
 According to Vitkevich, who met with a yuzbāshi of Bukhara in the 1830s, the Bukharans 
occasionally made an active effort to recruit fugitives and slaves into the military, though their 
efforts were, around the time of Vitkevich’s journey, meeting with mixed success: 
He [the yuzbāshi] said that they are recruiting an army made up of runaway Tatars and 
Russian captives, and would soon punish the troublemakers; that after Kurban Bayram, 
the Khan himself planned to ride on Shahrisabz. We note that the Khan actually did 
recruit into his army a man from among 10 of our Tatar fugitives (in this case we speak 
of soldiers), keeping him by means of deception and without pay; and besides this he 
unveiled a firman by which all captives in private hands were invited to run away from 
their masters and come to the Ark, to the palace, where they would promptly be recorded 
as sepoys, as soldiers. This challenge was taken up by some 25 people, who were held in 
a most pitiable condition.
370
 
 
Russian slaves often served the Bukharan and Khivan militaries through craftsmanship 
and blacksmithing as well, the latter work being, according to Murav’ev, nearly monopolized by 
the Russians in Khiva.
371
 In Bukhara too Russians were often tradesmen: Burnes met a Russian 
slave employed as a carpenter,
372
 and Vitkevich, who interviewed a number of Russians in the 
city, met several others working in this trade. One of these craftsmen, named Ivan, may have 
been a freedman who chose to settle in the khanate. He had previously lived in Astrakhan and 
had been taken captive on the Caspian Sea. He reported living in Khiva for three years, and then 
fleeing to Bukhara, where he worked as a carpenter “for the khan,” making gun carriages for the 
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Bukharan army.
373
 Another Russian slave had likewise escaped his master and come to the 
attention of the khan, being conscripted into the Bukharan army as well as serving as a 
shoemaker and carpenter; at the time Vitkevich met him, this man intended to build carriages 
under Ivan’s supervision.374 A Pole named Mikhal’skii that Vitkevich interviewed was also 
working as a craftsman in Bukhara, having arrived there by a very roundabout route. He had 
been taken prisoner, possibly by Poles, in 1812, but somehow escaped to Orenburg, where he 
evidently served as a guard along the border from 1816-1817. “Here they wanted to punish him,” 
Vitkevich writes, “for the fact that his gun discharged during a hunt and badly injured his hand; 
they suspected that he wanted to make himself ineligible for duty.” Rather than face his 
punishment, he fled into the steppe, where he was captured by Kazakhs and sold to the kushbegi 
of Bukhara. When Vitkevich met Mikhal’skii, he was 60 years old, and was serving as “a 
shoemaker, carpenter, mechanic, and whatever else.” He had previously set up a cobbler’s shop 
in Bukhara along with a Tatar acquaintance, “but it was a catastrophe: they couldn’t sew a decent 
pair of galoshes.” Sometime after this, he cast a pair of guns for the khan. He was a convert to 
Islam and had married a Bukharan wife, with whom he had three children.
375
   
Being a slave of a Bukharan kushbegi could come with notable benefits. At the time of 
his visit in 1820, Meyendorff reported that the “whole of the administration” of the domain was 
in the hands of the kushbegi’s family and slaves, a state of affairs Meyendorff considered less 
than ideal for the development of civic morale: “Thus we find Bokhara presents a repetition of 
the comedy eventually played by every despotic country, having a Prime Minister possessing 
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unlimited powers, which he either can exercise himself or by his subordinates, who do not 
possess the noble feeling which we call patriotism.”376 We may indeed question the “patriotism” 
of even highly promoted slaves, but generalized patriotism was surely less important than 
specific loyalty within the administration, a quality which the appointment of family and 
personal slaves was probably intended to foster. As elsewhere in the Muslim world, it was not 
uncommon to find slaves occupying administrative posts, as well as undertaking other court 
duties. Murav’ev notes some such cases in Khiva,377 while, in Bukhara, Shubinskii writes that 
nearly every minor court official (as well as every palace servant) was a slave.
378
 
The spheres of Islamic jurisprudence and prayer-leading, meanwhile, serve as examples 
of trades in which slaves were given little, if any, place. A child of slaves could take on these 
kinds of leadership roles, but the ranks of Islamic jurists, imams, and other high positions within 
religious institutions seem to have been closed off to converted slaves. One powerful case-study 
in the alienation of slaves and former-slaves from the higher echelons of the region’s religious 
life can be seen in the social bifurcation of Khwāja-Eli, a Khwarazmian town known for 
consisting in large part of sayyids, who were exempt from most obligations to the khan. M. 
Alikhanov-Avarskii visited the town around 1873, and observed its social composition: 
In order to maintain their privileged position, Khwajas [sayyids] give their daughters in 
marriage to, and themselves marry, only the descendents of Muhammad, and carefully 
guard their city from any foreign elements. In spite of this, there are several hundred 
ordinary mortals in Khwaja-Eli—the descendents of slaves who were released or 
ransomed themselves, being [therefore] descendents of Persian captives sold here. These 
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latter ones, of course, do not enjoy the privileges of the city; they live in a special quarter 
[of town] and annually contribute about 1,000 rubles to the khan’s treasury.379  
 
 Does this mean that those among the manumitted converts to Sunnism and their 
descendents converted back to Shiʿism after gaining their freedom? This is one possibility, but 
another is simply that the ranks of the religious elite were closed to them; they may have been 
regarded with suspicion as “foreign elements” or—still more likely—held in lower regard due to 
their non-sayyid ancestry.   
Slaves could, however, sometimes be found working as servants for religious institutions. 
They could even be permanently “attached” to religious institutions by formal endowment 
contracts. In one waqf deed dating to 1693, for example, it is stipulated that two families of 
slaves were to remain constantly in residence at a large Bukharan mausoleum complex, and that 
their responsibilities to the shrine were to pass from generation to generation. Likewise stipulated 
in the document is the right of each subsequent generation of slaves to draw their compensation 
from funds established by the waqf.
380
 
The fact that slaves and former-slaves are rarely, if ever, seen among the class of Islamic 
jurists and imams does not mean that slaves never served as educators, broadly considered. On 
the contrary, the education of children among nomads was not infrequently entrusted to slaves, 
and it is not unreasonable to presume that this included some measure of religious education as 
well. One Tatar slave among the Kazakhs reports that he spent his time among them teaching his 
owner’s children to read and write.381 Russians also served in this capacity; one Russian slave 
described having been treated well by his Teke Turkmen mistress, who tasked him with 
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educating her children.
382
 In other contexts, historians have considered the ways in which slaves’ 
educating children of a different background can result in cultural transmission, and it is 
tempting to assume that Kazakh children who received some education from Tatars, or Turkmen 
children who received some education from Russians, would glean from them more than just 
literacy. In the diverse cultural environment of Central Asia, though, it is difficult to isolate those 
aspects of culture which may have had “slave-mentors” as their vector. Even so, tentative 
hypotheses along these lines are possible in certain, specific areas: given the prominence of 
Russian slaves in Central Asian ironworking and military technology in the nineteenth century, 
for example, we might expect these fields to show a significant Russian imprint.  
Slaves could also be used to provide musical entertainment, and we may assume that 
these slave-musicians were typically Iranian, as we have no evidence of Russian slaves 
performing such a role. It is likely that this use of slaves was a phenomenon particular to the 
elite, though we have strikingly little evidence either way. We lack any sources from Central 
Asia which would allow us to reconstruct an environment akin to that of the famous “singing 
girls” of the medieval Middle East—an environment in which slaves (and particularly slave-
girls) provided the best-known form of spectator entertainment. Twentieth-century accounts of 
so-called bachcha bāzī (“boy play”) in Afghanistan, which often involves effeminately-clothed 
boys dancing and singing for small audiences, may hint at a practice that was current in prior 
centuries throughout Central Asia, but there are few reliable reports of slave-entertainers of any 
age or gender that we can date to earlier periods. Meyendorff offers one of the few accounts 
along these lines, providing his evidence mostly as a template for expressing a more generalized 
moral outrage of the kind so common in the era’s travel literature: “I once asked a young 
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Bokharian of good family,” he writes, “of what his amusements consisted; he said that he gave 
midday dinner parties accompanied by the music of his slaves; further, that he sometimes 
attended the chase; and, lastly, that he kept Jawanis or boy favourites. The calm and unhesitating 
way he told me this astonished me, and proved to me how well acquainted they are here with the 
most horrible of all vices.”383  
In any event, slaves’ work was often defined by what they were capable of, and we may 
assume that a slave who was a competent musician or dancer would have been put to work doing 
what he or she did best. That personal talents and perceived competencies could define a slave’s 
sphere of action is well-evidenced by the predominance of Russians among military engineers, 
and by that of Iranians working in and proximate to the royal court (the stereotype of Iranians as 
savvy bureaucrats and court attachés was long-held throughout the Muslim world). But it would 
be wrong to assume that most slaves performed only one role, and that they occupied only one 
sphere of action (agriculture, say, or the military). For example, any slave, given their owner’s 
consent, could perform work beyond what was assigned to them if they had the time and the 
inclination, and they could even legally keep the additional income they earned if their owner 
allowed them to do so. A slave put to work predominantly as a planter could work as a shepherd 
on the side, and vice-versa. A slave could also be delegated as his or her owner’s agent in matters 
of business, acting in the owner’s place and enacting the rights of a free person only as a proxy 
(such a go-between in the Islamic legal context is typically called a vakīl). In Hanafi legal 
tradition, slaves could even be charged to speak on behalf of their owners in court cases, though I 
have not yet seen any direct evidence of this occurring in early modern Central Asia.  
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Slaves could also serve as their masters’ agents in trades whose legality was more 
dubious, and indeed they would have been ideal candidates for illicit work (at least from their 
masters’ perspective). Major Blankenagel’ recalled the experiences of a Russian slave who was 
quite profitably employed in illegal labor: 
A Russian named Maksim, who had been slave at Khiva… told me that he was briefly 
acquainted with a slave named Ivan belonging to a Bukharan kazi, who told him that, 
with his owner’s consent, he secretly extracted the metals from gold and silver ores and 
got the proceeds from this, and that in half a year he had accrued the amount—totaling 30 
silver coins—[necessary] to buy himself [from his owner, i.e. to purchase his own 
freedom]… Maksim had often helped Ivan in his work, sorting the crushed ore and 
alloying the metals… Maksim had also been in the mines which Khivan Sarts used to 
work in olden times, where he had found many [more] of those inexhaustible lumps of 
ore similar to the ones he had seen [while working] with Ivan. Though it was strictly 
prohibited to work in the Khivan mines, greed compels some to secretly extract the ore 
and take it back to Bukhara, where they sell it as a commodity much in demand. Maksim 
was at Khiva for 20 years, and he had amassed many skills for enriching himself by 
means of the land. I tried to convince him to come back to Russia with me, but he did not 
agree, fearing that he would not make it back to Khiva, where he had a wife and children 
in slavery. All the same, I promised him both a dual passport and the funds, allotted by 
Her Imperial Majesty, [necessarily] to buy these slaves, and he agreed to my proposal.
384
  
  
 
Maksim’s experiences underscore the degree to which cultivating skills could enhance a 
slave’s circumstances, even facilitating his or her manumission, given the possibility of buying 
one’s own freedom. His account is also remarkable as an example—a unique one, as far as I 
have seen—of cooperation and sociability among slaves from different domains: here, we find a 
Bukharan slave teaching a trade to a Khwarazmian slave, with the two then working side-by-
side. The illegal nature of the work in question, as well as the slaves’ shared Russian 
background, likely facilitated this ostensibly rare kind of partnership.  
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Slaves’ talents could also directly affect their sale-price, and Meyendorff claimed that 
competency in a craft could even double their market value: “The price of a well-built man is 
about 40 or 50 Tellas (600 to 800 Francs). Should he be acquainted with any profession, such as 
turning, making shoes, or the work of a blacksmith, then his value increases to about 100 Tellas 
(16,000 Francs).”385 Beyond this, facility in a trade most certainly played a part in life beyond 
manumission. Those former-slaves who chose to remain in the region had to find their own 
way—and often did—using either the skills that they had before their capture or those they 
acquired during their captivity. From this we can hypothesize that those manumitted slaves who 
voluntarily chose to stay in Khwarazm, Bukhara, or the steppe after their release were more 
likely to be skilled laborers, or at least laborers who had found a niche, such as the Russian slave 
Ivan, above, who continued working in the Khwarazmian mines after buying his own freedom, 
or the Persian slaves who stayed on as court functionaries after spending much of their captivity 
at work in a similar capacity.  
 
The Roles and Position of Enslaved Women  
The literature on enslaved women in Central Asia is quite meager when compared to that 
concerning male slaves. Elsewhere in the Near East, enslaved women were extensively involved 
in agricultural labor, so that we might expect to find a similar trend in Central Asia, but mentions 
of enslaved women working in the fields are scarce in the sources I have seen. Nevertheless, 
some important features concerning enslaved women’s spheres of action emerge from the 
scattered evidence available, and a number of women left their own accounts of their captivity in 
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the form of interviews at the Russian border.   
The most commonly-discussed subject in our sources concerning enslaved women in the 
region, particularly in travel literature and eyewitness reportage, is marriage: enslaved girls and 
women were purchased to be married to male slaves, and they were sometimes married by free 
men. They could also serve as concubines, particularly for elites. That enslaved women in the 
Muslim world could occupy intimate and central roles within their owner’s household, even to 
the extent of bearing and raising their owner’s children, has inspired some historians to 
hypothesize that they were liable to enjoy better treatment and a greater permanency of position 
than their male counterparts.
386
 In particular, the legal status of umm walad (“mother of the 
child”), by which an enslaved woman who bears her owner’s child is free upon his death, has 
often been cited as a key advantage, the likes of which naturally was not available to male slaves. 
Permanency of position did not necessarily equate to better treatment, however, and our sources 
on the Central Asian context often serve to emphasize elements of social instability and 
misfortune that were unique to enslaved women, and from which even bearing their owners’ 
children served as scant protection. While marriage served to incorporate them into the 
household and—especially among nomadic Kazakhs—into the local community, the death of a 
husband could spell disaster for an enslaved woman and reveal the tenuous nature of the bonds 
her marriage had forged with the larger society around her. The following two examples, drawn 
from the testimony of escaped, formerly-enslaved women themselves, will illustrate this point.  
 On March 30
th
, 1800, a woman who had fled the steppe arrived at the Russian border and 
was interviewed by border officials. She told these officials that she did not know her own age or 
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precisely where she was had originally come from. She had been with the Kazakh Baybakt clan 
since her early childhood, living with a man whose name is recorded as Tulagan Khudaynazarov. 
When she had come of age, she learned from this man that she was a Kalmyk, and that Tulagan 
had been among a group of Kazakhs that had taken her and some other Kalmyks captive near the 
town of Uralsk. This group of captives was then divided up, and Tulagan became her owner. 
According to the woman, Tulagan eventually came to value her above his own Kazakh wife. She 
bore him three sons and three daughters; two of the sons and two of the daughters died in 
childhood. In 1790, ten years before she arrived at the Russian border, Tulagan died, and the 
woman and her children fell upon hard times. Five years later, in poverty, she sold her only 
surviving son to another member of the Baybakt clan, named Baymirza, and her daughter was 
given in marriage to a Kazakh from the Alachin clan, among whom the woman and her daughter 
both went to live. There, they were both pressed into servitude (upotrebili v prislugu) and 
suffered abuses whose harshness they could not bear. Finding an opportune moment, the woman 
fled to the Russian border at the Nizhni-Uralsk Line, from which she was transferred to the 
Orenburg Border Commission offices. The officials there, as per usual, asked her if she wished 
to be baptized. She declined, and was permitted to reside among the Muslims living at 
Orenburg.
387
  
 On the very same day, another former slave from the steppe was processed by border 
officials, and her story, though different in most details, bears some striking resemblances to the 
one above. Her name was recorded as Chiben, and she was 44 years old at the time of her 
interview. She was a Kalmyk, born and raised near the Chinese border, and she had been taken 
captive along with her mother and several other Kalmyks of both genders by a number of men 
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from the Kazakh Middle Horde. She was taken, along with her mother and sister, to their 
captors’ ulus and, soon after, she was traded to a Kazakh from the Little Horde for nine horses, a 
fleece-and-fur coat, and a gun. Her mother and sister remained with the Middle Horde.   
When Chiben came of age, she became the concubine (nalozhnitsa) of her new owner, 
bearing him two sons and a daughter. Her daughter had been married off some five years 
previously—in 1795—to a Kazakh of the Jabaltay [?] clan. In the winter of 1799-1800, Chiben’s 
owner died, and Chiben (who is referred to at this point in the document as the man’s wife) 
remained among the Kazakhs along with with her sons. She claimed that, after the death of her 
owner, the others in the tribe began to inflict “intolerable oppression” upon her and her children. 
She fled to the Nizhni-Uralsk line along with her youngest son, who was then 13 years old. Her 
other son, 15 years old, remained among the Kazakhs. She too declined to be baptized, and asked 
that she might be given leave to visit the daughter mentioned above, who had married into 
another Kazakh clan.
388
  
 We find striking common elements in these narratives: both of these women were 
Kalmyks, and both had been taken captive at a young age; both evidently grew up with the 
owners whose children they would eventually bear; both saw their daughters married off to 
different Kazakh clans; and, most strikingly, both reported suffering abuse and mistreatment 
starting from the time their owners died. It is not clear whether either woman was given the 
traditional rights of an umm walad—that is, the right of manumission after their owners’ death—
though the fact that the first woman was able to sell her own son might hint at her free status. 
She was nevertheless forced into servitude once more when she transitioned between clans. 
Regardless of their legal standing in these two communities, it is clear that their long period of 
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concubinage or marriage within the clan had not resulted in their full integration on equal footing 
with other clan members. Their wellbeing was a function of their owner’s presence, and in their 
owner’s absence they faced alienation, or worse, despite the fact that they had each grown up 
almost entirely within the clan community. Their slave status left permanent traces.  
 It is conceivable that these women exaggerated the alleged abuses they suffered in order 
to play on the sympathies of border officials, but this would hardly have been necessary: there is 
no evidence that the treatment of enslaved people by their owners had any bearing on Russian 
officials’ reception or treatment of them, either as a matter of policy or as a matter of record. The 
fact that both women came to the border only after the death of their owners suggests, at the very 
least, that they faced some sort of unwanted fate within their own communities in widowhood. It 
is likely that both were beyond the age of possible remarriage, and that the clan was unable or 
unwilling to support them in lieu of their spouses.
389
  
 As the following Border Commission report shows, however, it was not only women who 
could face an undesirable future in the steppe after the death of a spouse. Manas Sadykov, said to 
be a Kalmyk,
390
 was 70 years old when he was received by border officials on the 19
th
 of June, 
1800. He was originally from a village near the border with China, and was taken captive in his 
early youth by Middle Horde Kazakhs of the Atagay clan. They changed his name to N___ 
Sakay, and when he came of age he was married to a Kazakh woman named Janalia. They had a 
son and a daughter together, whose names are recorded as Kunabay and Jaima; the latter was 
given in marriage to a Kalmyk former-slave who lived with the clan. When Manas’ wife died, 
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however, he no longer wished to live with the clan, and he arrived at the Russian border along 
with his Kalmyk son-in-law, though his own son, Kunabay, remained in the orda. He requested 
to be baptized, after which he was evidently settled in Stavropol. It is possible that his advanced 
age made it difficult for him to do any manual labor for the clan. But ultimately there is not much 
reason to doubt his own explanation of his motivations: when he lost his wife, he lost his will to 
stay with the clan.
391
   
 Even the slave-concubines of a khan could face an uncertain future after their royal 
owner’s death. G.N. Zelenin, in his remembrances of the Russian mission to Khiva in 1842, as 
recorded by I.N. Zakhar’in, indicates as much in a lurid tale concerning the sexual services that 
had been offered to Russian officers during the embassy. We may justifiably cast suspicion upon 
Zelenin’s story, given its resemblance to the popular Orientalist erotica of the same period, but it 
is nevertheless a unique account, not altogether impossible, and it is worth reproducing here. The 
story begins with a Tatar that Zelenin met in Khiva: 
It turned out that he was a runaway soldier of ours, a Tatar and a native of Orenburg. 
Serving in the Orenburg garrison, he had often met with Zelenin on the streets of the city 
and remembered his face, being that of an officer to whom he had needed to doff his cap. 
He now had his own house in Khiva, and he already had a family there. Inviting his 
‘countrymen’ over [to his house], he treated them to tea and asked that they come back 
often. But Zelenin was afraid to visit him again, as the neighboring Khivans cast very 
unfriendly glares upon this ‘Russian,’ and the Tatar’s home was on the outskirts of the 
city, along the ravine. This [runaway] soldier was later [seen] in the residence of the 
embassy, and he offered its occupants—all of them young and single people—quite 
intimate services. But such a provider’s place was already occupied. The garden, in 
which a reserve ‘palace’ of the Khan was situated (and where our embassy was housed), 
was overseen by a special gardener from among the Persian captives, a man who knows 
his trade well. And here, his wife, also a Persian captive, offered the officers [of the 
embassy] her confidential services, costing only a poluimperial: in the Khan’s garden, at 
night, accompanying this lady gardener, a female figure would appear in a veil, a silk 
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robe, and shalvar [loose-fitting pants], wrapped in muslin and in a Persian scarf. Upon 
demand, several such figures could appear in the garden at once. In strict secrecy the 
Persian lady [gardener] would make assurances that the mysterious strangers were the 
former wives of the dead Khan, whose material circumstances under the new Khan were 
nothing to envy… It is quite possible that the lady gardener exaggerated the qualities and 
circumstances by which she came to recommend her ladies, and that they may have been 
simply Persian slave-girls, maidservants from the former Khan’s harem; but their 
costumes were always very luxurious, and simple slave-girls could not have owned such 
things.
392
  
 
 Whether we choose to believe the claims of the Iranian gardener (or, for that matter, of 
Zalenin himself), the tale offers another possible answer to the question of what happened to 
enslaved wives and concubines once their owners died. It seems intuitive to presume that 
enslaved women, even once manumitted, did not share the same potential for social mobility as 
their male counterparts, and indeed evidence of their mobility—beyond their place in an 
individual household—is largely lacking. There are few reports of enslaved women taking up 
crafts or trades, and if the lack of reportage is at all indicative of real social circumstances, then it 
is possible that enslaved women were also less likely to secure the earnings necessary to buy 
their own freedom.
393
  
In this light, it is not surprising that, of the several Russian slaves interviewed by 
Vitkevich in Bukhara, the individual in the saddest circumstances was the lone woman among 
them. She was “some major’s daughter,” then 50 years old, who had been captured when she 
was 15. She had been manumitted at some point, but her present occupation when Vitkevich met 
her was, according to him, nothing more than “following after and imposing herself on all 
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[Russian] newcomers.”394 Murav’ev too reports on the fate of enslaved women after their 
owner’s death, though he seems to conflate the fate of enslaved women with that of women 
generally. “No one, not even the nearest relation,” he writes, “is permitted to enter the female 
apartments, and the women are condemned to a life of the strictest solitude and most dreadful 
ennui. They are slaves, and on a man's death, the son has a right to sell them at pleasure.”395 
According to Vitkevich, at least some manumitted Iranian women in Bukhara were able to 
remarry, presumably of their own volition: “Most of the captives in Bukhara are Persian, and a 
significant portion of the current population of Bukhara is descended from the mixing of Tajiks 
and Uzbeks with freed Persians. One must, however, note that the Uzbeks will take for 
themselves the daughter of a Tajik or even a Persian, but they will not give their own daughters 
[in marriage] to them.”396 
 The death of an elite personage could leave a great many enslaved women in a 
precarious position. One khan of Khiva, writes the American journalist Januarius Aloysius 
MacGahan, had four wives and “about a hundred slave women; he seems to have some from 
each of the races that are found in his dominions. The exact number I did not ascertain; the Khan 
himself one could not ask, as it is considered extremely unpolite, in Central Asia, to make any 
mention to a man of his wife, or wives.”397 Vambery reports the same number of “legitimate” 
wives for Muzaffar ad-Dīn, Emir of Bokhara who, he writes, “has (for it is a custom of his 
religion) four legitimate wives and about twenty others, the former natives of Bokhara, the latter 
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slaves, and, as I was told seriously, only employed to tend upon the children, of whom there are 
sixteen, ten girls (but I beg pardon, princesses), and six boys (Tore).”398 
 As little as we know about the fate of manumitted women, it is no clearer from our 
sources what sort of work women tended to do while still in slavery. While we know they bore 
children for their owners, it is not even entirely clear that enslaved women would have been 
primarily responsible for raising these children. The lack of exposés from inside the harem 
should not surprise us, despite the comparatively vast literature on slave-women—or 
“odalisques”—from elsewhere in the Muslim world (particularly the Ottoman Empire). It must 
be remembered that most of our literature on the subject is entirely fictional—little more than the 
product of European fantasies—and consists of speculation rather than eyewitness reportage. 
Precious few foreign men ever gained admittance to the female quarters of an elite Ottoman 
residence, and the same may be assumed of male travelers in Central Asia. Among the few 
travelers who purported to describe the functioning of a Central Asian harem, we may at least 
note the report of Vambery, who offers the dubious claim that most Uzbeks had little taste for 
Iranian slaves as concubines because they did not find Iranian women sufficiently beautiful; he 
likewise notes, more plausibly, that relative poverty prevented most Uzbeks from indulging 
extensively in polygamy with slave-women: 
As for the female slaves, they do not by any means enjoy the position which is occupied 
by the daughters of Circassia and Georgia in the harems of Turkey and Persia. On the 
contrary, their position is rather to be compared with that of the negresses in those 
countries. It is very easy to explain why. In the first place, the daughters of Turkestan 
correspond better to the ideas of beauty entertained by Oezbegs and Tadjiks than the 
Iranian women, who with their olive complexions and large noses, would never bear off 
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the apple of Paris from the fair, full-cheeked Oezbeg women. In the second place, in 
consequence of their poverty the inhabitants of Central Asia do not indulge in polygamy 
to such an extent as the Mohammedans of the West. Besides this, the Oezbeg has 
generally too much aristocratic pride to share his bed and board with a slave, whom he 
has bought for money. In Bokhara it is true that we find instances to the contrary, but that 
is only among the high functionaries of state, and even they only take such women as 
have been brought as children into the country. In the middle classes such misalliances 
are very rare phenomena. Besides, marriage is much easier here than in other 
Mohammedan countries. Hence female slaves are kept only as articles of luxury in the 
harems of the great, or as domestic servants.
399
 
 
 
Vambery’s claims about the rarity of Iranian wives and concubines contrasts with most 
other accounts, but it cannot be dismissed out-of-hand: there is simply too little information on 
the labors of Central Asian slave-women to decisively confirm what sort domestic roles they 
played and what place they tended to have in the household. It is plausible, at least, that many 
enslaved women served as maidservants, as Vambery suggests. Concerning Khiva, Zelenin 
recounts that “with [slave] girls, their dealings were much simpler: the beautiful ones among 
them filled the harems of Khivan nobles and wealthy merchants, and the ugly occupied [the same 
place, but] as slave-girls and servants.”400 
 A still smaller body of evidence is available concerning the role of enslaved women 
among the Turkmens. Eyewitness and secondhand reportage on the subject is, moreover, 
sometimes contradictory, and it is thoroughly permeated with the tone of contempt and derision 
common to nearly all nineteenth-century writings on the Turkmens, whether it be English, 
Russian, or Iranian. General agreement exists, at least, that slave women often became 
concubines among the Turkmens, as Grodekoff claims for the Teke: “The women are the chief 
prize, becoming, on their arrival at the aoul, the concubines of their captors; their children being 
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brought up in slavery.”401 Rzhevuskii commented on these arrangements in the larger context of 
Turkmen marriage and social organization:  
Turkmens can have several wives, and, if they have sufficient funds, they set out several 
tents, one for each wife, arranged near one-another. In conditions of poverty, they all live 
under the same roof. Divorce is completely dependent on the husband[’s will]. Aside 
from their wives, Turkmens often associate with their female slaves, as a consequence of 
which all the Yomuds are divided into the kul and the iz. To the first category belong all 
who are born of slave women; to the second, of Yomud mothers. The kul’s inheritance is 
half that of the iz.
402
 
 
 
 Whether Turkmens could actually marry their enslaved women remained a matter of 
debate, however. Some claimed that this practice was strictly forbidden, as in the following—
highly suspect—report on the Teke: 
Custom prohibits the Teke from marrying slave-women, and this is one of the most 
prominent motifs of Teke poetry. The beautiful, delicate Persians strongly tempt them, 
but their law does not permit the Tekes to enrich their tribe with cross-breeds, and for that 
reason, in those cases where a love-struck gentleman exercises the right of the victor by 
impregnating his captive and she gives birth, the baby is either killed or sold into slavery. 
Generally speaking, the family environment in Akhal-Teke is fairly wholesome, although 
(or perhaps because?) husbands often beat their wives.
403
 
 
 Suffice to say this is the only extant source that claims the Turkmens killed their own 
children or sold them into slavery, and I believe we may dismiss the notion as a silly fantasy. At 
the opposite extreme is the British traveler John Wood, who claimed not only that Turkmens 
could marry their slaves, but even that their free-born wives became slaves upon marriage. “The 
custom of man-stealing,” Wood writes, “appears to have smothered every better feeling, and the 
practice of trafficking in human beings extends even into their domestic arrangements; for their 
wives are as much articles of property as their slaves, and are bought and sold with the same 
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callous indifference.”404 Suffice to say that efforts to better understand the predicament of 
enslaved women among the Turkmens must await the revelation of better sources than these, if 
such sources exist.   
The relative lack of eyewitness information on enslaved women mostly indicates an 
imbalance of access, and perhaps an imbalance of interest on the part of witnesses, and should 
not be thought to suggest a scarcity of women among the ranks of the enslaved. Among the 
Kazakhs, Semeniuk alleges that women and children formed the predominant enslaved 
demographic, and that slaves were therefore predominantly found occupying women’s and 
children’s roles in the household.405 This makes some intuitive sense given that women and 
children were less likely to attack their own captors (a constant danger) or to successfully flee 
from them, and also because slave-women could carry a price similar to that of men on the open 
market: they were, in other words, easier to obtain and no less valuable than men.
406
 But there 
are few eyewitness reports by observers who actually witnessed enslaved women and children at 
work in Kazakh households and communities, and few of the formerly-enslaved women 
interviewed at the Russian border described the sort of work they did. Moreover, as far as I have 
seen, women are in the minority among those who escaped captivity in the steppe. There are a 
few possible reasons for this. First, women may have been less inclined to attempt the dangerous 
and arduous journey to the nearest Russian fortification. Second, given that many—perhaps even 
most—enslaved women in the steppe bore children by their owners or by others, their children 
may have served as an additional incentive not to flee the clan.  
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Marriage Among Slaves  
Oftentimes these children were the product of marriages that were arranged between enslaved 
men and women. Integrating slaves into the social fabric of the community, however 
temporarily, was, according to some eyewitnesses, the main reason why male slaves were 
permitted to marry at all. “Desiring as much as possible to tie the slaves to their new fatherland,” 
writes Zalesov of Khwarazm, “the Uzbeks usually try to marry them off, finding them brides 
who, for the most part, are also Persian captives from their master’s harem, or else dilapidated 
beauties from the Khan’s harem.”407 Because the children of male slaves were likewise slaves, 
the owners also benefited from their slaves’ marriages, as these unions could serve to produce 
more human property for them. It is likely for this reason—rather than pure generosity—that we 
find reports of some owners purchasing women specifically for the purposes of marrying them to 
their male slaves. Burnes, for example, interviewed an Iranian slave from Mashhad who, he 
writes, “gave us a favourable account of his treatment by his master, who intended to purchase a 
wife for him; but he had no hope of his liberty.”408 In Khwarazm and Bukhara, it seems that the 
purchased wives were generally Iranian, though they could be married to male slaves of any 
background. Meyendorff, among others, observed that enslaved Iranian women were used for the 
purposes of increasing the general labor pool: “[W]e ﬁnd among the slaves in Bokhara Hezurehs, 
Chitrars, Siapuchs, and even Georgians; their number never diminishes, for they are given 
Persian women in marriage, it being the interest of their masters to keep them up.”409 
Among the Kazakhs, there is evidence of a remarkably different dynamic: while I have 
                                                 
407
 Zalesov, “Pis’mo iz Khivy,” 286 
408
 Burnes, Travels into Bokhara, Vol. 1, 256 
409
 Meyendorff, Journey of the Russian Mission from Orenbourg to Bokhara, 61-62 
179 
 
found no indication of slaves in Khwarazm and Bukhara marrying free, non-Iranian women (free 
Uzbeks, for example), it was apparently not unusual for slaves in the steppe to take free Kazakh 
brides. Particular customs governed this phenomenon. In at least some parts of the steppe, if a 
free female member of the orda married a slave, their children would remain technically free, but 
they would likewise serve the family that their enslaved father served.
410
 Different customs 
applied to enslaved women who married free Kazakh men: these women would evidently 
convert and be manumitted as part of the terms of their marriage, but their original owner (if this 
person was not the woman’s new husband) could decide even then whether to send the woman to 
her husband or, rejecting the marriage, keep her in servitude.
411
  
Among the Kazakhs, it seems that marriage could be a very effective means of 
integrating male slaves into the community. The most vivid indication of this fact is the high 
incidence of married slaves who, having been surrendered by their owners and manumitted by 
decree at the Russian border, chose to return to their homes among the Kazakhs rather than 
opting to be repatriated elsewhere. A few exemplary individuals, all of whom were interviewed 
in September of 1852 and all of whom are referred to as “Afghans” in records of border officials, 
will serve to illustrate this and other common features of slave marriages among the Kazakhs: 
 1) An Afghan, 45 years old, was surrendered to the Russian authorities by his owner and 
interviewed by Russian border officials. He did not know the details of how he had been taken 
captive, only that he had initially been sold by Turkmens to a Kazakh named Khuday-Berdi for 
60 tillas, and that, when he was four years old, he was sold to his present owner at the same 
price. He lived with his present owner from that time on. During this period he received his own 
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tent (otdel’naia kibitka), married a Kazakh woman, and raised three sons and two daughters with 
her. Upon receiving his Russian-decreed freedom at Orenburg, he evidently returned home again 
to his family among the Kazakhs.
412
  
 2) An Afghan, 34 years old and originally from Herat, told the Russian authorities that he 
had been captured by Turkmens nineteen years previously while he was out watching after cattle. 
These Turkmens carried him along with them for the next two years before finally trading him to 
a Kazakh for some quantity of sheep. He lived with this Kazakh from that time on. He married a 
Kazakh woman, though he does not report having any children with her. Upon being surrendered 
by his owner and receiving his Russian-ordained manumission, he too seems to have simply 
returned home again to his wife among the Kazakhs, choosing not to return to Herat.
413
 
 3) An Afghan, 40 years old, whose name was recorded as Baydullah, was also originally 
from Herat. He was taken captive by Turkmens at ten years old, and he remained among the 
Turkmens for the next five years, after which they sold him to his present Kazakh owner, with 
whom he lived for more than two decades before being surrendered to the Russian authorities. 
He had a Kazakh wife and a daughter, and opted not to be returned to his original home in 
Herat.
414
  
 4) An Afghan whose name is recorded as Tursun
415
 was 22 years old when he was 
surrendered by his Kazakh owner to the Russian authorities. He reports that he came from among 
the Afghans (iz afgantsev), but does not specify a town or village. This is likely because he was 
captured early in his youth, since he claimed not to know the details of his original captivity or 
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who sold him to his present owner. He was married to a Kazakh woman, with whom he had a 
son. He too reported possessing his own tent, and he did not wish for border officials to return 
him to his original home (of which he seems to have had no knowledge in any case).
416
 
 According to the Soviet historian Zimanov, slaves among the Kazakhs who gained the 
confidence of their owners were sometimes given not only their own tents but even their own 
livestock. Those who attained this level of autonomy were generally withdrawn from the pool of 
slaves who were sold and re-sold as commodities, though their owners retained this right at all 
times.
417
 It is not clear whether this custom had strong parallels among the slaves of Khwarazm 
and Bukhara, though Alexander Burnes reports having met an enslaved Russian in Bukhara who 
had not only a wife and child, but even his own slaves.
418
 In the context of the khanates too there 
can be little doubt about the effectiveness of marriage in developing a male slave’s local 
loyalties—if not to his owner, then at least to his new family. When Joseph Wolff, the eccentric 
German missionary and adventurer, met with a Bukharan official concerning, among other 
things, the release of Russian and Persian slaves, the official was eager to show him a selection 
of those Russians who had no desire to return to Russia; their disinclination was couched in 
terms that should not surprise us: some claimed to be deserters, but others replied, “We are 
married here, and have wives and children.”419  
It is unclear whether slaves, either in the khanates or in the steppe, had much autonomy in 
selecting their spouses or consenting to their betrothals. If we can believe the reportage of Filipp 
Efremov, the Russian slave who rose through the ranks to become a military officer in Khiva, 
then it appears that slave-women had, at least in rare cases, some agency in choosing a husband. 
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Efremov reports that, at one point, he had a female attendant appointed to him, an enslaved 
woman who had been sold at Bukhara. This lady wished to marry Efremov, and she was 
evidently persistent: “on account of her insistent entreaties,” Efremov writes, “I promised to 
avail myself of a favourable opportunity to escape.”420 Efremov did not escape anytime soon, 
however, and she evidently grew on him, since when he finally did make his getaway he 
mentions having taken her with him in order to secure her freedom as well. Aside from this 
account, it seems safe to assume that most slave marriages were arranged by the slaves’ owners, 
and it is possible that Efremov’s attendant may have been appointed in order to establish this 
kind of bond.   
 
Limited Spaces for Slaves’ Autonomy  
Evidence of autonomy and independent initiatives among the enslaved are not abundant in our 
sources, which generally lack the depth of detail we find in Mīrzā Maḥmūd’s narrative. 
Nevertheless, the evidence that exists—slaves entrusted with their own households in the steppe, 
for example, as well as some of the examples I will offer below—are helpful in reconstructing 
the possible range of slaves’ experiences. On the more dramatic end of the spectrum, we have at 
least one account, offered by Murav’ev, of a woman who—like Mīrzā Maḥmūd—was able to 
convince her master to re-sell her in order to enhance her living conditions. Despite her master’s 
eventual consent, the circumstances reported by Murav’ev, who traveled with the woman and her 
owner in a caravan, are tragic: 
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On the leading camel sat Fatima, by birth a Kurd, and formerly Said’s father’s concubine. 
She had been 12 years his slave, and now, wishing to improve her lot, begged her master 
to sell her in Khiva. On his refusal to part with her, she threatened to commit suicide; so 
he gave in. It is incredible what this woman endured on the road. Clothed only in rags, 
she led the caravan day and night, hardly slept or ate, and, when we halted, attended to 
the camels, cooked her master’s food, &c… Said himself became disrespectful, as the 
following incident will show: He had taken his female slave Fatima to all the villages and 
bazars about, but could nowhere get his price for her. This poor woman lived in the same 
room with all the rest of the party, but when they went out she used to be so ill-treated by 
the other people in the fortress, that I had frequently to send Petrovitch to drive them off. 
On one of these occasions the ruffians behaved so badly to her, that Fatima fled, and 
declared that she would certainly take her own life if she were not sold soon. When Said 
returned I represented the state of things to him, and begged him to have it altered, and to 
sell Fatima, whose presence was a scandal to us all. He listened to me quietly, then rose 
up and said, “Farewell Murad Beg! My service is at an end, for since this is to be your 
treatment of me, I leave you. Fatima is my slave, and I shall sell her whenever and to 
whomsoever I please." With those words he went away, but I called him back, and he 
came, probably supposing I would ask his pardon for my interference… I made the 
matter up with him, and next day he sold Fatima.421 
 
 
 Vambery offers another memorable (but, like all of his reportage, potentially fictional) 
story concerning the influence enslaved women could have over their owners. He claims that two 
of the traveling-companions who accompanied him for a short while on the road to Khiva were a 
Turkmen and his wife, the latter having convinced her husband to travel there. She had been 
captured some time previously in a surprise raid, during which her husband had been badly 
wounded. She undertook the journey, Vambery tells us, in order to ascertain whether her 
husband was still alive, what person or persons had bought her children, and, in particular, what 
had become of her 12-year-old daughter. “The poor woman,” Vambery writes, “by extraordinary 
fidelity and laboriousness, had so enchained her new master, that he consented to accompany her 
on her sorrowful journey of enquiry. I was always asking him what he would do if her former 
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husband were forthcoming, but his mind on that point was made up—the law guaranteed him his 
possession.”422 
  Such rare anecdotes aside, there can be no doubt that the most common and widely-
documented means by which both enslaved men and women demonstrated their autonomy was 
by fleeing from their owners. Along with evidence from the many slaves who fled to the Russian 
border (the subject of the following chapter), stories concerning escaped slaves also appear in 
many travelers’ reports, such as the narrative which emerged in a colonial court case witnessed 
by J.A. MacGahan. A Russian colonel presided over the court, into which an elderly Khivan 
woman entered, “leading a lubberly-looking young man about fourteen, and bowing almost to 
the earth at every step, and [she] addressed the Colonel, whom she took for General Kaufmann, 
as the ‘Yarim-Padshah,’ or half-emperor, which title the Colonel accepted with grave 
composure.” She wore a tall white turban and a “dirty-looking tunic,” and she presented the 
colonel with an offering of bread and apricots before making her case. She claimed that her son, 
the “gawky boy” next to her, had been robbed of his wife by “a vile thieving dog of a Persian 
slave,” who had also stolen her donkey and used it to carry the boy’s wife away. “So he is three 
times a thief,” the colonel replied. “He stole the donkey, the girl, and himself.” The colonel then 
asked the woman about the identity of the stolen bride. "She is a Persian girl,” the woman 
replied. “I bought her from a Turcoman who had just brought her from Astrabad, and I paid fifty  
tillahs for her. The dog of a slave must have bewitched her, for as soon as she saw him she flew 
into his arms, weeping and crying, and said, ‘he was her old playmate.’ That was nonsense, and I 
beat her for it soundly. The marriage was to be celebrated in a few days; but as soon as the 
Russians came, the vile hussy persuaded the slave to run away with her, and I believe they are as 
good as married.” In the end, MacGahan writes, the escaped slaves were never returned to the 
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woman and her son, and neither was the donkey.
423
  Collusion among slaves was a common 
means of escape both in settled lands and in the steppe, with many of those who came to the 
Russian border arriving in the company of others.  
 Beyond fleeing from their owners, there were other, less drastic—albeit also less well-
evidenced—means by which the enslaved endeavored to shape their own experiences. For 
example, those up for sale or newly purchased could try to influence their appeal to certain 
buyers by modulating their behavior.
424
 Some documents suggest that a slave showing defects 
which became obvious only after his or her sale could be returned in exchange for a refund, or 
for a new, more satisfactory slave. A terse Bukharan document in Persian, published in facsimile 
by S.K. Ismailova, reveals this sort of exchange; its author writes: “[To] Muḥammadshah Bay: a 
female slave given by us to Qarategin has turned out to be insane [divāna buda ast]. On 
receiving her, you should punish her and keep her for yourself. In her place send a female slave 
[chūrī] brought from Nurāt.”425 That such a “refund” could be imposed through legal means is 
evidenced by another Bukharan document, published in facsimile by Faiziev, in which the buyer 
of a female slave realized only too late that his purchase had a serious skin-disease and took his 
complaint before the court in hopes of getting his money back.
426
 It is easy to imagine slaves 
making use of such legal processes to change owners, perhaps by faking insanity or 
incompetence, or otherwise by altering their behavior and managing their own conduct.    
  Mīrzā Maḥmūd’s narrative, meanwhile, points toward the different ways in which 
slaves could modulate their own skills and talents in the presence of their owners in order to 
resist—or change the nature of—certain types of work or work-regimes. Abilities which might 
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be put to uncomfortable use were likely hidden; skilled artisans may have been apt to conceal 
their craft if they feared it would increase their owners’ demand for their labor without any 
further benefit to themselves. Women faced with concubinage could endeavor to make 
themselves less desirable to their owners, or to make themselves more desirable if it might result 
in better treatment.   
*  *  * 
In this chapter we have seen something of the diversity of slave labor, slaves’ roles, and slaves’ 
family life in Central Asia. Slaves worked the land; they processed the land’s produce; they 
worked as blacksmiths, artillerymen, guardsmen, herdsmen, maidservants, harem attendants, 
court attendants, shrine attendants, concubines, well-diggers, entertainers, carpenters, leather-
workers, textile-workers, teachers, soldiers, officers, and administrators. They could be 
appointed as their owners’ agents in commerce. They were wives and mothers. Even if an 
individual owned no slaves, he or she would have been immersed in a world partially made and 
thoroughly inhabited by slaves.  
 Unlike slaves who were specifically acquired to tend to a monoculture, such as slaves on 
colonial-era Caribbean sugar plantations, each individual Central Asian slave would likely have 
been put to work in a variety of tasks, occupying multiple social spheres and spaces throughout 
his or her lifetime. Enslaved men had a particularly broad range of mobility, as they were able to 
work more extensively outside the home and in a greater variety of trades. The work a slave 
performed could be defined by his or her capabilities, be it metalworking or leading a military 
regiment. Generally speaking, though, greater mobility should not be mistaken for greater 
autonomy: work was delegated to slaves by their owners, and slaves’ abilities to earn their own 
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autonomous revenue or define their own labor regimen depended entirely upon their masters’ 
will. 
Women who bore children for their owners would have had a better chance of being 
freed than most men could hope for, but women also had generally poorer prospects after 
manumission, as well as fewer opportunities to earn the wages necessary to purchase their own 
freedom. Conclusions about the sort of work women did are necessarily tentative, however, since 
few eyewitnesses ever observed their role in private households. I have seen no reports, for 
example, of enslaved women in Central Asia serving as nursemaids for their owners, or as cooks, 
though they likely served as both. We know with greater certainty that they were often given in 
marriage, both to male slaves and to free-born men, and that they often served as their owners’ 
concubines and sometimes as their wives.  
Having observed in this chapter some of the many roles and spheres of action occupied 
by Central Asian slaves, the next chapter will provide a closer look at one of the most dramatic 
means by which slaves asserted their autonomy: by fleeing from their masters. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 From Slaves to Serfs: Manumission along the Kazakh Frontier 
 
  
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, thousands of slaves, predominantly Iranians 
and Kalmyks, issued from the steppe and arrived at the Russian border. At first, these slaves 
were exclusively refugees who had escaped their owners. Later on, following the imperial decree 
that all steppe peoples must give up their slaves to Russian officials, those slaves who arrived at 
the border usually came with their owners in tow. Two difficult decisions faced the officials 
during this period: they had to decide who was really a slave, a process which involved defining 
slavery itself; and they had to decide what was to be done with those slaves who, having been 
freed either by escape or by decree, were now at the disposal of the Russian Empire. The results 
of these negotiations were often surprising, and the Border Commission’s internal records 
preserve the story of how some slaves became serfs, and how some slave-owners became foster 
parents. This chapter considers such decisions as these and the logic behind them, while 
challenging the longstanding consensus among historians that the Russian project of 
manumitting slaves from the steppe was motivated by ideals of abolitionism.   
189 
 
 By the mid-eighteenth century, a steady stream of escaped slaves and captives from 
among the Kazakhs were arriving at Russian garrisons along the steppe frontier. What these 
escapees expected from the Russians is not clear; perhaps some expected safe passage to settle 
within the Russian Empire, or help in returning to their original homes elsewhere in the region. 
Others may have had no preconceptions at all, simply preferring to take their chances with the 
Russians rather than remain in captivity. Having taken the risk of fleeing into the steppe, either 
alone or in small groups, many of these escapees would have been profoundly disappointed by 
their fate upon arriving at the Russian border: throughout the eighteenth century, and even well 
into the nineteenth, the Russian modus operandi was generally to return escaped slaves to their 
Kazakh owners. This was inspired in part by a desire to maintain good relations with local 
Kazakh rulers and elites, but it may also have been the legacy of a sinister Russian policy in the 
steppe: during the Bashkir Uprising of 1704-1711, the Tsarist authorities had evidently 
encouraged their Kazakh allies to plunder and enslave Bashkirs.
427
 Having provided for the 
perpetuation and even the increase of slavery among the Kazakhs, the Russians were certainly 
not inclined to give quarter to those lucky enough to escape it, while offending their allies in the 
process. There was one exception, however, and the exception was made law by a decree issued 
from the Bureau of Foreign Affairs in February of 1752: escaped slaves who agreed to be 
baptized would thereafter be officially welcomed into the Russian Empire.
428
 Three decades 
later, in October of 1781, an imperial edict established that all captives fleeing Kazakh lands 
would be free to settle in Russia or to be returned to their homelands if they so desired.
429
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 By the mid-nineteenth century, the Orenburg Border Commission had decreed the end of 
slavery in the steppe, and even began employing Kazakh “native informants” to help free the 
region’s slave population (a subject to which we will return in the following chapter). As border 
authorities would discover throughout this period, however, it was not always an easy matter to 
negotiate the terrain of manumission. Internal documents produced by the Orenburg Border 
Commission and affiliated offices provide remarkably intimate reportage in this respect. We find 
in these documents that Russian notions of slavery and abolition did not always map cleanly onto 
the Kazakh context, and that official manumission policies were not always well-understood 
even by the border officials tasked with enforcing them. Abolishing Kazakh slavery would entail 
defining Kazakh slavery, first of all—and then there was still the matter of what should be done 
with all the newly manumitted men, women and children who were now at the Tsar’s disposal.  
 Among those escaping slavery in the steppe, it seems that many—and especially 
Kalmyks—chose to convert to Christianity at the prompting of border officials in order to be 
resettled within the Russian Empire. These new Russians were typically resettled in communities 
of other refugees and immigrants, such as those which could be found in the towns of Stavrapol, 
Sarapul, and Karakul.
430
 Those choosing to be baptized sometimes reported suffering bad 
treatment under their Kazakh owners, as did the escaped slave whose name was recorded as 
Muḥammad Akhmetov. A Persian from Sabzavar, Akhmetov had been captured by Turkmens 
while on a trading mission to Astarabad. He had been sold to a Kazakh for 100 sheep, and he 
remained with this owner for the next five years. Akhmetov reports that his owner inflicted 
various tortures upon him and kept him in a state of starvation. For this reason, he fled to the 
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Lower Uralsk line “with the intention of becoming a Christian” and making his home in the town 
of Uralsk.
431
   
Others who chose to be baptized claimed to be attempting to join relatives who had 
immigrated previously. One such refugee reported having been captured some twenty years prior 
along with his mother and brother, both of whom had fled to Russia almost immediately. He had 
been too young to join them in their flight, and so he remained in service to a Kazakh woman for 
another two decades before making his escape. Seizing an opportune moment, he stole a horse 
and fled to where he hoped to make contact with his brother, who, he had learned, was serving in 
an Ural Cossack army regiment based in Kazan. He was unable to find his brother, but wished to 
be resettled in Stavrapol nevertheless.
432
  
In another document, we find the report that seven Iranian slaves who had fled the steppe 
all shared an inclination to be baptized and repatriated as citizens of the Russian Empire. These 
Iranians hailed from various cities—Astarabad, Mashhad, and Sabzavar among them—and were 
evidently unrelated. But all claimed to have relatives in Uralsk, a coincidence we may justifiably 
regard as suspect. In any event, they were duly baptized, and their names were “Christianized”: 
Muḥammad Khan became Konstantin; Muḥammad ʿAlī became Aleksei. They were then 
permitted to reside in Uralsk “or some other place” under Russian dominion.433 
 Escaped slaves typically arrived at the border with no resources of their own, and with no 
safe, practical means of getting there they were going, whether it be to somewhere within the 
Russian Empire or to their original homeland of Iran or Afghanistan. Border authorities often 
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absorbed the expenses—or, in later periods, charged Kazakh elites who had failed to ensure that 
the slaves were turned over—and also made arrangements for necessary lodging and transport.434 
The authorities could not allow just anyone to take advantage of these accommodations, 
however, and Russian officials were well-aware of the possibility that an individual arriving 
fresh from the wilds, with an exotic tale to tell, might not be who he or she claimed to be. In 
cases of doubt, examinations were administered. One escapee, who arrived at the border in the 
Spring of 1862 and whose name was recorded as Nādir Sagarkulin, claimed to be an Iranian 
from Tehran, where he had lived with his mother, three brothers, his wife, and two children (all 
of whose names were recorded by border officials). Two years previously, he had been appointed 
to a military detachment tasked with raiding a Turkmen encampment, but he was taken captive in 
the campaign and sold to a Bukharan, with whom he lived for no more than half a year. This 
Bukharan sold him to a Kokandian merchant, and he went to live with that owner in Tashkent 
and in Turkestan. This Kokandian treated him cruelly, and he fled to Fort Perovskii in order to 
ask the Russian officials to send him back home, via Astrakhan, as he had no other means of 
making the journey. Before agreeing to this, however, the Border Commission had him 
examined by a titular medical counselor of the Syr Darya Line, who reported that Sagarkulin 
appeared to be the age he claimed to be. He also offered his opinion on the matter which 
probably inspired this and other examinations: that there “were no signs of corporal punishment 
on his body by which one could suspect him of being a criminal fleeing Russia[n authorities].”435 
Another test was also deemed necessary: Sagarkulin was brought before some Bukharan 
merchants who traded at the Fort Perovskii bazaar in order to confirm that he was indeed an 
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Iranian.
436
 Having confirmed to the modest extent possible that Nādir Sagarkulin was more likely 
an Iranian escaped slave than a disguised fugitive from Russia, the border officials consented to 
transport him back home to Iran via Astrakhan.  
 The next step for Sagarkulin, and for any other refugee who was to be conveyed back 
home, was the arrangement of transport. For this, border officials relied on the region’s caravans, 
and in some cases the safety of the passengers was ensured by the appointment of a police escort 
or others who might watch over them.
437
 Iranian slaves headed back to Iran would sometimes be 
added to the ranks of caravans bound for Bukhara, and the caravan drivers themselves were 
made to sign a document confirming that they would guarantee the delivery of these temporary 
wards of the state.   
One Bukharan caravan driver—Raḥīmbay Atambaev—was employed repeatedly for 
these purposes.
438
 In the course of one of his missions, Atambaev became involved in a curious 
episode which reveals the lengths to which the Commission would go in order to ensure the safe 
repatriation of former slaves. Having been tasked with delivering an Uzbek refugee whose name 
is recorded as Muslimberdi, Raḥīmbay informed this Uzbek that his caravan, which was set to 
depart from the Orenburg trading grounds, would be traveling through the territory of the 
Kazakh clan among which Muslimberdi had been kept as a slave. Because his former master still 
lived among them, it was resolved that Muslimberdi should instead leave on another caravan that 
would bypass this dangerous territory. The Uzbek could rest assured that a suitable caravan 
would be available to him, since another Bukharan caravan was being driven by Kazakhs from a 
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clan hostile to that of his former owner. They would most certainly avoid their rival clan’s 
territory. The officials of the Orenburg Customs House agreed to put Muslimberdi on this 
caravan.  
The caravan was not imminently scheduled to depart, however, and Muslimberdi had no 
choice but to wait in Orenburg. The problem was that Muslimberdi had no resources of any kind, 
and no way to care for himself in the meantime. A Customs House official named Burtsov 
agreed to put him to work, offering him clothing, lodgings, and the promise that he would send 
him off with some money when the time came. Muslimberdi ended up remaining in Burtsov’s 
employ for the next six months, evidently opting to remain in Orenburg rather than to return 
home on a caravan. Nevertheless, he turned up at the Border Commission offices again sometime 
later, claiming that Burtsov had refused to give him the clothing and money that he had been 
promised. Burtsov responded with the claim that he was in no way obligated to pay him, and, 
moreover, that Muslimberdi had since moved on to work for an Afghan prince living in 
Orenburg who paid him only in food, but who ultimately turned him away. It was only, Burtsov 
alleged, because of his present unemployment that Muslimberdi had come to the border 
authorities seeking money in “reparation.” At this point it appears to be Burtsov who requested 
that Muslimberdi be put on a Bukharan caravan and sent back home.
439
 
Notwithstanding complications such as these, repatriating former slaves to their original 
homelands appears usually to have been a relatively straightforward matter. Those who chose to 
be baptized and resettled in the Russian Empire, however, occasioned a more intricate protocol. 
Details on the fate which awaited these refugees are preserved in a work by Nikolai Blinov,
440
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and what Blinov reveals is quite astonishing. Having escaped slavery in the steppe and having 
placed themselves at the mercy of the Russian Empire, these former slaves were converted not 
only into Christians, but also into serfs. For those historians who consider serfdom a type of 
slavery, it could be argued that these refugees were thus promptly re-enslaved by the very state 
which purported to free them. 
 Blinov’s discussion concerns just one of the many towns in which escapees were often 
resettled: Sarapul, a settlement on the right bank of the Kama River. He writes that Sarapul 
served as a point of resettlement for Persians, Khivans, Afghans, Bukharans, and “white Arabs” 
(belye arapy), and that these immigrants had, by the late nineteenth century, integrated with the 
population such that one often met with burghers and peasants “with hair and beards as black as 
pitch”—hallmarks of “Asian” descent—among the light-haired Russian population. These, 
Blinov tells us, are escaped slaves who had converted to Christianity and had found safe passage 
into the Russian Empire thanks to the government’s concern for the fate of foreign migrants.441  
Blinov dates the Russian Empire’s decision to receive converted refugees to the early 
1760s, the dawn of Catherine the Great’s reign, citing a decree which specified that “people of 
the various Asian nations” who were received at the border should be asked whether they wished 
to settle in the Empire and, if so, where they wished to settle. Some would then enter into the 
employ of private individuals (as Muslimberdi had done); the rest were conveyed to Moscow, 
where they would receive new clothing and provisions while awaiting resettlement. The ultimate 
goal was for these individuals to adopt “Russian customs” and to acquire basic proficiency in the 
Russian language so that they would be well-adapted to their new homeland. The first group of 
such refugees to arrive in Moscow consisted of 72 men and women, none of whom spoke 
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enough Russian to express precisely where in the Russian Empire they wished to settle. It was 
thus decided that they should be sent eastward again, to the vicinity of Kazan and Orenburg. 
Here they would find settlements, surrounded by suitable farmland, in which they could meet 
“the local peasants who, through proximity to the Bashkirs and Tatars, might know their 
language.” The Kalmyk refugees would be separated from the Persians. Accordingly, 54 
Kalmyks were sent to Sarapul, and 18 Persians were sent to Karakul.
442
           
The refugees were sent off in a convoy of 20 carts. They were overseen by two Russian 
officers, one of whom served as a translator, along with three soldiers tasked with ensuring that 
no harm come to them. They were ordered to travel as quickly as possible, no less than 50 versts 
per day, and a stipend of five kopeks per day was allotted to each refugee for food. If any among 
them became ill and died during the journey, they were to be buried in the nearest churchyard. 
Upon their arrival at Sarapul and Karakul, they would be received by local officials who were 
appointed as their stewards. These stewards were tasked with dividing them into groups of two, 
three, or four individuals—or however the steward saw fit—and arranging for them to receive 
training in the Russian language. These small groups would be given over to reliable local 
peasants who would train them in all things customary for a Russian peasant, including the 
mechanics of tilling and plowing, as well as Christian observances. The refugees were to attend 
church on Sundays and on holidays, though no abuse or injury should be inflicted upon them if 
they neglected to do so. During their first year of residence, each individual would continue to 
receive an allowance of five kopeks per day.
443
  
                                                 
442
 Blinov, Sarapul’, 14-15 
443
 Blinov, Sarapul’, 15 
197 
 
After one year, those refugees who had proven themselves capable would receive an 
allotment of land, along with two horses, one cow, three sheep, three shirts, a coat, a hat, and a 
pair of gloves. The amount of land they were to receive was commensurate with that worked by 
other peasants in the area, adjusted on a case-by-case basis according to the needs of each family. 
They would also be given three rubles each from the treasury for the purchase of any necessary 
instruments, along with a monthly allotment of rye and bread until that time when they were able 
to produce their own bread. In all their possessions they were to be made satisfied vis à vis the 
other peasants in the area. If any of these new settlers should wish to marry a local woman, or 
vice versa, the marriage was not to be prevented. If anyone, moreover, was to impress any kind 
of unfreedom upon these new residents, the “firm gaze” of local officials would fall upon the 
offender. Provided with these rights and amenities, the refugees would be able to enter the 
“condition of peasanthood” (krest’ianskoe sostoianie). After six years’ residence, these new 
inhabitants would begin to pay the notorious dues (obrok) demanded of all Russian peasants.
444
   
According to Blinov, the system outlined here had not been developed specifically to 
accommodate escaped slaves from the steppe. In fact, the protocol for converting these new 
citizens into peasants had been adapted from an identical system that had been developed for 
Polish immigrants and outlined in a royal manifest from May of 1763. Evidently the system was 
deemed effective for steppe refugees as well, as their numbers steadily increased in the decades 
to come: by 1777, 184 men and 124 women, 308 people in all, had been resettled in Sarapul 
alone.  
Their religious conversion, meanwhile, may or may not have been considered effective, 
judging by the experiences of a Russian official who passed through Sarapul in 1778. This 
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official found himself petitioned to re-baptize the local settlers. While many of these ones had 
presumably been baptized already prior to their resettlement, they had “forgotten the Christian 
faith” (zabyli khrest’ianskuiu veru) and had been eating carrion and other impermissible foods. 
The consistory obligingly cleansed one such offender through prayer and baptized another, 
teaching the latter how to pray.
445
   
While Blinov characterizes the conversion of former slaves into peasants as an example 
of the Russian state’s “concern” for migrants, it is clear that there were less charitable motives 
involved. Above all, these new peasants were being enlisted in the ongoing effort to colonize the 
Russian frontier, as the Russian Empire was engaged in bringing the borderlands under 
cultivation and populating them with Russian subjects. The process of resettling converted 
Central Asians had, moreover, been going on for decades. In 1738, for example, the head of 
Russia’s Kalmyk Commission had resettled over 2,000 “Kalmyk new Christians” to the fort of 
Stavrapol, north of Samara. Here, as in Sarapul, the settlers were trained in “the plow and the 
Russian way” and encouraged to engage with the local churches.446 Between 1719 and 1744, the 
peasant population nearly tripled in Saratov province, swelled by the influx of migrants resettled 
there by the state.
447
   
The resettlement of escaped slaves was a novel development in this effort, directly 
linking colonization with manumission. It would not be until well into the nineteenth century, 
however, that Russian-sponsored manumission would be strongly linked to antislavery and 
abolitionism. For proof of this, we need only consider the fact that, until 1825, Russian citizens 
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and officials were permitted—and even encouraged—to purchase Kazakh children themselves, 
just as long as they agreed to free them when they reached 25 years of age.
448
  
In the early 1850s, in concert with the rising tide of antislavery sentiment throughout the 
Empire, orders were given that all steppe peoples under Russian rule must surrender their slaves 
to the nearest officials to be manumitted. These laws would greatly increase the volume of slaves 
turning up at Russian border offices. As we shall see, however, these notionally abolitionist 
orders did not often result in functionally abolitionist policies. As the border officials would soon 
discover, it was not always clear what should be done with these newly- surrendered slaves—or 
even if they should be defined as slaves.  
 In the 1850s and 60s, slaves surrendered by their owners to Russian officials would have 
had three options: returning to their original homeland; settling in the Russian Empire; or, if the 
slave was over 22 years of age, he or she could choose to return to life among the Kazakhs. In all 
cases, slaves were transferred only after being formally manumitted by border officials. Since 
many of the slaves in question had been taken captive or purchased at a young age, their owner’s 
home was often the only home they had ever known. This helps to explain the high proportion of 
slaves who, once manumitted, simply chose to return to the steppe. In such cases, border officials 
usually interviewed both the owners who had surrendered their slaves and the slaves themselves, 
presumably to observe the level of correspondence between their respective tales. In these 
interviews, we often find claims that the slave did not really live as a slave (ne v vide raba), even 
though he or she had been purchased with money or with livestock.  
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Such was the case with one Kazakh slave-owner of the Altyn clan, whose name is 
recorded as Batygul, and who admitted that he had purchased two “Asian” slaves, whose names 
are recorded as Gamadan (Hamadan) and Ak-Dzhulay. He owned these children for 14 and 16 
years, respectively. He had purchased Gamadan for 30 Bukharan coins, and Ak-Dzhulay for 25. 
Batygul avowed that they lived with him under humane conditions (po chelovechestvu), without 
any shame and in no kind of slavery. As evidence of this, he adds that he even arranged their 
marriages. He placed them at the disposal of the authorities, as was demanded of him, claiming 
that neither wished to be returned to their original homeland, and implying that they would both 
prefer to remain with him.
449
  
 An interview with Gamadan appears in this document immediately following his owner’s 
statement. He declares his age as 26, and mentions that he does not know his patronymic. He is 
illiterate, a Muslim, originally from among the Hazara. He had been taken captive at a young age 
by unknown assailants (khishniki) and sold to Bukhara. Some fourteen years ago, he was 
purchased by Batygul for 30 Bukharan coins, and he had since lived with him as a son (v vide 
syna). Gamadan declares that he does not wish to return to his original homeland among the 
Hazara, since it was “an unknown place”; he prefers to remain with Batygul.450  
 Ak-Dzhulay’s statement follows this. He describes himself as 21 years old, illiterate, a 
Muslim, and likewise originally from among the Hazara, though he adds that he does not know 
which clan was his. He was evidently very young when he was captured and sold to Bukhara. 
Sixteen years ago he was purchased in Bukhara for 25 coins by Batygul, who took him as his 
adopted son (vzial v usynovlenii). He adds that his original homeland is unknown to him, as is his 
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original family, since he had been alienated from them for so long, and for this reason he did not 
want to return to the Hazara. He expresses the wish to remain with Batygul, under whom he 
claims to suffer no manner of oppression, and to fulfill all his obligations among the Kazakhs.
451
  
 We find a similar situation in the case of an Arab slave whose name was recorded as 
Derbis [Darvish] Muḥammad. This slave had also been living among the Altyn clan, and his 
owner reports having purchased him in Bukhara for 25 Bukharan coins some 14 years ago, when 
Derbis Muḥammad was just eight years old. The owner, whose name was recorded as 
Taylanbay-Dzhan Aristanov, claims to have adopted the boy as his son, and mentions that he had 
even arranged his marriage. He declares that Derbis Muḥammad has no desire to return to his 
original homeland, but that he agreed to turn the young man over in accordance with the will of 
his superiors, which had only recently been announced to him. Placing his slave at the disposal 
of the authorities, Aristanov adds that if Derbis Muḥammad would be permitted by the border 
officials to continue living with him, he would allow the young man to do so. A statement by 
Derbis Muḥammad has also been preserved, and in it young man confirms every detail provided 
by his owner: that he is 22 years old, an Arab, sold in Bukhara to Aristanov at the age of eight 
for 25 Bukharan coins; that he lives with Aristanov as his adopted son; and that he has no wish to 
return to his original home, of which, he says, he knows nothing. He expresses his “unashamed 
desire to live always among the Kazakhs” and, moreover, with this same Aristanov.452 
 It appears that a great many adult slaves who had been surrendered by their owners chose 
to remain in the steppe. Some may have experienced moments of indecision, weighing the 
chance at a new but uncertain life against their familiar captivity. One slave of Iranian origin, 
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whose name was recorded as Kulgilbay, originally agreed to convert to Christianity, but then 
changed his mind and renounced that intention, choosing instead to continue living with his 
former owner among the Kazakhs.
453
 Most others chose similarly. In one group of eight slaves—
seven men and one woman—that arrived at the border, only the woman, whose name is recorded 
as Summanaz, expressed a wish to be returned to her original homeland. Summanaz was duly 
taken away from her Kazakh owner and placed in the care of the border office. Meanwhile, the 
others became the subject of a fatigued request by the border official tasked with processing 
them. This official penned an inquiry to his superiors, asking if, in order to save time and avoid 
“burdensome correspondence,” he might simply provide those “Asians” who wished to remain 
among the Kazakhs with their freedom and forego the process of submitting any more 
“complicated reports” about them—promising, however, to submit full reports for those who 
wished to be sent back to their original homes.
454
  
Other border officials seemed to take the process more seriously. In October of 1851, 
another group of Iranian slaves was divided according to their wishes: one wished to return home 
to Iran, and the rest to return among the Kazakhs. The official receiving this group wrote to his 
superior asking how he should proceed, as the process for repatriating surrendered slaves was, at 
that time, still in its infancy. The superior officer unhesitatingly sent the slave who wished to 
return home back to Iran via Astrakhan, arranging for border offices to absorb any costs of 
transport. Regarding the rest, however, the official implored his comrades to certify that 
returning among the Kazakhs “was indeed their true and proper desire,” and he took the 
opportunity to “remind the [Border] Commission of its responsibility” to ensure that former 
slaves returning to their former owners be treated equitably from then on in terms of their 
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“personal rights” (lichnaia prava) and responsibilities among the Kazakhs. He asked to be 
appraised of the results once these Persians had returned to the steppe.
455
  
 In the case of adult former-slaves who chose to return to their former owners, it must be 
asked: what had Russian-sponsored manumission really accomplished for them? First of all, we 
have no way of knowing whether manumission at the hands of the Russians was considered to be 
a valid form of manumission among Kazakhs. We also have no way of knowing whether this 
type of manumission really prevented the “freedmen” from being sold off or traded in the future. 
Nor do we know if the process had any real impact on the social standing, treatment, and 
obligations of these former-slaves once they returned to the steppe. Finally, and perhaps most 
significantly, we do not know if most Russian officials considered these ambiguities at all 
significant to what they were ultimately trying to accomplish—a point to which we will soon 
return.  
It may be tempting to presume that the widespread desire among slaves to return to their 
owners indicates that they were generally well-treated, but we have reason to hesitate here: 
Russian officials could offer these slaves transportation elsewhere, but it could not offer any 
alternative livelihoods beyond the unfamiliar—and quite possibly unappealing—existence of the 
newly-minted Russian peasant. Since many of these manumitted slaves had been taken from 
their relatives in childhood, the communities in which they had been enslaved formed the closest 
thing they had to a family network. Moreover, those enslaved men who had married free women 
among the Kazakhs may not have been able or willing to ask their wives to abandon their homes 
and join them in their bid for a more total freedom. The prospect of freedom and a new 
beginning may, in other words, have struck many of these individuals as a profoundly lonely 
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option. In this light, their “manumission” and return to the steppe may serve only to emphasize 
the fundamental tragedy of their circumstances.      
 Such were the options presented to adult slaves, but border policy recognized minors—
those under 22—as a different case that called for different protocols. Many children were 
brought before border officials, and most often their owners claimed to have “adopted them” 
noting also that these child slaves knew nothing of their original homelands.  Three examples 
will suffice to give a sense of these interviews, which resemble the depositions concerning adult 
slaves in all but the age of the slaves in question. 
 In one document, a woman whose name was recorded as Sar Kulova, the wife of one 
Churtegen Khalimakov, reports that her husband had purchased a seven year-old boy named 
Azat in Bukhara the previous winter, paying 25 Bukharan coins for him. Kulova avows that the 
boy is their adopted son, and that Azat has no desire to return to his homeland, “all the more so 
since [that place] is completely alien to him,” given his young age. She presents Azat to the 
Border Commission with the request that they not simply return him to his homeland, where no 
one knows anything of him, and where there is no one to be a mother to him to the extent that 
she herself is.
456
   
 In the same month, we find a Kazakh of the Altyn clan whose name is recorded as 
Mamirbay surrendering to the Commission two boys, Pivan and Khudaybergan, whom he had 
purchased in Bukhara earlier that year, the former for 25 Bukharan coins and the latter for 19. 
Hearing only now, he says, that that the authorities were no longer permitting them to be kept, he 
surrendered them to the Kazakh Sultan who was working as an agent of the Border Commission. 
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He notes, however, that they are quite young—Pivan being no more than 14, Khudaybergan no 
more than 15—and have expressed a “persistent desire” to live with him. A statement from Pivan 
follows in the document, and the boy confirms that he is 14 years old. He says that he is a 
Muslim, from among the Arabs, and that he was taken to Bukhara two years previously by 
Turkmens. In the present year he had been purchased by Mamirbay. Following this we find a 
more concise interview with Khudaybergan, who reveals only that he is 15 years old and was 
purchased by Mamirbay for 19 Bukharan coins in Bukhara, where he was born, though he does 
not remember his mother and father. Both boys express that they do not wish to be returned to 
their original homeland, “as we do not know our parents or any relations there.”457 In Pivan’s 
case, we may wonder if this last claim is true: in his own telling he was 12 years old when he 
was taken to Bukhara by Turkmens. It is possible that these Turkmens were his original captors 
and, if so, he would likely have known his biological family. We do not know these details, of 
course, but neither can we rule out the possibility that some child slaves expressed a desire to 
remain with their owners only under duress. Their owners may even have been in the room while 
these children were being interviewed.  
 In the case of an enslaved boy named Amanzhul, it appears more likely that he was truly 
unfamiliar with his biological family, though at least one detail in his story remains suspicious. 
His owner, whose name is recorded as Sansizbay, reports in his interview that he had bought 
Amanzhul four years previously, in Bukhara, for just 14 Bukharan coins. The boy was at that 
time “no more than six years old,” and Sansizbay claims to keep him as an adopted son, and not 
as a slave (ne v vide raba). He says that Amanzhul has no knowledge of his original homeland 
and prefers to stay with him. A brief statement from Amanzhul follows, in which the boy 
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declares that he is 10 years old, a Muslim, and illiterate; and that he is of “Central Asian” origins, 
though he cannot specify more than this (prikhozhu iz sredneaziatskikh vladenii, no iz kakogo 
imenno ne znaiu). He does not know how he ended up in Bukhara or whom he lived with there, 
though he knows that he was eventually purchased by Sansizbay for 14 Bukharan coins. He adds 
that he does not wish to be sent back to his original homeland, as he knows nothing of that place, 
nor is he able learn anything more about it. One detail may call his narrative into question, 
however. The Kazakh name “Amanzhul” was apparently given to him by his present owner, as 
the boy claims that he does not even know what name he had gone by previously.
458
 It was 
common for a slave to receive a new name from his or her owner, but the idea that a ten year-old 
boy would not know what name he had gone by at four years old ought to make us wonder to 
what extent the boy chose to exaggerate the obscurity of his origins—and why he might have 
been inclined to do so.  
 What was to be done with children such as these, who had been “adopted” by the men 
who had purchased them? Were they really slaves? It was clear to the Border Commission, first 
of all, that a child’s profession of loyalty to his or her owner should be regarded differently from 
that of an adult slave. For one thing, their prospects in the absence of any sort of guardianship 
were significantly worse than those of adult slaves—a fact that would not have been lost on the 
children themselves. Children, moreover, would be more vulnerable to the influence of threats, 
lies, or other forms of manipulation on the part of their owners. This is not to suggest that their 
owners were being dishonest in characterizing these boys and girls as their own adopted 
children. In fact, since they faced no punishment for voluntarily turning these children over to 
the Russians, and since—as we shall soon see—border officials’ decision on what to do with 
                                                 
458
 TsGAKaz 4.1.3641 f. 37b-38a 
207 
 
these children did not rest entirely on whether or not their owners considered them to be slaves, it 
is most likely that we are witnessing a cultural disconnect in which Russian definitions of slavery 
were lost in translation for those Kazakhs drawn into the new system of enforced manumission.  
 In fact, Russian manumission policies—as well as official definitions of who should be 
considered a slave—were sometimes unclear even to border officials themselves. They were 
likewise unclear to some native informants tasked with rounding up and exposing the slave-
owners. One internal document concerning a local Kazakh biy preserves an unusual ethnographic 
preamble, in which an official evidently felt compelled to explain to his superiors the ambiguity 
of notions of “slavery” in the Kazakh context. In the old days, the official explains, some 
Kazakhs would freely send their children into others’ care. Other Kazakhs—in times of famine, 
for example—would sell their children. This was, the official observes, forbidden by Islamic 
law, but in such instances they were not being purchased as slaves, but rather in place of 
biological children, since their purchasers typically had no children of their own. Still others 
bought maidens (devits) to marry, and this transaction was carried out not against anyone’s will, 
but by agreement from both sides (ne chrez [sic] nevol’no a po soglasno oboikh storon). Both 
Kazakhs and Karakalpaks engaged in this custom, according to the officer, who then offers his 
inquiry: would those Kazakhs and Karakalpaks still be subject to the new manumission laws if, 
having been purchased before the passing of these laws, they currently lived as wives and 
children according to common consent?
459
  
 The officer’s inquiry was not an abstract consideration; he needed an answer 
immediately, as he had just received a report from a Kazakh biy, operating as a native informant, 
concerning a young man who was in precisely the ambiguous position outlined above: perhaps a 
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slave, perhaps not. Roughly 14 years previously, in 1847, “at the time of the hunger” (vo vremia 
goloda), a Kazakh whose name is recorded as Batyrbay Baydelov purchased the young man 
from a Karakalpak for one camel and one horse. The young man, named Dawlat, was at that time 
just two years old. He was the Karakalpak’s own son. Dawlat confirmed under the biy’s 
questioning that he had been sold in early childhood, and he declared that he had no desire to 
return among the Karakalpaks. He was, moreover, satisfied with his present owner because, he 
told the biy, “Batyrbay Baydelov does not have children of his own and considers me his son, 
and he does not use me for labor” (ne upotrebliaet na raboty).460   
 As it turns out, the border offices already had a policy concerning cases such as these—
though it is revealing that the policy was apparently not known or understood by all of the 
officers tasked with implementing it. The policy had been established by a pronouncement of the 
Orenburg Governor General on December 1
st
, 1860, which reinforced, first of all, the fact that 
those immigrants who had freed themselves from slavery under Kazakhs subject to Orenburg’s 
authority could choose to swear allegiance to Russia, or to the Kazakhs, or to be returned to their 
original homeland elsewhere.
461
 As for slaves under 22 years old, however, their fate was not 
entirely their own to decide. Instead, border officials would have them turned over to 
“trustworthy hands” (blagonadezhnye ruki) until they reached the age of full maturity 
(sovershennyi vozrast). At that point they would achieve “full freedom” (pol’naia svoboda), and 
they would be able to make their own decision about where to go next.
462
 These children would, 
in other words, be placed in foster care.  
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Regardless of age, an individual turned over to border officials was granted his or her 
freedom as a standard matter of bureaucratic process. When adult slaves chose to return among 
the Kazakhs, the documentation of their manumission would often include the detail that their 
former owners were henceforth forbidden from enslaving them. Children who had allegedly been 
“adopted” by their owners were likewise officially manumitted by the Russians. Women who 
had been purchased as brides were likely also manumitted, though I have yet to see a 
manumission document pertaining to such a woman.  
Combining the above information on official policies with the nature of the information 
collected from slaves at the border allows us to ascertain something of the Orenburg Border 
Commission’s working definition of slavery. First, it is useful to observe what was absent from 
slaves’ interviews. It is clear, for example, that border officials appear remarkably unconcerned 
with labor as a condition of slavery; it seems that slaves were only rarely asked about the nature 
of the labor that had been expected of them, or about the nature of their upkeep and 
compensation, if any. Likewise, their owners, having surrendered them, were rarely asked how 
they had used them and what kind of work they had assigned to them. If such questions came up 
over the course of these interviews, neither the questions nor the answers were typically 
documented.  
By contrast, all surrendered slaves were asked when and where they had been purchased; 
from whom they had been purchased; who had purchased them; and at what price they had been 
sold. The fact of having been bought and sold emerges in these documents as the central defining 
feature of their slavery. Their owners were made to supply precisely the same information 
concerning purchase and sale: when, where, from whom, and at what price. This may be 
explained in part as both a means of checking a slave’s autobiography against the testimony of 
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his or her owner and, more simply, as a way to add a key validating detail to their categorization 
as slaves. Above all, the contours of these slaves’ biographies are defined by periods of 
ownership.  
A slave, then, was an individual who had been bought and sold. Purchase and sale are the 
two ever-present factors in these interviews, which served also as documentation of 
manumission. Purchasing an individual marked one, in the eyes of the Border Commission, as 
being subject to punishment unless the purchased individual was surrendered to the state. This 
fact remained constant regardless of the circumstances of sale. It also remained constant 
regardless of what relationship the owner claimed to have with their purchase. Owners who 
“adopted” their purchases, arranged their marriages, and so on, were still made to surrender them 
to border offices.   
But where did border officials find “trustworthy hands” to receive those manumitted 
slaves who were not yet of age? The fate of a child slave named Ashirbay reveals the surprising 
details of this process. Ashirbay was ten years old when he was brought to the border along with 
three other child slaves: Nasir, nine years old, Mazhik [?], fifteen, and Azim, eighteen. They 
were inspected by the Bukharan merchants at Fort Perovskii to verify their origins, and none 
showed any signs of abuse at the hands of his owner. The official charged with processing them 
logged a request that the two youngest boys—Ashirbay and Nasir—be given over into fosterage 
until they had reached the age of maturity.
463
 A third boy, Mazhik, was eventually processed into 
fosterage as well.
464
 Azim appears to have been allowed to remain with his Kazakh owner under 
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the conditions that the latter not attempt to re-enslave the boy, despite the fact that, at 18, Azim 
would technically have been eligible for fosterage.
465
  
In the case of Ashirbay, we find that the “trustworthy hands” chosen for his fosterage 
were those of his former owner, the Kazakh who had purchased him as a slave. The child had 
expressed a wish to remain in the steppe, and while Russian border policy dictated that he be 
placed somewhere to receive his “education” until he came of age, there was nothing in the 
policy which stipulated where, precisely, a child was to be sent or who qualified as a 
“trustworthy” foster parent. We may assume that the Russian state lacked adequate foster homes 
in the region to receive the influx of freed slaves. Otherwise, the decision to send Ashirbay back 
to his owner seems difficult to comprehend in light of policies which seem designed specifically 
to prevent such a circumstance. The official in charge specified for the record that the former 
owner to whom Ashirbay would be returned was not to receive him as a slave. Ashirbay had, at 
least on paper, been manumitted. Thanks to the Russian state, his owner had become his foster 
father.  
Here, we may find some explanation for a seeming lapse of logic in border officials’ 
usual interview regimen. Why, after all, had officials bothered documenting so often whether or 
not a slave lived with his or her owner as an “adopted” child, only to manumit the child anyway? 
On first glance, the claim of adoption seems like a desperate and vain effort on the part of the 
owners to keep their slaves or avoid punishment, and on the part of the slaves to placate their 
owners or to avoid an uncertain fate. Even in those cases where the bond between owner and 
slave may truly have been close, such as that between parent and child, the owner was still made 
to surrender any child he or she had purchased. So why would border officials bother reporting 
                                                 
465
 TsGAKaz 381.1.184 ff. 27a-b 
212 
 
these supposed “familial” bonds? As we see in the case of Ashirbay, it was likely these professed 
bonds—along with the medical examination that uncovered no evidence of his abuse—that 
allowed his former owner to foster him after his manumission. 
We have now observed three possible outcomes in Russia’s border-manumission system. 
Some slaves—a small number, probably—were given access back to their homelands; a larger 
number were resettled and turned into serfs; and perhaps a still larger number were sent back to 
the steppe. Should we think of these as “abolitionist” policies? Was Russia an “abolitionist” 
empire in the steppe?  
In the case of those slaves who made it back home, we can perhaps answer in the 
affirmative. In the case of those who were turned into serfs, the answer depends on whether one 
considers serfdom to be freedom. The third case, though—the case of saves sent back to the 
steppe—is especially revealing. If so many slaves who had been surrendered to Russian border 
authorities were simply returned to the care of their former owners, then what was the purpose of 
manumitting these ones in the first place? Why did the Russian state bother establishing a 
network of native informants, for example, only to remit “freed” slaves back into the steppe?   
Along with providing new agricultural laborers for the settling of the borderlands, the 
purpose of this system of manumission was not to ensure the freedom of the enslaved—and in 
most cases it did no such thing—but to impress upon the slave-owner that he was now visible to 
the Russian state. It was about jurisdiction. Equally, Russian-enforced manumission was the tool 
of an expanding bureaucracy: the information provided in Border Commission interviews served 
to document and make legible individuals—both slaves and their owners—who may otherwise 
have been practically invisible to the Empire; it served, in other words, as a sort of census.   
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Finally, this process served to make Russian power more visible to all the people of the 
steppe. It spread a powerful message: the reach of Russian colonial power could now extend into 
their homes and divest them of their property. It could turn their slaves into Russian serfs and—
at least on Russian paper—it could turn slave-owners into foster fathers. It could even send 
slaves back to Iran, “legally” dismantling what many Kazakhs may have considered to be a 
relationship between parent and child.   
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Chapter 5 
 
The Khan as Russian Agent: Native Informants and Abolition  
 
  
In matters of intelligence-gathering as well as enforcement, the Russian Empire in the nineteenth 
century came to rely extensively on informants drawn from local Kazakh and Turkmen 
populations along the steppe and Iranian frontiers. These informants became instrumental in 
Russian efforts to “pacify” the borderlands, and this chapter will explore the roles they were 
called upon to play in enforcing the Tsar’s emancipation program and in militating against 
captive-taking. As often as not, as I will show, these informants did not play the roles intended 
for them: acutely aware of their importance to Russian officials, many Kazakh and Turkmen 
“agents” took advantage of their positions by manipulating their Russian patrons for their own 
benefit or for the benefit of their communities. Far from being mere colonial puppets, many of 
these informants came to use their newfound status not only for personal interests, but also as a 
form of resistance against their own colonial patrons. Meanwhile, the impact of the informant 
system on captive-taking in the region was, as we shall see, decidedly mixed.  
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Kazakh Informants Along the Steppe Frontier 
From its inception at the end of the eighteenth century, the Orenburg Border Commission 
involved itself in the resolution of disputes among neighboring Kazakhs, providing both an 
alternative source of legal authority and an alternative framework of legal enforcement for many 
in the steppe. A diverse range of disputes came before the Commission, concerning everything 
from the theft of livestock to cases of assault. In some cases, the Commission served as merely 
one of several Russian-officiated courts of appeal available to complainants. In one fairly typical 
case from the turn of the nineteenth century, for example, a Kazakh named Akutin, who claimed 
to have been assaulted, first brought his case before the Ural military chancery and then before 
the Border Commission; a record of his complaint is preserved both in Arabic-script Turkic and 
in Russian translation. According to the records of the case, Akutin crossed the Ural River into 
the steppe along with his wife in order to trade in fish. He did so without permission from the 
chief (nachal’nik) of his settlement (krepost’) at Topolinsk. A Kazakh demanded payment of 
debts from him while he was across the river, and he refused to pay. The Kazakh in question then 
pursued him back to Topolinsk, where they quarreled and the Kazakh made two wounds in 
Akutin’s head and took two of his horses. The Ural military chancery evidently sent Akutin 
onwards to Orenburg in order to seek the return of his confiscated property.
466
 
 Given its dual role in enforcement and adjudication, it is natural that the Border 
Commission also involved itself early on in cases of kidnapping and enslavement. As early as 
1822, a decree was issued prohibiting slaveholding among the Elder Horde, with a penalty of 
150 rubles extracted from offenders.
467
 Lacking a comprehensive network for patrol and 
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surveillance across the steppe, the Commission relied from the beginning on the agency and 
cooperation of locals and steppe peoples to define and report crises as well as to bring forward 
information leading to the capture of suspected offenders. Modest and ad hoc in its origins, this 
novel system of delegating and receiving native informants in the steppe would become 
increasingly systematic and complex over the course of the nineteenth century. Similar strategies 
would be implemented to the south, along the Khurasan frontier. By the middle of the century, 
native informants would form the backbone of the Russian Empire’s accelerating efforts toward 
pacifying the steppe and eliminating the phenomenon of captive-taking—at least insofar as it 
impacted Russian citizens.   
 As early as 1800, Kazakh informants were already submitting formal reports to the 
military governor of Orenburg in order to alert him to the presence of captives among the 
Kazakhs. The primary concern appears to have been the release of Russian subjects, but some 
Kazakh and Kalmyk captives were also freed by these means. One report from January, 1800, 
recognizes the “diligence and laudable deeds” of a Kazakh sultan who delivered to the 
Commission a number of captives who had previously been taken by Kazakh “thieves,” 
including two Saratov “peasants” and nine officials from the Ural Office. “Along with these,” the 
document adds (leaving little ambiguity as to the captives’ relative order of priority) that 21 
Kazakhs of both genders were also delivered. One Kazakh, named Imangul, was held “under 
guard” at the Uralsk, and the sultan asked that he be released. In recognition of the sultan’s 
service, the Border Commission honored the request and set Imangul free.
468
 It is not clear how 
the sultan managed to secure more than two dozen captives for the Border Commission, and we 
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cannot rule out the likelihood that they were taken in a raid, perhaps accomplished specifically 
for the purposes of securing a reward.  
 Other missions were undertaken with a higher level of cooperation from the Russian side. 
On one occasion, a Kazakh khan of the Junior Horde contacted the Commission in order to alert 
officials that he knew the whereabouts of some Kazakhs who had been implicated in the 
kidnapping of a young Russian boy. The alleged kidnappers, the khan claimed, had taken refuge 
in a dense expanse of reeds at the seaside, and he offered the Russians his services: “I, for my 
part,” the khan testified, “will not fail to point out which reeds the nomads are hiding in.” The 
Russian officials, with the khan’s assistance, evidently undertook the delicate operation of 
seizing the kidnappers and freeing the boy.
469
   
 The use of Russian funds rather than troops or favors was often necessary to affect the 
release of captives. In one case recorded by border officials in 1799-1800, some Kazakhs took 
the son of a merchant named Poliakov, along with 50 rubles in plunder. Somehow, a Kazakh 
sultan ended up in possession of the boy (named Vasilii) and pledged to the Russians that he held 
him in safekeeping. He promised to turn the boy over, but, evidently, only in exchange for 
payment.
470
 While the documentary record of the exchange does not explicitly accuse the sultan 
of complicity or participation in the boy’s capture, it is clear that the payment is tantamount to 
ransom. In such a case, the informant was clearly a beneficiary of the crime itself.   
 Engaging with Kazakh informants to secure captives could sometimes be a relatively 
straightforward affair, as in the examples above, but other cases suggest a world of possible 
complications, and point toward the innumerable avenues by which Russian colonial forces 
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could find themselves manipulated by their would-be colonial subjects. One of the most detailed 
narratives along these lines is provided by Witkiewicz, who was personally involved in the 
freeing of a Russian captive during his mission to the Bukhara in the mid-1830s. After 25 horses 
were stolen from a caravan in which Witkiewicz was traveling, patrols were sent forth from the 
caravan to search alongside the Syr Darya, and this search turned up a “famous” thief named 
Kuldzhan Karakchi of the Diurtkara clan. When the alleged thief was brought back to the 
caravan, he gave assurances that he had only made himself vulnerable to capture in order to alert 
the Russians that a Cossack captive named Ivan Stepanov was in residence with his clan. 
Stepanov had been captured along with his wife while making hay, and the captors were said to 
be Dzhegalbay fugitives who had been living among the Diurtkara. The stolen horses were also 
among the Diurtkara, and Kuldzhan Karakchi promised to return all of them along with 
Stepanov. The merchants of the caravan wanted to detain Karakchi and deliver him to 
Khwarazm for punishment, but Witkiewicz forbade it, since the suspect was technically a 
Russian subject.
471
  
Witkiewicz ordering Karakchi’s release and demanded that he bring forth the captive and 
the stolen horses. Karakchi returned to his clan along with a caravan guide, a Kazakh from 
among the Chumekey, who would be tasked with transporting the captive and the horses back to 
the caravan. Once back at the alleged thief’s aul, Witkiewicz writes, “a comedy played out:” the 
people of the aul tied Karakchi up, acting as if they suspected him of giving false testimony, and 
insisted that the stolen horses were not among them. Those responsible for the theft, they 
claimed, could be found at some headland or peninsula on the Aral Sea. There, at Aran, north of 
the mouth of the Syr Darya, lived some 500 tents of alleged “robbers” known as the Karkru-
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Aranchi, consisting of 40 clans who subsisted through trapping saiga and goats, growing grain, 
and thieving.
472
   
 Stepanov, however, unlike the stolen horses, was found among the Diurtkara. A sultan-
governor from Orsk sent a Cossack agent to collaborate with Witkiewicz in order to secure his 
release. The man had refused to travel to the aul with Kuldzhan Karakchi, fearing the latter 
would kill him, but he wished to make an attempt at buying the Stepanov’s freedom. Witkiewicz 
forbade it, but the agent insisted on being given the necessary funds. These funds were promptly 
divided among the Diurtkara, who declined to release Stepanov. In the meantime, they had sold 
his wife—who had given birth in the steppe—to some Khivans. In all, the initial efforts by 
Witkiewicz and his fellow-travelers to free Stepanov while on their way to Bukhara were a 
disaster.
473
 
 Later, on the way back from Bukhara, he would have another opportunity to rescue 
Stepanov. When the caravan was passing roughly 100 versts from where the Diurtkara were 
residing, Witkiewicz sent them a guide as an envoy. The guide returned with a Kazakh named 
Bulush Bay, who was identified as the son-in-law of the man with whom Stepanov was residing, 
a Diurtkara Kazakh named Kulbay. Witkiewicz “informed him of his obligation to render 
service” to the Russian Empire, promising him also a reward if he brought forth the captive. 
Bulush Bay returned among the Diurtkara, but came back to the caravan empty-handed seven 
days later, requesting an official document which pledged that he would not be prosecuted after 
bringing the captive. Witkiewicz provided him with the requested papers along with some gifts 
and sent him back to the Diurtkara. Four days later, Bulush Bay returned empty-handed once 
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again—this time, badly beaten and bloody. He returned the gifts Witkiewicz had given him, not 
wanting to receive payment for an unfulfilled mission. He had, it turned out, quarreled with his 
father-in-law, who resented the prospect of giving up the captive with no visible ransom on the 
table, especially in light of the ransom which had been brought earlier by the Cossack agent. In 
the midst of their heated discussions, a man named Bek Mirza, who had sold Stepanov’s wife to 
Khiva, managed to convince many others in the clan not to give up their captive. Kuldzhan 
Karakchi argued likewise, even offering to buy the captive himself, with the aim of re-selling 
him to some Khivans.
474
  
 On the verge of losing hope, Witkiewicz sent Bulush Bay back to the clan once again, 
this time accompanied by two others. These three returned to the caravan twelve days later, 
reporting that they had met with a man named Tlyaulii, of the Diurtkara. Tlyaulii, identified as a 
“robber,” had previously fought with Bek Mirza and was presently on the run from some 
Khivans. It was, therefore, not difficult to convince him to serve the Russian Empire. Tlyaulii 
sent Kuldzhan Karakchi (who had evidently changed his tune) along with the caravan envoys 
and some others to Kulbay to negotiate the release of Stepanov. This group managed to 
intimidate Kulbay into giving up the captive, and Stepanov was promptly sent to join the 
caravan.
475
  
 Along with the captive came a letter from Tlyaulii. In it, Tlyaulii evidently blamed the 
oppressive tactics of the Russian Empire for discord in the steppe. He requested that Witkiewicz 
address Russian commanders in order to mediate and enact a peaceful settlement between the 
clans of the Diurtkara, Dzhagalbay, Tamyn and Tabyn. The ultimate goal would be to enact a 
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separation between the Russians and these clans, in order to ensure a relationship “free of 
harassment” between Russians and nomads. As a gesture of goodwill, Tlyaulii also offered to 
facilitate the capture of Bek Mirza’s band of robbers.476  
 As for the liberated man, Stepanov, it seems that the hardships of his captivity and the 
loss of his wife had taken a tragic toll on him. He was, Witkiewicz writes, “a sick man, weak and 
foolish. It was impossible to learn anything from him.”477  
 In Witkiewicz’s story, as well as in previous examples, the initiative of local, non-
Russian actors guides all efforts and determines the outcome in securing the release of captives. 
The relationship between Russian colonial forces and steppe natives was hardly one in which the 
“Great Power” was able to simply delegate mercenaries to do its bidding. Until the mid-
nineteenth century, at least, captors or slave-owners were free to negotiate ransom settlements 
with Russian officials, and agents in the employ of the Russians could negotiate the terms of 
their own remuneration. As we see in the case of Stepanov, captors could boldly decline to free a 
captive after receiving ransom, though such a betrayal would have been counter-productive for 
those hoping to make a steady business out of Russian ransom payments. Go-betweens, 
meanwhile, could decline to deliver the freedmen, choosing instead to pocket their pay and sell 
off their new cargo. These agents could—and did—conspire together with captors to extract 
larger sums in ransom;
478
 perhaps they were sometimes paid off or otherwise encouraged by their 
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contacts to deliver false information to Russian officials. In short, those residents of the steppe 
who served as points of contact between Russian officials and captors or slave-owners had a 
practically unlimited ability to guide negotiations by controlling the nature of the information 
passed between the two camps. Witkiewicz, for one, reports only what was related to him by his 
interlocutors; he had to choose whether to believe them.  
 The initiative of these interlocutors—whether they be khans-turned-informants or 
caravan guides-turned-emissaries—could also serve ends beyond mere personal gain. With 
Russian influence becoming ever more visible in the steppe, go-betweens could use their 
privileged positions for the purposes of resistance. This could be accomplished both by foiling 
Russian ambitions on a case-by-case basis or, as in the case of Tlyaulii, by positioning oneself to 
submit a request. Though there is no evidence that Tlyaulii’s request was taken seriously by 
Russian officials, the nature of his appeal is striking in itself. It shows a keen awareness that the 
incursions of Russian influence had interfered with relations among steppe clans. Witkiewicz 
makes no mention of Tlyaulii being offered any form of compensation other than the chance to 
submit his appeal.  
  By the mid-nineteenth century, the ad hoc process by which Russian officials endeavored 
to free captives and slaves from the steppe was replaced with a more rigorous, deliberate, and 
wide-ranging system. By 1851-52, the Orenburg Border Commission had begun circulating, 
among Kazakhs in the western reaches of the steppe, decrees in Arabic-script Turkic ordering the 
release of slaves and captives. Some of the earliest decrees that I have seen specify that Iranian 
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Shiʿites—called simply “Qizilbash” in these documents, which doubtless indicated Iranian 
slaves—were living in the area (shu örinda qizilbāsh vilāyatlik yasarlar bar), and that it is these 
particular slaves that must be surrendered.
479
 One decree from December of 1851 mentions 
“Persian [captives] and other captives” bought from Khiva or from “Khivan subjects,” with the 
captives in question being “transferred from one owner to another” or given as dowries. The 
decree calls upon all Kazakhs under Orenburg’s authority, without exception, to turn over these 
captives promptly. Henceforth, the decree explains, if any slaves or captives were to be found 
living with any Kazakhs, regardless of rank, that individual would be exposed and brought to 
justice, and they would be subject to “a monetary penalty of 150 silver rubles for each captive 
and 6 months' imprisonment or, depending on the gravity of the circumstances surrounding the 
acquisition of the captive, deprivation of property rights, corporal punishment, and banishment to 
Siberia.”480 
 The Border Commission evidently printed and circulated at least 1,000 copies of this 
decree by January of 1852.
481
 Further copies of this or similar decrees—in groups of 100 and of 
230 pressings—were issued in the months to come.482 No information is available on the 
reception of these documents in the steppe. Since the majority of Kazakhs were illiterate at the 
time we may assume that the decrees were meant to be read aloud. We know, at least, that two or 
three issuances of the general emancipation order were not considered sufficient: the Border 
Commission would issue still more decrees of a very similar nature over the course of the next 
two decades. We also know that the Kazakh informants who chose to cooperate early on in the 
process of liberating slaves in the steppe included powerful figures like Sultan Arslan. The 
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Sultan received reports from his own informants on slaveholders under his authority, ensured the 
release of captives, and then delivered them to the Border Commission along with testimony that 
often included a chain-of-transmission revealing how he learned of the captive’s presence among 
his subjects.
483
  
 In general we can only speculate about the various individual motivations which would 
have inspired Kazakh elites to cooperate with the Russians in enforcing manumission decrees.  
The contents of one Russian-authored decree in Turkic, however, dating from 1860, can help to 
clarify at least one motivation: here, Russian officials threaten punishment not only for those 
Kazakhs who held slaves and captives, but also for those leaders who claimed the offenders as 
subjects. Bearing the signatures and seals of five Kazakh bays (elites), this decree, like the 
others, declares that “if any Kazakh is in possession of a slave, he must turn this slave over to the 
governor, and after this he must not buy any [other] slave” (gar kim birär qazaqning qolinda qul 
bolsa, ul qulni ḥākim husurina täbshurur wa mundan song qul sätub älmas). It concludes with 
the announcement that if any Kazakh is to “open his hand” (qol ächilsa), i.e. to release his or her 
slave, then this Kazakh as well as the bay overseeing him or her (ul qazaq ham aning ustidan 
qarab turguvchi bay) would not be “subject to merciless inquiry” (hich bir raḥimsiz 
tekshirdilar).
484
 Elites, in other words, could be held accountable for the slaveholding of their 
subjects.  
 Another document, dating from June of 1852, hints at more direct threats against 
noncompliant steppe elites. Having been informed of the captivity of an Iranian whose name is 
recorded as Asan Yacubov, Russian officials informed the sultan of Asan’s owner’s orda that the 
                                                 
483
 TsGAKaz 3573 f. 193a 
484
 TsGAKaz 383.1.89, unnumbered folio.  
225 
 
captive was henceforth to live and work where he pleased, and that no others should take him 
into slavery. The sultan was tasked with the execution of these orders, which were evidently 
passed to him in secret by way of one of his retainers. (This individual was referred to as a 
“clerk” in the document; the official who drafted it noted that he disapproved of the instructions, 
all the more so since the “clerk” was merely a dependent of the sultan and therefore provided no 
additional influence over the outcome). The secret orders included an explicit warning: if 
anything transpired which was inconsistent with the above demands, Russian officials would be 
informed of it.
485
      
 In reality, slaveholding Kazakhs whom other Kazakhs brought before Russian officials 
were not always dealt the punishments specified in these dramatic Russian decrees. One group of 
offenders, who were charged with owning four slaves among them, was evidently pardoned 
entirely; according to the official report, it was not thought necessary to hold them to any 
liability for failing to surrender their slaves, since they simply “did not know of the prohibitive 
order” (o zapretitel’nom rasporiazhenii) against slave-owning. 486 
 Captors and slave-owners, meanwhile, could stand to benefit from surrendering their 
contraband at border offices, at least after 1852. In January of that year, a Russian border official 
proposed that offenders who surrendered their captives should receive compensation 
(voznograzhdeniia) for their loss.
487
 It appears that this policy was implemented in at least some 
cases; one slave owner, for example, was issued one ruble and 50 kopeks in compensation for 
each of the 36 sheep he had formerly paid to a fellow Kazakh for the Iranian slave he 
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surrendered at the border.
488
 This kind of compensatory system may hint at the disappointing 
impact of previous emancipation decrees. Compensating slave-owners for their loss, moreover, is 
not altogether different from paying ransom, and the new system surely risked offering a further 
incentive for captive-taking. Nevertheless, authorization was given for systematized 
compensation, to be implemented in June of 1852.
489
  It is not clear that the system was fully 
implemented, however, and may have been stalled by officials’ misgivings: by September of 
1852, the official who had recommended the compensation system eight months earlier 
submitted a report noting that he still had not received a decision from his superiors on the 
question of compensating compliant slaveholders. He reiterated his recommendation, urging 
them to come to a final decision on the matter.
490
  
 Slaveholders and informants were not the only parties who sometimes stood to gain 
compensation during the manumission process. The testimony of an Iranian slave whose name 
was recorded as Yul-Muhammad Asanov indicates that the freedmen themselves could 
sometimes earn reparations for their suffering. Asanov relates in his interview with Russian 
officials that he was first taken captive at the age of seven by Turkmens who soon sold him to a 
Kazakh of the Alchin clan. He spent eight years with this owner before being sold to a Kazakh of 
the Dzhagalbay clan. He fled this owner, but he was captured and then sold to a Kazakh of the 
Chagatay clan whose name is recorded as Bay Murzabek Yamanbaev. He lived as Yamanbaev’s 
slave for the next 23 years until, in 1854, he was freed. “Upon being freed from 24 years of 
slavery,” Asanov testifies, “Murzabek Yamanbaev, instead of giving me any remuneration, cut 
my head with a knife and hit me in the face with a whip, knocking out one of my teeth. Hoping 
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for nothing more than what is my share, I have repeatedly appealed to the Russian officials. But 
for their part, down to the present time, I have received neither my recompense nor any 
information [concerning my case].” Upon being freed, Asanov reports have been given only 
“meager rags” to wear, and he could not find a way to provide for himself “even by the most 
strenuous effort.” In these dire circumstances, he turned to Russian officials to seek 
compensation from his former master and, as he phrased it in his interview, to “dispense gracious 
satisfaction to me for my years of slavery.”491 Following his testimony, the wheels of justice 
turned at a leisurely pace. Asanov first came before officials on August 2
nd
, 1857. By April of 
1858, his former owner had evidently died, and it was his heirs who were at that time ordered to 
“render compensation” (okazat’ posobie) to Asanov for his 23 years of service. Finally, in 
November of that same year, it was confirmed that he had received some compensation from 
these heirs.
492
    
 Taken altogether, the influx of slaves and slaveholders arriving at the border in the 1850s 
and 60s demonstrates that Russian abolition decrees and the policies and practices that came with 
them had at least some impact on the steppe’s slave population. Even at mid-century, however, 
progress was decidedly gradual: further abolition decrees were disseminated in 1860 and again in 
1861; the last known decree was circulated in the steppe as late as 1869.
493
 By that time, the 
influx of Iranian slaves from Khurasan had slowed considerably. While the conquest of the 
Khivan domains in 1873 did not, as we have seen, end the slave trade, a major waystation and 
market for slaves was thrown into turmoil. The resale market in Khiva that had long been 
available to Kazakh captors and dealers surely contracted. Meanwhile, with the strengthening of 
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Russian border defenses and the weakening and increasing dependency of neighboring Kazakh 
clans, fewer Russian subjects were falling into Kazakh hands. It was in this context that Russian-
sponsored emancipation, however modest in its impacts, further depleted the steppe slave 
population from within. The final quarter of the nineteenth century was tantamount to dusk for 
the slave trade in the Kazakh steppe.  
 The sun would not set on slavery itself, however. As I have shown in previous chapters, 
many slaves who were “manumitted” at the Russian border were simply returned to their former 
owners, either as “foster children” or as laborers. Some slaves had free Kazakh wives and had 
integrated into free society to a degree unimaginable for slaves in other regions of the world. 
Many others were not so lucky.  
The success of Russian emancipation efforts relied entirely on Kazakh informants. The 
Empire was at the mercy of these informants simply to identify slaveholders and slaves amid the 
general population. Other agents were often needed to transport offenders to the border along 
with their slaves. The pool of local go-betweens willing to take on these roles was remarkably 
diverse: khans and sultans, fugitives and thieves all played a part. Each had his or her own 
motives, and each was seemingly able to negotiate individual terms of compensation. Rich 
opportunities for manipulating these negotiations must have presented themselves to many an 
agent. In the end, however, whatever the costs, it appears that the Russian Empire, by engaging 
informant networks, achieved certain substantial aims: it reduced the threat of captivity for 
Russian subjects in or near the steppe; it engaged in a novel means of extending Russian 
governance over subjects and neighboring populations; and it initiated new forms of dependency 
and service among the Kazakhs.  
229 
 
 
Informants and Local Agents Among the Turkmens 
Meanwhile, a parallel strategy was being enacted to the south, along the shores of the Caspian.  
In 1828, the Treaty of Turkmenchay stipulated that Iranian ships would cede the right to navigate 
the Caspian and its coasts freely; henceforth, no Iranian military vessels would patrol the Sea. 
These rights were transferred exclusively to the Russian Empire. Russia’s newfound supremacy 
on the sea came with certain responsibilities for the benefit of Iran, however: the Russian 
military would take over the task of policing the Caspian shore, along which Turkmen raiding 
parties had long engaged in systematic attacks on Iranian villages for the purpose of taking 
captives for ransom or sale. In this effort, the Turkmens had been aided by the challenges of 
patrolling the terrain: the thick reed-beds offered them excellent cover; their narrow, flat-
bottomed boats presented a low profile as they cruised along the coastline; and, if caught on their 
way to launching an attack, empty-handed Turkmens could always claim that they were merely 
fishing.
494
 The problem, from the Russian perspective, was not the kidnapping of Iranians 
(indeed, this ongoing crisis barely registers as a concern in Russian sources), but rather that the 
same Turkmens who captured Iranians also engaged in capturing Russian soldiers and officers.  
The services of informants—agents who might tip off the Russians to coming raids, or 
identify chief raiders—were thus badly needed, and the Russians sought them among Turkmen 
elites. As they had done with the Kazakhs of the steppe, Russian military officials attempted to 
build new patronage networks among the Turkmens. Backed by the ever-present threat of 
military force, some Turkmen groups along the Caspian surrendered to a system by which their 
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khans would have to be confirmed in their status by Russian officials at the seaside military 
station. According to the officer C.A. Gunaropulo, the khans who consented to working with the 
Empire could receive considerable benefits: they drew a salary and received gifts along with it. 
But their position could be precarious. In those cases in which perpetrators of raids and robberies 
were not caught in the act, and their captives were not returned, the responsibility would fall on 
the nearest aul and its headmen. The community would have either to extradite the criminals, if 
they were known to them, or to make every effort to find them. Otherwise, the chief elder of the 
aul would be faced with stern punishment. According to Gunaropulo, the man regarded as the 
chief of the community could carry exclusive responsibility in these cases. Aware of the benefits 
of cultivating good relations with the Russian military station, they would sometimes make an 
effort to stop raids and robbers themselves.
495
 
The story of the notorious slave-raider Ergeld Khan serves as a remarkable case study in 
Russian patronage along the Caspian shores. After years of Russian military patrols and 
interventions had interfered in his main line of work, Ergeld Khan was in a desperate situation. 
Nevertheless, after his long tenure as the chief raider in his community (“bravely serving his 
tribe,” as Gunaropulo phrases it), he maintained significant influence over his comrades and high 
esteem among them. The elders of his aul, observing the benefits of maintaining peaceful 
relations with the Russian military station, resolved to propose Ergeld as khan—pending Russian 
approval, of course.
496
 It was a highly intelligent maneuver on the part of the elders: with this 
gesture, they could relieve themselves of the accusation that their community was harboring a 
felon “at large;” they could alleviate the destabilizing pressure that the presence of a destitute 
and dissatisfied warrior and his followers could have on the aul; they could maintain good 
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relations with the station and reap its rewards; and they could ensure all of this by offering the 
Russians something of immense value: an ally in the fight against slave-raiding who knew the 
business very intimately indeed.   
The benefits of working with Ergeld Khan were not lost on the Russians, or on Ergeld 
himself. Lengthy negotiations followed, during which it was resolved that Ergeld Khan would be 
well-compensated for his cooperation. Gunaropulo had the opportunity to meet him during the 
khan’s visit to the station, and the Russian officer barely conceals his admiration in describing 
him: He was quite a remarkable individual, both in his outward appearance and in the details of 
his life, which was full of sundry adventures. He was a tall man of majestic bearing, expressive 
features, and a penetrating gaze. He was covered in [old] wounds. This man, with his appealing 
appearance, did not give the impression of being a robber. He was no more than 40 years old, 
and his name inspired terror in the Persian coastal dwellings, but he rarely resorted to the 
dagger—only [doing so] to save his own life.”497 In the end, Ergeld took the title of “khan-
intermediary” (khan-posrednik).  
It was not long before Ergeld Khan would have a chance to demonstrate his usefulness to 
his new patrons. An Iranian captive was taken by Turkmens, and Ergeld Khan informed station 
officers that the captive was presently located in an aul far from the coast, but that the relatives 
of his captors could be found in the aul of Gasan-Guli (sic). Russian station officers had 
previously shown relatively little interest in freeing Iranian captives, but they made an exception 
in order to enlist Ergeld Khan’s services. Gunaropulo joined Ergeld in the efforts to secure the 
captive’s release, and he provides a detailed narrative of his adventure with the Khan. As with 
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Witkiewicz’s narrations of the effort to free a captive from the steppe, Gunaropulo’s account 
offers a rich view of the politics of manumission on the “frontlines.”  
The proximity of the captors’ relatives was considered a useful lead: “Among the 
Turkmens,” Gunaropulo writes, “there is the custom of avenging any insult to their relatives, but 
also of answering for their actions.”498 Gunaropulo set off in a schooner along with the station 
chief, Ergeld Khan, an interpreter, and some others. They were accompanied by ten armed 
sailors divided between two Turkmen boats—brought, Gunaropulo writes, for the sake of 
“presentation.” They anchored the schooner about four miles from shore, and continued onwards 
in the two Turkmen boats, entering the mouth of the Gasan Guli River. On either side of the river 
there were “countless tents,” and the arrival of the boats evidently inspired “great wonder and 
surprise” among the Turkmens. “It seemed as if the entire population of the aul poured forth to 
meet us,” writes Gunaropulo, “and the banks of the river resembled two colorful, rippling 
ribbons, from which could be heard a vague hum [of voices], which accompanied us the whole 
time as we moved along the river.”499  
To avoid the throngs of people, they sailed onward and made landing slightly downriver. 
A few minutes later, elders from the village came to find out the reason for their arrival. 
Gunaropulo suggested to the Khan that he should take charge in the negotiations. A servant of 
the Khan brought out a samovar, a chest, some carpets, some dried fruit, and other items, and the 
Turkmen elders sat in a circle and had tea. The Khan invited Gunaropulo to join them, ordering 
his servant to provide the officer with a pillow, of the kind provided to esteemed guests at 
Turkmen gatherings. Gunaropulo asked the interpreter to convey to him the precise contents of 
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the ensuing discussions. After some pleasantries, the Khan explained to the elders that the 
Russian station chief was very unhappy with them because they knew the location of the Iranian 
captive but had made no efforts to secure his release. In light of the privileges available to them 
and the good relations they had thus far maintained with the Russians, the Khan asked that they 
not rupture that “friendship” by impeding the common effort to free the captive.500  
The elders swore that they had taken no part in what had befallen the Iranian captive, and 
that they did not know if he was really located in the aul mentioned by the Khan. They insisted 
on the veracity of their testimony as Ergeld reiterated his suspicions. Gunaropulo allows that the 
elders may well have spoken honestly, but the Khan had been provided with “overwhelming 
evidence” by his trustworthy scouts (lazutchiki), and he felt certain of the captive’s whereabouts. 
Ergeld was unwavering in the matter; indicating to Gunaropulo and the interpreter that they 
should follow him, he stepped away from the gathering and proposed that it was necessary to 
invite the elders onto the schooner, and to hold one of them in captivity as collateral for the 
return of the Iranian captive. When Gunaropulo invited the elders to join him onboard the 
schooner, where they should receive a personal audience from the station chief, they bowed 
deeply and indicated their consent.
501
   
   Their distance from the village had not, in the meantime, provided much relief from the 
throngs of onlookers. “We were surrounded by a dense, colorful ring,” Gunaropulo writes, 
“which, gradually closing in, would have crushed us had the requests and admonitions of the 
Khan and the elders not mitigated the crowd’s intensity.”502 The elders’ march toward the boats 
provoked alarm among the crowd, and several Turkmens with “fearful, questioning eyes” ran 
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over and grabbed Gunaropulo by his sleeves and the tails of his coat, crying out “Sibir! Sibir!” 
(“Siberia, Siberia!”)—they evidently recognized the possibility that their elders could be 
imprisoned, and feared that they would be sent to the notorious prison camps of Siberia. A 
dangerous moment followed:  
At this time, a sailor who was overzealous in the performance of his duty… shoved a 
Turkmen woman off of me so violently that she fell. Words cannot express the brutal 
expressions which then appeared on the faces of most of these Turkmens, of both sexes. 
Fearing a formidable demonstration on their part of the deep indignation which, although 
somewhat weakened, evidently still gripped them, I made a show in that same moment of 
striking the sailor, though really I merely knocked his cap from his head. A single 
moment, and there was a metamorphosis: the grim, embittered faces brightened, and we 
[managed to] enter the boat, albeit not without some effort in delicately reducing, as 
much as possible, the impediments presented to us by the Turkmens who were holding 
onto the elders, while assuring them that the elders would return to the village that same 
day.
503
  
 
 As they sailed downriver with the elders, “angry Turkmens dotted the shoreline” shouting 
at the boats, running after them, shaking their fists, and spitting in their direction. Arriving at the 
schooner, the station chief greeted the elders and they made their introductions. After this, the 
Russian official pointed to one of the elders who had been recommended to him by Ergeld as a 
relative of the captors who were sought, and he announced that he was to be placed under arrest 
until the return of the Iranian captive. The elders—unlike the others from their aul—evidently 
did not expect this outcome. They expressed their displeasure, but had no choice other than to 
submit. The schooner weighed anchor with its hostage onboard.
504
  
 As the schooner approached the military station, the Turkmen elder caught sight of 
something which filled him with palpable dread: a three-masted transport vessel, 
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decommissioned from service and standing on dead anchors. The primary purpose of the vessel 
was to store gunpowder, but it served also as a dungeon for the “lower sorts and guilty 
Turkmens” (dlia nizhnikh chinov i provinivshikhsia turkmen). This fact, Gunaropulo writes, was 
well-known among Turkmens. It is not clear whether this dungeon is where they detained the 
elder, who was innocent of all but being related to a suspected slave-raider. A few days later, his 
fellow elders from the aul came to plead with the station chief to release their associate, vowing 
to see the Iranian captive returned.  
 The Russians’ tactics here were inarguably brutish, inhumane, and quite possibly 
counterproductive in the long term: it is unlikely that they could, in the future, expect anything 
but the harshest welcome from the aul whose elders they had offended. It seems that the people 
of that community already knew very well the dangers involved in negotiating with the Russians. 
Their outrage upon seeing their elders heading downriver was well-founded, and it hardly 
seemed to surprise Gunaropulo. The presence of Ergeld Khan may or may not have impressed 
the elders, but it certainly did not serve to ease the minds of the general populace. Which is not 
to say that Ergeld’s participation had no value: from the beginning, the entire operation appears 
to have been under his direction. His own network of informants identified the likely 
whereabouts of the Iranian captive; he pointed out their relatives’ community; he undertook 
negotiations with the elders entirely on his own; and he suggested the hostage trick. He was no 
mere informant for the Russians in this enterprise; he was the mission’s commander.  
The mission, moreover, was a success: promptly after pleading with Russian officials to 
free their compatriot, the elders managed to deliver the Iranian captive to the station.  
236 
 
Such complicated missions for the freeing of hostages were not always necessary. Most 
often, it appears that the Russians of the Caspian station simply engaged in the ransom economy, 
paying a redemption fee for Russian captives. According to Gunaropulo, the station had a special 
fund for ransom payments, formed out of the voluntary contributions of officers serving there. 
Each officer contributed three “Dutch coins” (gollandskii chervonets) per year.505 The informal 
nature of this arrangement—and the fact that the ransom fund was not subsidized by higher 
authorities—suggests that ransoming captives was not part of the mission that the Empire had 
intended for the Caspian station. Most likely, the “ransom collection” arose as a practical 
response to the complexities involved in the more general mission of “pacifying” the Turkmens. 
Suffice to say, however, it is not clear how perpetuating the ransom economy might have aided 
in reducing the deprivations wrought by Turkmens. Instead, it proves the bargaining power of the 
Turkmens and the relative weakness of the Russians, their powerful station and equipment 
notwithstanding.  
 Sometimes ransom exchanges went terribly wrong for the Russians. In early 1860, two 
Russian sailors, named Potakeev and Ivanov, were captured by Turkmens along the Iranian 
coastline. These two captives became the joint property of three families of Turkmens, and these 
families were jointly involved in negotiating the terms of his release. Several times, Gunaropulo 
tells us, the negotiations were concluded to the satisfaction of all parties, and the agreed-upon 
ransom money was brought to the families, only to be rejected: each time, the families would 
dramatically raise the ransom price. The process, overall, was incredibly dilatory: the captives 
remained with their Turkmen captors for seven years, “performing the most burdensome of 
labors,” before another strategy was attempted. Once again, it was a Turkmen “khan-
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intermediary” who lead the way. Ana-San Khan [sic] proposed a novel approach: the khan 
suggested that a trustworthy Turkmen should be sent to the aul where the captives were residing 
with the ostensible mission of purchasing an arghumak horse—a Central Asian breed famous for 
its speed and hardiness. Once in possession of the horse, the Turkmen agent would seize an 
opportune moment to give it over to the Russian captives, so that they might ride it to freedom. 
Incredibly, the plan was a success: the sailors were freed, and the horse on which they escaped 
became joint property of the station guards.
506
  
The “khan-intermediaries” in the employ of the Russian Empire could, no doubt, serve as 
very effective agents. It is clear that they served the Russians as a survival strategy, both for 
themselves and for their communities. Threatened with the loss of proceeds from raiding and 
ransoming, and naturally alarmed by the proximity of the Russian navy, these intermediaries did 
what was necessary to maintain a measure of independence as well as to secure some revenue. In 
the short term, these aims appear to have been met: compensations were offered, and “indirect 
rule” remained the order of the day for communities led by “intermediary” khans. But in the long 
term, some Turkmen leaders found their aims tragically frustrated by their Russian patrons.  
In a letter dating from no later than 1839, Kiyat Khan [sic], a Turkmen ruler who had 
served the Empire as an informant and intermediary for decades, related his sorrow and 
disappointment to a top Russian official in the Caucasus. In 1812, the khan writes, a Russian 
general sent an envoy to the Teke, Yomud and Gökleng Turkmens, and members of these tribes 
chose Kiyat Khan by common agreement to conduct necessary political errands in Russia. 
“Now,” he writes, “I am fading and nearing the end of my life; it is a pity that not one of my 
desires has been fulfilled.” He made “repeated requests” to leading Russian officials concerning 
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various subjects, but never received any satisfaction. Even so, the khan pledges that he has not 
lost his zeal for diligently serving the Russian state. The greatest disappointment had come quite 
recently: he had received the news that a Russian plenary minister had indicated to the Iranian 
court that the khan’s territories along the Atrak and Gurgen Rivers would be the rightful territory 
of Iran. The minister evidently paid the khan a visit thereafter: “Yesterday the minister came to 
our post, and he very easily learned the business of centuries! We entreat Your Excellency to ask 
[him] what graves are in the aforesaid domains: [are they] Turkmen or Persian? Your Excellency 
will likely not agree with the perspective according to which we should be deprived of land left 
to us by our forefathers.” The Khan concludes his complaint with a request that he himself may 
have known to be outlandish: 
I have an abiding desire which, to my misfortune, has not hitherto been achieved, though 
I disclosed all to the chief superintendent [Rtishchev]; I disclose it now to Your 
Excellency, so that the weight of it shall not lie upon my chest. Here it is: I have wished 
that His Majesty the Emperor should give me an army for the conquest of Astarabad and 
the subjugation of its local inhabitants to my will. But, to my boundless regret, this goal 
has not been reached. Nearing the end of my life, it is a pity to die without having 
achieved my desire.
507
   
  
As disappointed as the Khan may have been that he never had a chance to conquer 
Astarabad, his bold appeal should not overshadow the deeper tragedy in his letter. Caught, like 
his fellow Turkmen elites, between Russia, Khiva, and Persia, the Khan worked with the 
Russians for some three decades only to find, at the end of his life, thanks to Russian 
negotiations, that his Turkmen forefathers’ graves were on Iranian soil.  
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Chapter 6 
 
 The Conquest of Khiva and the Myth of Russian Abolitionism in Central Asia 
 
 
 
The Russian conquest of Khiva in the spring of 1873 came with high expectations among the 
abolitionists of rival empires. “The first steps have already been taken,” the British officer 
Herbert Wood would soon afterwards write, “for the diffusion of light in these dark places of the 
earth, for Humanity owes to Russia the cessation of brigandage and slavery, which from the 
earliest historical times have been the scourges of the Oxus countries.”508 When the expected 
emancipation was accomplished, in the form of a decree drafted by the khan at General 
Kaufman’s behest, few were likely surprised. But perhaps they should have been. In this chapter, 
I will argue that the Russian-sponsored emancipation of Khwarazm’s slaves was far from 
inevitable; that it had not been planned in advance by Kaufman or his superiors; that 
abolitionism, contrary to popular belief, played no significant part in motivating the Russian 
conquest of the region; and that credit for the slaves’ mass emancipation—one of the most 
revolutionary acts in the history of Central Asia—should rightfully go to the slaves themselves.   
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Throughout the 1860s and early 70s, right down to the eve of Khiva’s conquest, a 
declining but significant trade in Iranian slaves had continued, notwithstanding the near-total 
cessation in raids among steppe Kazakhs and the concurrent Russian and Qajar efforts to 
subjugate Turkmens to the south. In fact, imperial efforts in Khurasan sometimes served only to 
provide more captives for Central Asian markets. In 1860, for example, a Qajar campaign 
brought an estimated 13,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 33 cannons to Merv, only to be routed 
by Teke adversaries; so many captives were taken and sold that, according to Kuropatkin, the 
price of a single Iranian slave in the markets of Bukhara and Khiva fell to seven rubles and 50 
kopeks.
509
 M. Alikhanov-Avarskii ventured to propose the scope of the disaster: “a Persian 
detachment of Prince Sultan Murad, on its way to Merv, left no less than 20,000 of their soldiers 
in the hands of local Teke, and the majority of those were sold to Khiva.”510  
Miserable conditions in northern Iran in the early 1870s may also have contributed to the 
trade: Grodekov observes that the “terrible famine that raged throughout Persia” in 1871 resulted 
in the Iranians being “so weakened by want of food that they offered the Tekes no resistance 
whatever.” He met with a man who had been held captive by Tekes for many years, and the man 
related to him the ease with which these weakened victims could be taken: “[he] told me that the 
poorer nomads used to ride on donkeys to Serakhs, armed only with cudgels, and drive back the 
villagers in droves to slavery at Merv. He himself was captured in this manner during one of the 
Alamans.”511  
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As we have seen in a previous chapter, the subjugation of Bukhara by June of 1868 had 
not brought about the end of the slave trade in those quarters either—nor did such a goal appear 
to be a matter of urgency for its Russian conquerors. It was not until 1873, some five years later, 
that the Russians would write abolition into a treaty with the Bukharan amīr, and even then the 
ruler was allowed a deferment of ten years before full emancipation would have to take effect. In 
the eighteen-point treaty in question, in which ten of the points related to commercial relations 
between Russia and Bukhara, the abolition of the slave trade occupied the seventeenth point:
512
   
In deference to the Emperor of all the Russias, and for the greater glory of His 
Imperial Majesty, His Eminence the Amir Sayed Muzaffar has resolved that 
henceforth and for ever the shameful trade in men which is so contrary to the laws 
of humanity, shall be abolished within the limits of Bukhara. In conformity with 
this resolution, Sayed Muzaffar shall immediately send to all his beks the strictest 
orders to that effect. Besides the order abolishing the slave trade, commands shall 
be sent to all the frontier towns of Bukhara to which slaves are brought for sale 
from neighbouring countries, to the effect that in case slaves should be brought to 
such places, notwithstanding the orders of the Amir, the same should be taken from 
their owners and immediately liberated. 
 The ambitious language of the treaty was surely undermined by the ten-year grace period 
permitted, and indeed the slave trade in Bukhara continued. Nevertheless, the rumor had 
evidently spread both among Central Asian slaves and among foreign journalists that the era of 
slavery was drawing to a close and that Russian troops were consummate liberators, breaking 
slaves’ shackles wherever they went. So it was that the slaves of Khiva began to revolt against 
their masters and free themselves before the Tsar’s invading armies had even arrived at the 
capital.
513
 The closer the Russian detachments came to the city, the greater the number of slaves 
seizing the occasion to liberate themselves in the “conviction and the hope…that the fall of 
Khiva would also bring them their freedom… [A]t first they appeared in small parties, but the 
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bands steadily increased as the [Russians] advanced.”514 Many joined the Russians, marching 
beside them.   
The possibility of slaves fleeing or rebelling at the approach of the Russian forces had 
been anticipated by many slave-owners well in advance of the Khivan campaign.
515
 Alikhanov-
Avarskii witnessed that Iranians, freeing themselves, “flee from their masters and appear at our 
camp in masses, despite the fact that the Khivans, as a precaution, have in recent times been 
keeping them chained and under close supervision.”516 By all accounts, slaves met their 
presumed liberators with dramatic displays of ecstatic joy and relief. Grodekov described how 
“[t]he people loudly greeted the troops, and especially boisterous were the noisy greetings of the 
Persian slaves. They had begun to free themselves immediately upon the troops’ entry into the 
capital of the Khanate, and in the crowd one could see many slaves jostling forward, showing the 
troops arms and legs bloodied from tight shackles.”517 MacGahan would later witness a similar 
spectacle, writing how he and the group of Russian soldiers he accompanied “came upon a 
crowd of Persian slaves, who received us with shouts, cries, and tears of joy. They were wild 
with excitement. They had heard that wherever the Russians went slavery disappeared, and they 
did not doubt that it would be the case here. Some had already liberated themselves; and I saw 
several engaged in cutting the chains of three or four miserable beings, shouting the while, and 
laughing and crying all at once in the wildest manner.”518  
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 Foreign observers, too, would have had good reason for suspecting that abolition was on 
the Tsar’s list of priorities. After all, the Tsar’s public announcement and explanation for the 
campaign, which appeared in the newspaper Russkii invalid and was translated for the New York 
Times, makes no fewer than four references to slavery and captivity in describing its incentives.  
For example, the circular alleges that the khan had previously been prompted to “immediately set 
at liberty all Russian prisoners,” but that he had declined to do so, and so they remained “slaves 
in the possession of the Khan and his high functionaries.”519 It also notes “several merchants and 
others” who were killed or “dragged into slavery” on the road between Orsk and Kazalinsk.520 
Slavery was a topic of concern and an incentive for the campaign at the highest levels—or so it 
was made to seem.  
 It is perhaps for this reason that the khan’s final, desperate effort to stave off invasion 
came in the form of selective manumission. The khan ordered twenty-one Russian slaves 
gathered together and sent off to General Kaufman along with a petition (ʿarznāma) asking for 
peace, all to be delivered by a high-ranking emissary (identified in a Khivan source as Murtaża 
Biy Khwāja, ḥākīm of Khwāja Eli). Kaufman neither accepted the petition nor permitted the 
emissary to return home, keeping Murtaża Biy with his retinue on the way to Khiva. The twenty-
one former slaves were duly received, but their manumission did nothing to slow Kaufman’s 
advance.
521
 These freedmen, of whom eleven were Cossacks, had all been captured in 1869 and 
1870 by Kazakhs and sold to Khiva; it was evidently claimed by the khan that they were the only 
Russian subjects still held as slaves there, “with the exception of one old man taken in Perovsky's 
disastrous expedition” of 1839-40, who had converted to Islam, married, and preferred not to 
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leave.”522 It is unlikely that the khan believed these concessions alone would be sufficient to 
convince Kaufman to turn his troops back. He probably hoped the gesture might show his 
willingness to negotiate given the opportunity. But the opportunity was not to come.  
 As Kaufman entered the capital on the 28
th
 of March, 1873, a large-scale slave uprising 
had begun in earnest. Emboldened by rumors of the city’s imminent downfall, slaves broke from 
their owners, plundered them, and in some cases, according to a later Khivan source called the 
Āzādnāma, began tormenting them.523 Scenes like this could be witnessed not only in the capital, 
but in towns and villages throughout Khwarazm, and it was reported that both owners and their 
(now former) slaves seized the occasion to engage in acts of cruelty against one-another.
524
 
Before long, groups of Khivans began approaching Kaufman, pleading that he do something to 
help put down the uprising. In what may have been the first act of governance on the part of the 
Russian Empire in Khwarazm, Kaufman ordered an inquiry into the crimes of rebelling former 
slaves, in the course of which two were found guilty and hung from the gallows.
525
  
 MacGahan witnessed the aftermath. “I saw their dead bodies hanging from the beams in 
one of the bazaars,” he writes, “where they remained for several days. I may mention that many 
of Kaufmann's officers strongly condemned this act, thinking that the Persians had too much 
reason for taking some vengeance on the masters, to be thus severely treated. The punishment, 
however, had the double effect of cowing the Persians and of encouraging the masters to punish 
them severely for the use they had made of their liberty. Several poor fellows came into our 
camp and showed us gashes in the soles of their feet or in the calves of their legs, in which was 
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strewed cut horsehair.”526 This evidently quelled the uprising for a time, but it was not long 
before the unrest was resumed with renewed ferocity.
527
  
 Kaufman’s decision to demand the liberation of the slaves was directly inspired by the 
uprising undertaken by the slaves themselves. Granted, some Russian officers had supported 
individual acts of manumission on an ad hoc basis during the campaign: those slaves who had 
escaped and joined themselves to General Verevkin’s ranks, for example, were welcomed by that 
officer, who declared them to be free. In early June, Verevkin corresponded both with officials in 
Astrakhan and with Kaufman concerning the liberation of slaves, and the latter replied that he 
would propose the subject of general abolition to the new council which he had formed among 
Khivan elites to negotiate the surrender and future governance of Khwarazm. As Schuyler notes, 
however, echoing the sentiments of both Central Asian and foreign commentators, “the most 
impelling reason for the emancipation was, that slaves who had run away from their masters had 
begun to rob, pillage, and murder; and the masters, fearing to be deprived of their slaves, were 
imprisoning and torturing those who remained to prevent them from running away.”528 So it was 
that, shortly after Muḥammad Raḥim Khan returned to the conquered capital from his temporary 
hiding-place among the Yomuts, he was compelled by Kaufman to draft an edict of abolition and 
general manumission, to be circulated throughout the Khanate.
529
 Khwarazm’s emancipation 
proclamation read:
530
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I, Sayyid Muhammad Rahim Bahadur Khan, out of deep respect for the Russian 
Emperor, command all of my subjects promptly to provide total freedom [pol'naia 
svoboda] to all the slaves of my Khanate. Henceforth slavery is to be abolished in my 
Khanate for all time. May this humanitarian act [chelovekoliubivoe delo] serve as a 
pledge of eternal friendship between all of my glorious people and the great Russian 
people.  
I command that my will be carried out precisely, under threat of strict punishment. All 
former slaves, henceforth free, must be considered to have rights equal to those of my 
other subjects, and subject to the same penalties as they are, and tried for disturbing the 
peace in the country and for disorderliness—thus I urge all of them to maintain order.  
All former slaves are granted the right to live anywhere in my Khanate, or to leave it for 
wherever they desire. For those who wish to leave the Khanate, special measures will be 
taken. Female slaves [zhenshini-rabyni] are freed on equal footing with men. Disputes 
between married women and their husbands will be sorted out according to sharia law [po 
sharigatu]." 
 
This edict was to be followed, several weeks later, in mid-August, by a treaty between the 
Khan and the Russian Empire which included the provision that all slaves were officially freed, 
and that reducing people to slavery (qul qilmaq) and trading in human beings (ādam satmaqlik) 
were absolutely prohibited.
531
 
                                                                                                                                                             
give the Uzbegs an opportunity for maltreating the Persians. The Khan, however, having read the first part of the 
letter, immediately, without stopping to finish it, wrote out a proclamation, and ordered it to be proclaimed through 
the streets next day by a herald, and then went to Kaufmann, with childish eagerness, to tell him what he had done, 
and show him how prompt he was to obey his wishes. ‘But,’ said Kaufmann, ‘did you not read the last part of my 
letter ?’ ‘No,’ said the Khan, ‘I did not know it was necessary.’ ‘Why, yes,’ said Kaufmann, ‘with us the last part of 
a letter is often the best. In it I advised you not to issue your proclamation for a few days yet’” (ibid, 278-79). It is 
much more likely that the Khan’s “mistake” was a deliberate and none-too-subtle attempt at resistance, intended to 
undermine Kaufman’s efforts.    
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 The June decree was announced publicly in towns and villages throughout Khwarazm.
532
 
Soon, slaves could be seen celebrating all across the Khanate, shouting out joyfully in the streets. 
Freedmen were witnessed affixing Russian imperial emblems and colors to their clothing in a 
show of gratitude.
533
 In the weeks to come, these freedmen—whose numbers have been 
estimated at anywhere between 27,000 and 58,500—would have to choose whether to remain in 
Khwarazm or to attempt to return to their original homeland. For nearly all of them, that 
homeland was Iran, and the journey there would involve crossing dangerous ground. There was 
no guarantee that homecoming parties venturing south would be safe from Turkmen raids. 
Indeed, those who were most eager to return home in the days that followed the news of their 
liberation met a miserable end: “[F]ollowing the announcement of freedom,” Alikhanov-
Avarskii writes, “Persians began to gather into large parties for the return to their homeland. Two 
such parties, of 700-800 souls each, have already left the oasis and moved into the desert where, 
they say, they were slaughtered without exception by Turkmens fleeing Khiva… In light of such 
rumors, the unfortunate Persians no longer hurry home, but instead collect near our 
detachment—their numbers already adding to some 1,500 men, women, and children—in order 
to follow along the Caspian shore during the return march of the Caucasians…”534  
 Although those who wished to remain in Khwarazm rather than risking a journey 
elsewhere were guaranteed equal rights with other freedmen under the provisions of the 
liberation decree, Emil Schmidt claims that, at first, few showed any desire to stay where they 
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were.
535
 The author of the Āzādnāma, Ḥassan Muḥammad Amīn Oghlï, provides quite a different 
assessment, however, estimating that a substantial proportion of the freedmen, totaling no less 
than 22,500 Iranians and “Azeri Turks,” wished to become Khwarazmian citizens. By this 
author’s estimation, that left some 36,000 who were prepared to journey to Iran and elsewhere.  
 Grodekov recalled seeing the fourth group of freedmen to leave Khwarazm following 
behind Russian troops on the way to the Mangyshlaq.  Each was given a daily allowance of 20 
kopeks, though “it was noted that they were not making good use of the allotment given to them, 
and instead of stocking up on provisions for the voyage through the desert, they bought only 
some goodies which were made available to them in Kungrad… Little benefit was had from the 
Persians in the armed forces. They were for the most part weak and sick, depleted by being 
overworked by masters who, for the slightest offense, laid shackles upon them and punished 
them cruelly. There were, of course, healthy and strong individuals among the Persians, but these 
too did nothing without prodding. They were sometimes caught stealing.”536 It is not clear why 
Grodekov would have expected military or tactical assistance from these refugees, but his 
remarks help to reveal something of their poor condition during the long march home. This 
group would suffer still more on the road. They—as well as their Russian escorts—were 
tormented by thirst on their journey through the desert. Grodekov recalls that “[o]n coming to a 
well, six Persians climbed down into it and did not want to leave, even when ropes were lowered 
to bring them back up. One of the ropes broke while hauling a Persian up, but he survived.”537 
 When they arrived at Krasnovodsk, on the Caspian Sea, these Iranians were offered 
provisions totaling two pounds of flour and 1/8
th
 pound of butter per day for each adult, and half 
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this amount for each child. Grodekov recalls that a number of them expressed a desire to 
accompany the detachment all the way back to Russia. “But,” the he writes, “when the first 
steamship arrived to take  the Persians back to their homeland, all of them abandoned these 
intentions, some from a desire to see their fatherland and others for fear of being taken into the 
army as soldiers, as was claimed by a rumor someone spread among them. Although the officers 
tried to explain to them that the White Tsar had no need of the services of such people, dozens of 
whom could be sold to Khiva or Bukhara by a single Turkmen, they were thoroughly convinced 
by the [rumor] they had heard, and not one of them went off to Russia.”538 MacGahan confirms 
that this group arrived safely at their destination.
539
 Another group of some 500 freedmen, 
however, which had set off at the same time but had opted to travel along the Atrek River, was 
pillaged and massacred by Teke Turkmens.
540
 
 Among the thousands of freedmen who had gathered in certain Khwarazmian villages 
and bazaars to await their journey home, there were many who could not immediately afford the 
expenses required for the long journey. According to Ḥassan Muḥammad Amīn Oghlï, these 
ones could expect aid neither from their former masters nor from Iran (nor, presumably, from the 
Russian military). Still, they hoped to manage the return journey eventually, and as time wore on 
their patience grew thin. In the villages of Katta Bāgh and Tāshḥawż, some of them began taking 
out their frustration by attacking their former masters, while others resorted to banditry and other 
forms of aggression.
541
  
The Āzādnāma recounts the tragic events which followed. At this tense time, a man 
named ʿAwz Keldi Khan from among the Yomuts came to the freedmen in Katta Bāgh, telling 
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them that he could lead them, safe and sound, through the Turkmen deserts and back to their 
homeland in Iran. The former slaves made a show of gratitude for his offer, and some went to 
their comrades in Tāshḥawż in order to spread the news. Many agreed to follow him. Several 
days were spent working out the preparations. The plans gained the favorable attention of the 
local headman, ʿAlī Muḥammad Khan, and on his orders a large group departed for Iran via 
Kohne Urgench, under the leadership of ʿAwz Keldi Khan. All the while, the Azādnāma relates, 
this self-proclaimed guide had been surveying the freedmen’s worldly possessions and, in a 
clandestine manner (yashirin ravishda), had passed along the details of his plan to his fellow 
Yomuts, telling them that the former slaves would have many possessions among them 
(qullarning qolida māl-i dunyā köbdur).542  
With this information in hand, a massive host of some 17,000 armed Yomut horsemen 
gathered while ʿAwz Keldi Khan led a trusting cohort of several thousand former slaves into the 
desert. First, they stopped in Kohne Urgench, where they stocked up on supplies and provisions 
for the arduous road to come. For several days they traveled deeper into the desert, their water 
supply gradually depleting. Finally, they came upon a well and stopped to drink. It was here that, 
all of the sudden, they found themselves being fired upon. The 17,000 mounted Turkmens 
emerged and engaged them in a grueling siege which lasted the next twelve hours. At the end of 
it, some 5,000 former slaves lay dead. All of their possessions were pillaged.
543
  
 There would be more misery to come for the former slaves of Khwarazm following the 
departure of the Russian troops. “No sooner had the last Russian troops turned their back 
upon the Khanate,” Schmidt writes, “than the news reached Petro-Alexandrovsk that the 
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Turkomans had attacked a numerous party of former slaves (about 1,700 in number) near Kunya-
Urgenj, who were on their way home; of these wretched people a considerable number had been 
sabred on the spot and the rest captured by the Turkomans.”544 A courier on his way from Petro-
Alexandrovsk reported seeing “the bodies of hundreds of Persians who had been massacred after 
the Russians left the country;” another messenger, headed to Mangyshlaq, likewise reported 
“hundreds of corpses” of Iranian former-slaves by the roadside.545  
These acts of cruelty on the part of the Turkmens were unprecedented: Central Asian 
tribes had never before been known to slaughter Iranians en masse, a strategy which, among 
other things, would have undermined the business of slave-dealing. For all the reports of 
dehumanizing treatment inflicted upon slaves while in Turkmen captivity, reports of outright 
murder before 1873 are strikingly rare, and can usually be explained by rational means: those 
captives who were too slow or ill to manage the journey north from Khurasan might be killed, 
for example, or those who fought back. But it is difficult to ascertain any practical reason for the 
mass murder of thousands of former slaves. Perhaps some wanted to send the message that 
abolition for the sake of the slaves themselves would only lead to further misery—a desperate 
attempt to reinforce the market for slaves which abolition undermined. Some may have hoped to 
send a message to the slaves themselves that nothing good would come of fleeing their masters, 
perhaps in the hope of “stabilizing” the slave system. But these practical-minded explanations 
are ultimately unconvincing.  
It is more appropriate to reflect on these massacres both as acts of resistance and as 
expressions of collective desperation. In the weeks after the conquest of Khiva, Kaufman had 
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wasted little time in proving his cruelty to the Turkmens. Soon after the return of the khan to the 
capital, Kaufman imposed upon the Yomuts a war indemnity totaling the impossible sum of 
600,000 rubles, of which half was demanded to be paid by the Yomuts of Khwarazm within two 
weeks.
546
 The Yomut elders did not resist, despite the absurdity of the demand in light of their 
meager assets, which mostly consisted of livestock: they agreed to pay, but asked for more time 
to collect the funds. Instead, Kaufman arrested twelve elders, holding seven of them as hostages. 
The general did not wait even the allotted two weeks before sending a detachment of Cossacks to 
the Yomuts in western Khwarazm, ordering them to “proceed to the work of slaughter” if there 
was no evidence that the required indemnity was forthcoming.
547
 The Cossacks massacred the 
Yomuts, who were not expecting the assault and were not prepared to fight back. The other 
Turkmen tribes of Khwarazm were then ordered to pay the remaining 310,500 rubles of the fine. 
They could raise only 92,000 rubles among them, but Kaufman—already facing domestic 
criticism for the slaughter of the Yomuts—softened his approach, taking 26 Turkmen hostages 
but sparing their lives.
548
 All the Turkmens of the region, whether subjects of Russia or self- 
independent tribes, must have been horrified by these events, which appear calculated to 
ensure—rather than to prevent—ongoing conflict with the Tsar’s army.  
After these acts of terrorism on the part of the Russian military, allowing the safe passage 
of the freed slaves through Turkmen country would have been a tacit admission of Turkmen 
weakness, or even of Turkmen subjection to Russia. Their territories had never been a safe space 
for Iranians before; if that should change simply because Russian officers gave Iranians 
permission to return home, it would be as if the Russians—or still worse, the Iranians 
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themselves—had dictated the terms by which one could pass through the Turkmen-dominated 
deserts.  The Turkmens could, at the very least, assert their dominion over the shrinking territory 
in which they could still move and act freely. Inasmuch as their massacre of the freedmen served 
as a desperate assertion of their independence from the forces closing in from the north, we must 
observe a terrible irony: the imperial drive which had freed these slaves had likewise sealed their 
fate.   
The Turkmens now had to face an uncertain future. Raiding and slave-dealing had been a 
major economic force in Turkmen communities for which viable alternatives for securing a 
livelihood were few. Largely alienated from the agricultural lands of the oases, which were 
mostly owned by Uzbeks (in Khwarazm and Bukhara) and Iranians (in northern Iran), Turkmen 
tribes took advantage of every available means of securing food and resources, engaging in 
fishing, hunting, herding, and artisanship. Raiding and slave-dealing, however, not only provided 
for influxes of capital and trade-goods on a grander scale than these other occupations, but also 
served as the foundation for valued customs and social phenomena. The raids provided the 
supreme template for the proving of masculinity: a small-scale herder or fisherman could 
moonlight as a warrior. Young men, sharing the experience with their elders, could come of age 
in combat. The world-renowned horse-culture of the Turkmens had also become closely linked 
to the raiding expeditions, and it was in these contexts that the horsemanship and gallantry 
praised in the Turkmens’ vast oral literature, music, and poetry found its most vivid 
contemporary expression. The raids also served as a catalyst for the redistribution of goods, and 
the social functions that this engenders: the enactment of hierarchy, the proving of generosity, 
and the apportioning of prestige.  
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 The wealth generated by raids and slave-trading also provided for the creation of trade 
networks. The luxury goods and animals looted in raids, as well as the captives and the revenue 
generated from selling them, allowed for liaisons with neighboring Turkmens as well as with 
Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and others. The importance, moreover, of the goods, materials, animals, 
enslaved laborers and luxury wares gained by raiding can hardly be overstated in light of the 
poverty and chronic instability that characterized tribal life in the deserts in Central Asia. In an 
environment where herdsmen could lose the majority of their livelihood in a single season of 
brutal weather, the small measure of stability provided by supplemental revenue must have been 
precious indeed.  
In light of all this, one can begin to comprehend the desperation and outrage that must 
have gripped many Turkmen communities as they realized that the markets and infrastructure for 
their trade in slaves was collapsing with the Russian advance. What’s more, they could see the 
very cargo they had gone to such lengths to secure literally walking back to freedom before their 
eyes. And for those who believed that slavery among Sunnis was a charitable fate for Shīʿites, as 
it often brought about the auspicious occasion of conversion, the slaves’ return to Iran must have 
been all the more galling. The Turkmens’ work was undone, and their own futures were 
uncertain. At the very least, they could endeavor to steal what little goods the freedmen carried 
with them on the way back home. Having dehumanized their Iranian victims for decades already, 
it is no great surprise that the Turkmens’ anger should have found its outlet in astonishing acts of 
inhumanity.   
 
The Russian Conquest of the Turkmen Deserts  
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The conquest of Khiva is sometimes portrayed as the campaign which ended the slave trade in 
Central Asia. It was nothing of the sort. The slave trade continued, as we have seen, bolstered 
mostly by the ongoing tensions to the south between Turkmen tribes and the Iranians. Nor was it 
intended to be anything of the sort: Russian operations against the Turkmens in the 1850s and 
60s, more often than not, were justified as a means of ensuring the safety only of Russian 
citizens and soldiers; and the establishment of Russian military outposts on the Caspian Sea must 
be understood in light of the larger imperial project of establishing a permanent presence south 
of Khwarazm. Before the 1870s and 80s, however, this presence was peripheral. As we have 
seen, the activities of the Russians’ Caspian bases, in consultation with its Astarabad consulate, 
had some impact in reducing the incidence of raids on Iranian towns and villages in the region, 
and the establishment of patronage networks and alliances between the Russian military and 
Turkmen elites was a profound and novel development. But the slave trade was also reduced by 
many factors which had little or nothing to do with Russian interventions.   
 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the geography of slave-raiding among the 
Turkmens was generally distinguished by several spheres: the Salor Turkmens raided from their 
base at Sarakhs and took captives in their campaigns for the control of that town and its environs; 
the Sarïqs did the same in vicinity of Marv; the Ersari took captives in and around Herat; the 
Chawdurs conducted raids along the Russian frontier; the Yomuts raided the Caspian coast and 
the villages in the vicinity of Astarabad; and the Tekes, based at Akhal, likewise raided the 
Iranian frontier, though some authors claim that their raiding activities were less frequent than 
those of other tribes before the 1860s.
549
 By the time Khiva fell in 1873, all of these vectors in 
the slave trade had been interrupted to some extent, or even erased entirely. The Salors suffered a 
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massive defeat in ʿAbbas Mīrzā’s Sarakhs campaign of 1833, and would never again regain their 
former notoriety for taking captives in battle or raiding local settlements. The Chawdurs were 
reported by a Caspian flotilla commander to have ceased their raids on Russian subjects 
completely after the construction of the Novo-Petrovsk fort on the Mangyshlaq peninsula in 
1846.
550
 Relatively little is known about the Ersari in the mid- and late-nineteenth century, but 
there is no evidence that they conducted significant raids in the vicinity of Herat after the city fell 
decisively into the hands of the Afghans after 1863.  
As for the Sarïqs, their ascendancy—as well as their ability to take captives—eroded 
along with their hold on the oasis of Merv. In 1855, Khivan forces suffered a major defeat near 
Sarakhs at the hands of the Tekes, who proceeded to drive the Sarïqs from the vicinity of Merv 
as they migrated into the region. The Khivans, who had long employed Turkmens of various 
tribes in their struggle for Merv, would never retake the oasis, nor would they have any further 
need of hiring Turkmens as mercenaries (in which capacity they were also often captive-takers); 
the Sarïqs, who during their troubled residency there had allegedly become one of the principal 
Turkmen tribes engaged in slave-raiding,
551
 abandoned Merv entirely by 1858.  “Thus,” William 
Wood writes, “both of the major players at Merv in the first half of the nineteenth century 
suddenly found themselves on the outside looking in.”552 Meanwhile, from 1855-1867, 
Khwarazm was rocked by uprisings among Yomuts and other Turkmen groups within the 
Khanate, undermining whatever slave trade might have persisted between those groups and 
Khwarazmian markets.
553
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 The Tekes consolidated their control over Merv and held their ground against Qajar 
campaigns; they would maintain that control until 1884, when the Russians occupied the city. In 
the intervening years, they took advantage of the persistent demand for slaves in the markets to 
the north to become the preeminent slave dealers of the region. In 1859, they formed an alliance 
with the Salors and Sarïqs, and dominated a considerable expanse of territory under two 
simultaneous rulers (Kushīd Khan in Merv and Nūr Verdi Khan in Akhal). But the market for 
their slave trading was curtailed by the fall of Khiva. “The march to Khiva,” writes Grodekov, 
“and its results—the suppression of slavery in Khiva and Bokhara—struck a heavy blow at the 
ascendency of the Tekes. It became useless for them to steal the Persians for slaves, since they 
had no market for the disposal of them. For two years after the fall of Khiva the Alamans entirely 
ceased; and although they recommenced again in 1876, they have never yet reached the 
proportions they attained before the closing of the slave markets.”554 
 In the above cases concerning the decline of slave-raiding among Turkmen groups, 
Russian influence was either non-existent, as in the fall of the Salors at Sarakhs, the Sarïqs at 
Merv, and the ascendancy of the Afghans in Herat, or indirect, as in the interruption of markets 
(i.e., in Khwarazm) or access to victims (i.e., along the Russian frontier). In the case of the 
Yomuts along the shores of the Caspian, however, we find a more direct engagement, 
involving—as we have seen—skirmishes, intelligence-gathering operations, the hiring of native 
informants, and other tactics of war. (It is naturally for this reason that the decline of raiding 
among the Yomuts is better-documented than among any other Central Asian population except 
perhaps the Kazakhs.) While some Yomut elites chose to serve—or at least manipulate—the 
Russians as informants and ostensible allies, a great many others responded to Russian 
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encroachments with energetic and sustained resistance. Caught between the forces of the Tsar 
and those of the Shah, many directed their opposition toward both, and submitted to neither.   
 The violence was generally reciprocal. In 1850, in response to increasing Russian 
influence and control in their territory, a group of Yomuts launched an abortive campaign against 
the Tsar’s Ashur Ada sea-station. They arrived on Easter night in 40 large boats. “Leaping 
ashore,” Gunaropulo writes, “the Turkmens rushed to the brightly-lit church, being the only 
place clearly visible against the background of dark night. The people, praying in the garden 
adjacent to the church, saw the armed Turkmens approaching and, with a desperate cry, rushed 
into the church. At that moment the Turkmens heard gunfire, as the guard team had quickly 
assembled, and they fled, leaving four of their own dead but still taking three women with 
them.”555 According to Gunaropulo, the next few years saw a decline of Russian influence over 
the Yomuts. In 1854, however, station officials resolved upon a violent reassertion of Russian 
force: they made a landing assault on the Yomut village of Hassan-Quli, burning 28 boats and 
taking several prominent men as captives (“for whom the Turkmens paid dearly in ransom”).556    
Yomut relations with the Qajars were still more combustible. In 1858, after the Qajar 
governor of Astarabad, Jafar Qulī Khan Ilkhan, forcibly expelled Turkmens from the vicinity of 
Kara Kala with a force of some 10,000 men, taking some back to Astarabad as captives, the 
Turkmens began plundering the countryside and taking captives of their own in reprisal.
557
 The 
raids continued for the next three years, undoubtedly both a means by the Yomuts of generating 
revenue as well as a means of asserting that they could not be evicted from their homes without 
repercussions. In September, 1863, while likely still reeling from their disastrous defeat by the 
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Tekes at Merv two years earlier, the Qajars led an ambitious series of attacks against the Yomuts 
of Astarabad and the Atrek. This campaign too came with significant losses: At first their 
advance was beaten back, and one Qajar detachment had to retreat from Astarabad after being 
stricken with a typhoid outbreak that killed up to 20 soldiers per day. But the military governor 
of Bujnurd, Ḥaydar Qulī Khan, led a successful raid on the upper Atrek. Sixty-three Yomut 
captives were taken, along with 3,000 camels and 20,000 sheep. Fifteen Turkmens who were 
killed during the attack were beheaded, their severed heads sent to Ḥaydar Qulī Khan’s camp. 
This “success” inspired the Qajar minister of war to demand that the coastal Turkmens return all 
of the Iranian captives they had taken in recent years. Turkmen elders readily agreed to this, 
though naturally many of these captives would already have been sold into slavery in Khwarazm 
or Bukhara.
558
 By the next year, the Yomuts had evidently given up just 30 captives, and in 
November of 1864 they suffered another attack at the hands of the Qajars. An Iranian 
detachment ventured along the Atrek River, capturing 15 elderly Turkmen women, as well as 
some 1,000 camels and 12,000 sheep. According to Russian internal documents, the Qajars were 
demanding not only the surrender of captives, but also that the Turkmens submit to becoming 
Iranian citizens.
559
 In fact, given the clear impossibility of meeting the Qajar government’s 
demands—that is, of surrendering captives who had already been sold and, in some cases, may 
already have been dwelling as far off as the Kazakh steppe—we may conclude that these 
demands were little more than a pretext for the ongoing efforts to subjugate the Turkmens.  
A Turkmen uprising against the brutal Astarabad governor came in 1867, followed by a 
Qajar counter-assault which pushed many Yomuts north of the Atrek. Turkmens who were left 
behind—including women and children—suffered torture at the hands of the Iranians and were 
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massacred. Some who had fled returned home to become Qajar subjects.
560
 While north of the 
Atrek, the fleeing Yomuts seem to have been careful not to draw the Russians in the conflict. But 
it was during this same period, in the mid-1860s, that we find a distinct shift in Russia’s 
diplomatic conception of the Turkmens: we find in Tsarist political discourse a heightened 
preoccupation with putting a stop to their “predatory practices.” These “practices” among the 
Turkmens, sporadic and ongoing as they were, had not substantially increased in the mid-60s. So 
what had changed?  As Mehmet Saray observes, the shift in diplomatic language corresponded 
precisely with the dawn of Russia’s conquest of the region; it served as a rationale and provided 
an ideological basis for the conquests of Turkmen country that would follow in the coming two 
decades.
561
  
 With Russia’s recognition in 1869 of the Atrek River as the northern boundary of Iran, 
the Turkmens occupying the borderlands found themselves facing both new challenges and new 
possibilities for resistance. V.I. Markozov, commander of the newly-constructed Krasnovodsk 
garrison, recognized the inorganic nature of the new border and the curious manner in which it 
divided Turkmen territory:
562
  
Man’s nature and way of life are completely identical on the right and left banks of the 
Atrek. And both here and there…. live the same Yomut Turkmens, who, as mentioned, 
migrate now on one side of the river and now on the other, depending on the time of 
year…Thus, the Atrek does not constitute an ethnographic boundary. As a habitat 
boundary, the Atrek differs little from the Kara-Suu, and still less from the Gurgen, and 
in any case it has not the integrity of the Danube or anything of that sort because it is 
everywhere easy to ford, except, of course, in periods of flooding. Moreover, Persia never 
had any sort of rights to the strip of land between the Atrek and the Kara-Suu, because 
she never genuinely possessed it. In all that expanse, one could see Persians only in the 
form of slaves among the Turkmen population. There were almost no tents whose owners 
did not have at least one Persian, held in shackles.  
                                                 
560
 Saray, “Russo-Turkmen Relations up to 1874,” 26 
561
 Saray, “Russo-Turkmen Relations up to 1874,”, 27 
562
 Markozov, Krasnovodskii otriad, 24 
261 
 
 
 The commander’s chief concern, however, was not to preserve the territorial integrity of 
the Turkmens, but to patrol and subjugate them more easily.
563
 He notes that his men had often 
engaged in shootouts with Turkmens who lived for part of the year on one side of the border and 
part of the year—beyond Russian jurisdiction—on the other. The inconvenience of policing such 
a population, he implies, likewise had negative consequences for the Iranians themselves, whose 
citizens the Russian troops sometimes had the occasion to liberate. “Consequently,” he writes, 
“when the Krasnovodsk detachment approached the Turkmen predators’ nest [priblizilsia k 
gnezdu turkmenskikh khishchnikov] and began to subdue their thieving impulses and to cross the 
Atrek, [the soldiers] many times liberated Persians who had been languishing in pits on iron 
chains, and sent them off to Astarabad through the medium of our Astarabad consulate or the 
Ashur Ada sea station, which itself owes its existence to the need to protect Persia from seaward 
incursions by the Turkmen, for which ends it was taken over by Russia in the Turkmenchay 
treaty.”564 Markozov’s suggestion that the sea station was created mostly to protect Iranian 
citizens is dishonest, even preposterous, but his evidently sincere exasperation with the 
challenges posed by the Atrek border is revealing.  
 The irony of the fact that Russian and Qajar missions of “pacification” were themselves 
significant motivators of Turkmen violence and resistance—and thus of ongoing captive-
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taking—was surely lost on Markozov. An awareness of this cause-and-effect is absent among 
our Russian eyewitnesses in general, for whom Turkmen raids seem to have been nothing more 
than the reflexive and age-old “custom” of a barbarous people. In any case, Markozov was not 
alone in complaining that the militant subjugation of the Turkmens along the Russo-Iranian 
frontier had become, by the late 1860s, a disproportionately Russian endeavor. And he was 
surely correct in observing that this endeavor was complicated by the placement of the border 
itself. Regarding the Turkmens living south of the Atrek, Grodekov wondered with good reason 
whether they could really be considered Qajar subjects: “‘How are we Persian subjects,’ the 
Turkmens say, “‘when we carry their people into captivity, and they ours?’”565  
The Turkmens along the Atrek meanwhile found ingenious ways to take advantage of the 
curious division of their territory. Their continued raids on their “fellow” Qajar subjects, 
combined with the Qajars’ inability to effectively police the territory between Astarabad and the 
Atrek, apparently induced a kind of agreement whereby the Qajars would cease their punitive 
assaults entirely if the Turkmens would restrict their raiding forays to the lands north of the river. 
The appeal of this alleged agreement would have rested, for the Turkmens, on the presumption 
that the Russians would not cross the river into Iranian territory to avenge or take back their own 
subjects. Indeed, protocols were in place that would make such forays inconvenient: the Russian 
embassy in Tehran and the consulate in Astarabad had to be informed of any Russian missions 
south of the Atrek, and the Qajars themselves would likely object to them.
566
 Thus an appealing 
tactic arose for the resistant Turkmens of the borderland: they could use Iran as a safe harbor 
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while continuing to undermine the paralyzed Russian troops to the north or, in the event that the 
Russians actually ventured south of the Atrek, they could potentially benefit from the resulting 
tensions as their two adversaries, the Qajars and Russians, squabbled over border violations and 
the details of who should risk their troops fighting the Turkmens. This tactic, described by both 
Grodekov and Markozov, could also involve an additional, incidental benefit for the Qajars: the 
inevitable injuries that the Russians might inflict upon the Turkmens who attacked them.   
In July of 1871, Markozov read a letter from the chief of the Ashur Ada marine station 
giving notice of a joint attack on Russian troops by Tekes, “Khivans,” and Atabays (a branch of 
the Yomuts). These Atabays were reportedly supported by the Qajar governor of Astarabad, who 
hoped to distract them from conducting raids in the Iranian provinces and, incidentally, to ensure 
“that they would suffer greatly by making an attack on [Russian] troops.”567 For their part, the 
Turkmens, from Grodekov’s perspective, seemed to be attempting to incite Markozov’s forces 
into crossing the Atrek, as Turkmen raiding parties repeatedly stole regimental camels and 
occasionally captured soldiers sent out into the desert to gather fuel. Meanwhile, some Turkmen 
elders complained to Markozov that people in their community were continually finding their 
camels stolen and mutilated—they suspected this was meant as punishment by other Turkmens 
who were understandably upset by their devotion to the Russians. The Russian consulate at 
Astarabad urged the town’s Qajar governor to send border guards to the Atrek shores, but, 
unsurprisingly, the governor declined: any loss suffered by Russians and their allies was a 
Russian—not Qajar—problem, and if the Russians wished to “pacify” Turkmens along the 
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Atrek, it would henceforth be their own initiative. The Russians, led by Markozov, campaigned 
southward to the Atrek in February, 1872, killing several Turkmens.
568
  
Notwithstanding incidents like the above, the majority of Yomuts appear to have resolved 
upon non-violent relations with the fervently militant Russians well before the fall of Khiva. 
Between 1869 and 1873, hostilities on the part of the Yomuts were relatively rare, and for the 
most part limited to Atabay camel-stealing near the Atrek. After the failure of Khwarazmian 
Yomut resistance during the Khivan campaign, many Yomuts had chosen to subject themselves 
to the Tsar, and the wave of submissions only increased after Khwarazm’s conquest. As 
Markozov, on Kaufman’s orders, surveyed Yomut territories in the western part of the Khanate 
in the summer of 1873, he and his men were met with no hostility whatsoever; on the contrary, 
the Turkmens “not only professed their entire submission but showed it in deeds.”569  
Though peace prevailed, it was not peace that Kaufman was looking for, but a pretext for 
further campaigns of conquest. This is the most likely explanation for his “punitive” massacre of 
the non-combative Yomuts of Khwarazm in July of 1873, which doubtless had the effect of 
teaching Turkmens in the Khanate and beyond that making peace with the Russians was a futile 
exercise. The hostilities were not long in coming: later that same month, a group of Yomuts 
attacked a Russian camp, only to be driven back. At least 500—and perhaps as many as 1,300—
Turkmens died in battle.
570
  Further Russian raids came in the winter, when Kaufman had 
Lieutenant Colonel N.A. Ivanov lead a harsh attack on two Yomut clans implicated in the 
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slaughter of the freedmen.
571
 The remaining years of the 1870s would be marked by troubled 
attempts to affect the staged annexation of the Turkmen country. In 1877, Kizil Arvat fell to 
General Lomakin, though he was soon compelled to retreat.
572
 In that same year Chikishlar on 
the Caspian coast was established as a base for further campaigns against the Turkmens, but soon 
became a beacon for their raids.
573
 Further Russian campaigns also ended in failure, and the 
Tekes, undeterred and evidently unintimidated, showed their resistance with a successful raid on 
Krasnovodsk in April of 1879 and further attacks on both Chikishlar and Krasnovodsk after that. 
That same year, an ambitious charge by a large Russian army on the Teke stronghold of Geok 
Teppe was repulsed.  
Russia’s humiliating inability to put down the hostilities that the Tsar’s generals had 
chosen to instigate led to the installation of a new general to lead the charge against the 
Turkmens. M.D. Skobelev, a veteran of the Khiva and Kokand campaigns as well as the Yomut 
massacre, was installed and instructed by the Tsar to make an example of the Turkmens; the Tsar 
demanded “no retreat from the plan once adopted, no dangerous backward step that might be 
taken as evidence of our weakness in the eyes of Europe and Asia, that might encourage our 
foe.”574 Skobelev eagerly adopted the language of punishment and vengeance when rallying his 
men, but his initial efforts against the Tekes in 1880 ended in failure. He nevertheless invited the 
Tekes to submit, making preposterous demands by way of peace-terms. These demands included 
the payment of a 1,000,000 ruble war indemnity, the full Russian occupation of major Teke 
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towns and villages, the surrender of many Teke elders and chieftains as Russian captives, and the 
release all remaining Russian captives.
575
  
The Turkmens, unsurprisingly, declined these terms of surrender, and in January of 1881 
Skobelev led a siege of Geok Teppe that would be remembered as a massacre of astonishing 
brutality. The number of victims has been estimated at up to 20,000 Akhal Teke Turkmens.
576
  
Ashgabat was occupied by the Russians two months later, following which the Tekes were 
offered—and generally accepted—Russia’s “protection” within the newly-created Trans-Caspian 
district. The Russians then pressed onwards toward Merv. When the city was surrendered 
without a battle in 1884, it marked the final stage in the Russian conquest of Turkmen territories. 
The legendary independence of the Turkemens—cherished among the tribes themselves and 
elegized by foreign observers—became a thing of the past.  
 
Conclusion 
To what extent was the eradication of slavery a factor in Russia’s conquest of Central Asia? 
Were the Tsar’s troops really the vanguard of abolitionism that many observers assumed? A 
closer look at the evidence suggests that they were not. Time and again, it was the liberation of 
Russian slaves, and not the extermination of slavery in general, that served as a rhetorical 
rallying point in the war effort. In the Tsar’s written address to the Russian people, published on 
the eve of the Khivan campaign and offering a list of justifications for it, slavery is, as noted 
above, mentioned no less than four times—but no mention is made of the Iranian slaves, of 
which there were no fewer than 30,000. It was, rather, the Russian slaves alone that were 
targeted for liberation. The disastrous Perovskii campaign of 1839 had likewise been, among 
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other things, a mission to liberate Russian slaves, and it was exclusively Russian slaves that the 
khan turned over as a concession at that time. Once again, on the eve of the Khivan conquest, a 
different Khan tried the same old tactic, releasing Russian slaves in hopes of pacifying the Tsar. 
The release of these 21 slaves as a concession when the total slave population of the realm 
numbered anywhere from 30-60,000 would seem nearly comical, and could perhaps have been 
taken as a sarcastic taunt, had the liberation of all slaves actually been one of the Empire’s 
demands. But, after all, there had never been any demand that the khan liberate non-Russian 
slaves in the icy diplomatic exchanges leading up to the conquest.      
MacGahan’s claim, moreover, that “the emancipation of the slaves has always followed 
the occupation of any place in Central Asia by the Russians”577 was simply untrue. The Russian 
conquest of Bukhara in the late 1860s had resulted in a number of concessions rendered in 
ambitious treaties, but an order of general emancipation was not among them. Kaufman 
reportedly voiced his displeasure to the Bukharan ruler over the continuance of the trade, and 
claimed, in 1870, to be convinced that it had ceased; but it had not. Schuyler alleges that, two 
years later, a Russian official from the ministry of finance offered Kaufman an impassioned 
report calling his attention to the flourishing of the slave trade, but that “no notice was taken” of 
the information provided.
578
  If in fact this report produced any effect at all, it must have been a 
delayed effect: it was only in the autumn of 1873—some five years after Bukhara’s conquest—
that, by Russian demand, the universal emancipation of slavery became a law in the territory. But 
the enforcement of that law involved the bizarre concession that the Bukharan emir could take an 
entire decade to enact that emancipation, during which time all slaves would stay with their 
present masters. Attempts to escape to freedom were punishable by death. In 1874, Kaufman 
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alerted the emir to evidence of an ongoing slave trade, but the ruler denied that any such trade 
existed. It did indeed, however, and one Russian agent even witnessed a slave market operating 
in Bukhara as late as 1878. Nevertheless, Kaufman declined to press the issue, and in 1876 he 
instructed an official in Zarafshan okrug “in the majority of cases to decline interference in the 
slaves’ affairs.”579 These may seem like strange instructions coming from the “emancipator” of 
Khiva, but they make perfect sense once we abandon false notions of Russian abolitionism and 
realize, as Seymour Becker observes, that “slavery was, after all, an internal affair of no vital 
practical interest to Russia.”580 
By the time Merv fell to the Russians, moreover, captive-taking and slave-dealing had 
already been on the decline in the region for decades, for reasons that usually had little to do with 
Russian influence. In fact, Russian presence sometimes increased the incidence of captive-
taking. The ongoing raids perpetrated by Tekes and Yomuts in the 1860s and 70s were a direct 
result of the violence inflicted upon them by the Tsar’s armies and the staged annexation of their 
territories. The Russian imperial narrative of these events, employed by officers like Markozov 
and Skobelev, reversed the relationship between cause and effect, creating a cyclical rationale of 
conquest: Russian officers deliberately provoked and inflamed Turkmen hostilities, and then 
observed that further punishment was necessary to “pacify” these tribes.581   
Kaufman’s agreement with the Khivan khan to liberate the Iranian slaves was notable not 
because it was the final strike against Iranian slavery in Central Asia, but because it was the first. 
We must wonder why the slaves of Khwarazm were liberated by decree within weeks of the 
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city’s conquest, while the slaves of Bukhara waited nearly half a decade for an “emancipation” 
decree stipulating that they would be freed only after another ten years of bondage. The slave 
uprising of Khwarazm provides the answer. By casting off their chains and rising up against their 
masters, the slaves revealed the fundamental weakness of the slave-owning elites. While the 
slaves hailed the arrival of Russian troops and the new governance that they would bring, they 
simultaneously proved their own ability to make the region ungovernable. They forced the 
Russians to take sides: with newspapers around the world reporting on the events, the Tsar’s men 
could side with the slave-owning classes, attempt to crush the uprising, and see that the slaves 
were shackled and chained once more, or they could take their chances by liberating the slaves.  
It was not a foregone conclusion that the Russians would side with the slaves. On the 
contrary, the public hanging of two slaves for their participation in the uprising was, as we have 
seen, perhaps the first act of Russian governance in Khwarazm. The two bodies, left to rot in the 
heat of the summer sun, were displayed for all to see, offering a grim “official” comment on the 
uprising and certainly creating confusion among those slaves who had anticipated having 
Kaufman as their ally. If the uprising had ended with the execution of these two slaves, 
alleviating for Kaufman the challenges of governing a realm in chaos, perhaps—as in Bukhara—
the emancipation decree would not have been issued for months or even years to come. But the 
uprising began again with a fresh intensity, the slaves proving that not even the threat of death 
could stop them. They had already defied their masters; if the Russians wished only to become 
their new masters, then the slaves would defy them too.  
 Kaufman, then, was left with no choice but to facilitate the movement of liberation that 
was already in progress. He had no other reasonable option: if he had turned his troops on the 
rioting slaves, the Russians could have found themselves facing 30-60,000 new enemies, a great 
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many of whom had already demonstrated their boldness, their determination, and their anger. 
The Khwarazmian military, itself consisting largely of Iranian slaves, had just been routed and 
could hardly be relied upon to put down the uprising for the convenience of their new occupiers 
(or, for that matter, on behalf of their fallen Khan). The slaves, inspired by the anticipation of 
Russian solidarity, acted together to make it a foregone conclusion, even if their confidence in its 
inevitability had been unwarranted.  
The decision to abolish (however gradually) slavery in Bukhara, a step which was 
undertaken just a few months later, must also be credited in large part to the slaves of 
Khwarazm. By forcing Kaufman’s hand in abolishing slavery in their territory, these slaves made 
it inevitable that the same privilege should be extended to the slaves of the neighboring domain. 
Continuing to countenance Bukharan slavery would have been supremely awkward for Russian 
administrators who were about to reduce Bukhara to “protectorate” status. Having gained a 
reputation as emancipators, Russian officials had to consolidate their position in Central Asia 
with the eyes of the world upon them. Still more urgently, the possibility of a slave uprising in 
Bukhara, patterned on events next-door, could not have escaped their attention.     
The Russian press was all too happy to give Kaufman full credit for the emancipation, 
however, and he has been credited for it ever since. On the 25
th
 anniversary of the conquest, the 
popular Russian journal Niva offered a typical rhapsody: “The immediate consequences of the 
campaign were: the liberation of 40,000 captives and slaves, the complete pacification [polnoe 
umirotvorenie] of the country, the cessation of license, looting, and brigandage in the Khivan 
oasis and neighboring territory... This achievement is inscribed in golden letters in the annals of 
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Russian history, and the memory of it will be cherished by the Russian people forever.”582 The 
“golden letters” would read “Kaufman,” though the General may very well have been more 
surprised than pleased to find himself the emancipator of 30-60,000 Muslims. This had never 
been his intention until his hand was forced.    
Ultimately, then, visions of the conquest of Khwarazm as a Russian abolitionist 
enterprise are a fiction. There is no evidence that the liberation of tens of thousands of Iranian 
slaves played a significant role—or any role whatsoever—in inspiring the campaign, nor any 
good evidence that Kaufman had planned their liberation at any time before the slave uprising 
began. In the five previous years following the conquest of Bukhara, the Russians left no legal 
infrastructure or treaties in place to guarantee the manumission of even a single Bukharan slave, 
let alone the complete abolition of slavery, and there is little reason to believe that anything more 
ambitious was planned for the slaves of Khwarazm. On the contrary, it was the slaves who 
created the conditions for their own liberation. Their courageous uprising rendered it more 
convenient for the Russians to facilitate their freedom than to force them back into bondage. For 
Kaufman, the erstwhile executioner of rebelling slaves, emancipation became the only rational 
option. Despite his role in drafting the emancipation decree, then, it cannot be said that he freed 
the slaves; they had not waited for a Russian invitation to cast off their chains. The slaves of 
Khwarazm had freed themselves.   
*   *   * 
In 1877, four years after the conquest of Khiva, a petition arrived before Muḥammad Raḥīm 
Khan, who was by this time reduced to the Tsar’s puppet ruler, bearing a complaint from a 
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 “Dvadtsatipiatiletie pokoreniia Khivy,” Niva 24 (1898), 477-78 
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maker of fur coats. The author of the petition was named Nūr Muḥammad Makhdūm, and his 
complaint was that he and his fellow furriers at a Khiva bazaar were being taxed at a rate they 
could no longer afford. Times had changed. “Business at our bazaar is stagnant,” the furrier 
writes. “In times past, everyone had 5 or 10 slaves. The slaves received coats. Now the slaves are 
free and they have gone off, and no one will take the coats.”583 Slavery, at least in Khiva, 
appeared to be a thing of the past.
584
   
Or did the slave system simply take other forms, while becoming less visible to foreign 
observers? Large agricultural estates still needed hands to work them, and the will to secure 
cheap labor no doubt still existed among the owners of large estates. While the flow of captives 
into the khanates had been interrupted, more localized systems of corvée labor—such as debt-
based servitude, indentured servitude as a means of private dispute resolution, and indenturing 
oneself as a last resort in circumstances of extreme poverty—would presumably have continued 
unabated. After all, there was nothing in the Khwarazmian or Bukharan abolition declarations 
that would militate against these forms of bondage. Travelers and observers in the region in the 
final decades of the pre-Soviet era, convinced of the success of Russian-sponsored abolition, 
would likely have overlooked more subtle signs of unfree servitude. Unfortunately, available 
sources do not provide much basis for speculation on what became of Khwarazm’s labor markets 
in the years after 1873.  
It is clear from our sources, at least, that the centuries-long crisis of Iranian captives 
being channeled into Khwarazm had finally come to an end. But what became of the tens of 
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bolup ketip turur fustunni hichkim almay turur.” MS IVAN Uz No. 12581, f. 11 
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 According to some, slavery would persist in Bukhara even into the Soviet period: cf. M.A. Abduraimov, Ocherki 
agrarnykh otnoshenii v bukharskom khanstve v XVI- pervoi polovine XIX veka, t. 2. Tashkent: Fan, 1970, 236 
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thousands of former slaves who chose to remain in the khanate? This demographic must have 
constituted a very large proportion of the total number of freedmen. While reports of parties 
massacred on their way to Iran are legion, reports and eyewitness accounts of freedmen returning 
home safely are scarce, scattered, and lacking in detail. The most notable instances of 
repatriation were those accomplished via Russian steamships which departed for Iran from 
Krasnovodsk, but as far as I can tell, the fortunate former slaves boarding these ships numbered 
no more than a few thousand at most. Others likely made their way to Russia eventually, as had 
some Iranian former-slaves of previous generations, though there is scant information on such 
migrations. A lack of sources undermines efforts to reconstruct the freed slaves’ fates; the tide of 
foreign observers that arrived with the Russian regiments dissipated long before the trajectory of 
all the freed slaves could be observed. Thus Schuyler writes, “[t]here were estimated to be 
30,000 slaves in the Khanate, but it is supposed that not more than 5,000 of these were actually 
freed before the departure of the Russians.”585 By the phrase “actually freed,” Schuyler is hinting 
at a distinction between decree and effect which was likewise pursued by MacGahan, who wrote 
that “Those who remained in Khiva, though emancipated, are not, I fancy, much better off than 
before. Some Russian officers seemed to think that three-fourths of the Persians would remain 
slaves still, and were of the opinion that General Kaufmann did not act vigorously enough in this 
matter. However that be, there can be little doubt that the theoretical abolition of slavery will 
ultimately result in its practical abolition.”586 These observations are, of course, little more than 
guesswork.  
 Fortunately, Central Asian sources offer some hints as to the fate of the freedmen who 
remained in Khwarazm. The evidence they provide suggests a diverse spectrum of outcomes, 
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ranging from degrees of eventual assimilation into Khwarazmian society to the establishment of 
communities that were quite separate and distinctive. Many former slaves settled in the capital, 
where they and their descendents could be found living in their own neighborhood (mahalla) 
well into the Soviet period. Two distinctive mosques catered to this demographic in Khiva.
587
 
Others chose to settle in Tāshḥawż and other small towns and qishlaqs where they had gathered 
soon after the declaration of abolition. According to the Azādnāma, by the early Soviet period 
these communities had come to resemble the Uzbek communities of Khwarazm both in their 
language (with Uzbek predominating over Persian, which had allegedly been forgotten) and in 
their customs (urf-adatlar).
588
 
 Today in Uzbekistan, members of an eroniy (“Iranian”) diaspora community can be 
found throughout the country. Many attend a distinctive Shīʿite mosque in Samarqand’s Panjob 
neighborhood. Many others live in Tashkent, and overall the population of eroniy citizens in the 
country numbers in the thousands. Some are descended from Iranian merchants, and others from 
migrant laborers. Many, however, can trace their histories down a darker path. As we have seen, 
their enslaved forebears were ubiquitous in Central Asia for a matter of centuries. In certain 
regions, such as Khwarazm, slaves occupied such a diverse range of jobs and roles, and in such 
large numbers, that they can be considered a foundational element of society. The impact of 
slavery on Central Asian history has gone largely unrecognized, but it can hardly be 
overestimated. 
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